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Preface 
PERIODICALLY, the thoughtful scientist will take 
pause from his research activity to reflect upon the kind of 
description the facts he is uncovering are constraining him 
to make of the universe in which he lives-indeed, even 
of himself. He asks himself about the quality of the knowl­
edge he is acquiring. He asks himself about the certainty 
of that knowledge. Some scientists answer the question 
about certainty simply and devastatingly. They deny that 
there is anything certain about knowledge. Their skep­
ticism renders any attempt to draw conclusions from the 
raw data of experiment an operation that merely increases 
uncertainty. There is a school of thought which likes to 
vent its disdain for all it considers inferior knowledge upon 
that much-abused and misunderstood word, mysticism. 
As the physicist ponders over the insight his findings are 
giving him into "objective reality" he finds himself look­
ing into his own mind, and the material instrument 
through which mind works, the brain. How well does this 
mind get into contact with things outside itself? Indeed, 
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does it make such contact at all, or does it merely fabricate 
"evidence"? The chronic doubter is inclined to embrace 
this fabrication theory. He keeps asking himself whether 
he is dreaming, or insane. In so doing, is he not supposing 
that there is something in him, ultra-real, not depending 
on his senses for its knowledge, which sits in judgment 
over all the avenues by which knowledge comes into his 
conscious, or subconscious, self? 
Scientists know that their research has made contribu­
tions to many areas of human endeavor. The fruits of re­
search have made it possible for man's body to travel 
faster than the sound of his voice. They have lengthened 
life. They have entered the field of language and are mak­
ing translation by machine a reality. They have come to 
the aid of the paleontologist to help him in the difficult 
task of dating his archeological findings. Can it be pos­
sible, then, that science may have an important contribu­
tion to make to our everyday deportment, the "ought" in 
our lives? Do the laws of nature have any bearing on the 
laws of behavior? 
A study of the nature of knowledge demands that we in­
quire whether there is knowledge, or whether there are 
knowledges-all valid, yet different. This could lead to the 
further question whether what is "assumed" in one knowl­
edge may not be an evidence in another. 
Simplicity, transsubjectivity, and intersubjectivity are 
among the criteria accepted by scientists for testing the 
validity of the knowledge of science. How sound are these? 
Do they assume something more fundamental, which is 
neither self-evident nor demonstrable? If demonstration is 
needed, this itself becomes a subject of our concern. We 
need to inquire whether deductive reasoning is excessively 
susceptible to the fallacy of the consequent. Inductive rea­
soning, fruitful though it is, appears incapable of yielding 
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conclusions that are any better than probable. Only 
unswerving consistency maintained throughout the per• 
formance of all possible experiments, quantitative and 
qualitative, on a particular phenomenon in nature could 
bring true certainty. Quantitatively, approach to infinity 
in number of experiments would usually seem to be re­
quired for absolute certitude. 
The advent of quantum mechanics has compounded the 
epistemological problems of the physicist. He is less certain 
than ever about the ultimate unit of material reality, since 
reality seems to manifest itself to him both as a particle 
and as a wave. Is one of these an illusion? Is the wave in 
quantum mechanics no more than a probability amplitude? 
Have we unwittingly assigned the same objective reality 
to a statistical table as we assign to the events that supplied 
the data for the table? Is nature quanta}? Is it dualistic? 
These are some of the questions and problems upon 
which the participants in this symposium have touched 
directly, or indirectly. They are fundamental. They are 
important. Physicists want to broaden their outlook. They 
want to evaluate their work in terms of a broad and valid 
insight into all of reality. This symposium was organized 
in the hope that some contribution would be made toward 
an all-embracing view of reality, which may some day serve 
as a frame of reference for evaluating the scientist's con­
cepts of the real. 
Professor Henry Margenau of Yale University suggested 
this symposium in March of 1958 and agreed to participate 
in it. The Council of the American Physical Society con­
sented to placing it on the program of its 1959 "Summer 
Meeting in the East" at Milwaukee. Professor Margenau's 
aid in organizing the symposium and in securing partici­
pants was invaluable. Gratitude is due to Professor Frank 
Collingwood of Marquette University, who aided in or-
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ganizing the subject matter, and who graciously agreed to 
being moved from his initially assigned role of discussant 
to that of one of the principal lecturers, thus to take the 
place of Professor Philipp Frank, who had been scheduled 
as a principal lecturer but found it impossible to attend 
the meeting. Valuable financial help was kindly contrib­
uted by The Milwaukee Journal and the Falk Corporation. 
Portions of Chapter 3 are used by permission of Yale 
University Press, publishers of Professor Henry Mar­
genau's Open Vistas: Philosophical Perspectives of Mod­
ern Science. 
Some of the papers presented at the meeting have been 
revised by their authors for publication. 
It is the hope of those who participated in this sym­
posium that it has made at least some contribution to the 
physicist's understanding of the nature of his knowledge, 
and that it has helped to narrow, even if only slightly, the 
gap of misunderstanding which exists between so many 
physicists and philosophers. 
Marquette University 
November 6, 1959 
L. W. FRIEDRICH, S.J. 
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I 
The Nature of Physical "Knowledge" 
P. W. BRIDGMAN 
IT IS desirable to begin by trying to make more 
precise the meaning of our terms and the scope of the 
proposed analysis. As first formulated, the title proposed 
for this symposium was The Nature of Physical Knowl­
edge. The physicist was not explicitly mentioned in this 
formulation. In its general usage I think the word physical 
implies something broader than physics or the physicist, 
and suggests all the so-called physical sciences, including 
physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, and practically 
all biology as practiced by the biologist today. Not in­
cluded in the implications are the social sciences and 
the humanities. The status of psychology is perhaps more 
doubtful, for it has aspects both physical and humanitarian. 
In what I have to say I shall be concerned, not narrowly 
with physics, but with what would by general understand­
ing be considered the physical aspects of any of the several 
sciences. 
The originally proposed title was subject to some dis­
cussion by correspondence with several of the participants 
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and at one time appeared in the form The Nature of the 
"Knowledge" of the Physicist, a form that I suggested and 
particularly approved. This wording, however, got lost 
somewhere in the shuffle, and the final formulation that 
appears on the program is the same as the original except 
that there the word knowledge appeared unadorned, 
whereas in the final version it appears in quotation marks. 
This change was made at my suggestion in order to avoid 
what seemed to me the implication in the original formula­
tion that there is such a thing as knowledge in general, 
and that the physical scientist is concerned with only a 
special kind of this general knowledge, of which there may 
be other kinds, such, perhaps, as the knowledge of the 
mystic. We here encounter distinctions which to a certain 
extent are only verbal, but in any event the operational 
background of the so-called knowledge of the physical 
scientist is so different from the operational background 
of the so-called knowledge of the mystic that it seemed to 
me that only confusion and misunderstanding could result 
from applying the same word, knowledge, to the activities 
of both scientist and mystic. I wanted to underline this 
situation by putting knowledge in quotation marks, to 
indicate that some clarification was necessary in the pro­
posed usage. In anything that I have to say it is to be 
understood that I am addressing myself to the situations 
presented by the physical sciences unless the context indi­
cates that other sorts of situations are contemplated. I 
should also like to stress that what I have to say in the 
following expresses only my personal attitude, and I have 
no doubt that many physicists as well as philosophers will 
disagree with much of it. It seems that physicists, when 
they talk on matters with a philosophical tinge, are no 
more likely to agree than the philosophers themselves. 
A preliminary word is also desirable with regard to what 
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I shall understand to be implied in the word nature in our 
title. I shall not try to find the nature of the knowledge 
of the physicist by asking what that knowledge is. In 
general, whenever we ask what anything is we are inviting 
confusion by throwing the doors open to all sorts of 
philosophical issues about which there has been notorious 
disagreement for the last three thousand years. It seems to 
me that we shall do well to limit the scope of the discussion 
as narrowly as we can, and apply the principle of Occam's 
razor to strip away the unessentials. In particular, I want 
to avoid the implication of the existence of knowledge in
the abstract, after the fashion of a Platonic idea, and reduce 
the whole matter to as concrete terms as possible. I propose 
merely to ask under what circumstances the word knowl­
edge is used in connection with the activities of the physical 
scientist. If I can find the answer I shall have all that I 
need or can use in answering the question of what is the 
"nature" of this knowledge. 
It is to be noticed in the first place that the word knowl­
edge is used very seldom by the physical scientist or the 
physicist himself in describing what he does or in describ­
ing his experience. Knowledge is a general word, most 
commonly used by the outsider in describing what he 
sees the physicist do, whereas the physicist himself is 
mostly concerned with more specific situations for which 
he has more special words. The directions in a labora­
tory manual for elementary mechanics would, for ex­
ample, never read, "Acquire a knowledge of the velocity 
of the falling body after it has fallen one meter," but 
would instead be, "Measure the velocity of the body 
after it has fallen one meter." Neither would the phys­
icist, in describing the result of his experiments with 
falling bodies, say that he had acquired a "knowledge" 
of the law of falling bodies; more probably he would say 
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simply that he had found the law. The physicist is, never­
theless, human, and he does on occasion use the language 
of daily life; and in discussing his experiences he may well 
say that he "knows" something or other. What does the 
physicist have in the back of his head when he thus permits 
himself to say that he "knows" this or that? There is, in 
the first place, I believe, always the implication of truth. 
If what the physicist "knows" is not true, then he does 
not know it. Now truth does not proclaim itself, but has 
to be established by some method; that is, it has to be 
"verified." One of the functions of verification is to guard 
against mistakes-illusions or faulty observation or faulty 
memory or unjustified inferences as to fact. There is no 
unique method of verification, but any operation may be 
pressed into service which has any bearing, direct or in­
direct, on assuring ourselves that the situation is as we 
think it is. For the physical scientist, one of the most 
effective methods of verification is repetition. If our 
observation repeats, we presume that our original obser­
vation was correct and that we may say that we are in 
possession of legitimate knowledge. But this method is 
applicable only in special contexts; that is, it is applicable 
only to the type of situation that can be made to repeat 
itself. Furthermore, there must be some way of being sure 
that the conditions necessary for the repetition of the 
situation have in fact been fulfilled. This latter usually 
involves some sort of theoretical understanding on our 
part. 
Another powerful and widely used method of verifying 
the correctness of our report of some situation is agreement 
between our report and that of other observers. Physical 
science concerns itself by preference with situations in 
which verification by public report is possible. In fact, 
verification by public report is so important in the physical 
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sciences that sometimes it is incorporated into the very 
definition, as when it is said that one of the conditions 
that a body of so-called knowledge be scientific knowledge 
is that it be publicly confirmable. This demand can 
generally be met in the factual situations of physics, but 
even here there are special situations in which public 
observation or confirmation is impossible "in principle." 
An example is afforded by situations in which the intensity 
of the radiation with which the observations are made is 
so low that we are dealing with individual photons. In 
some of the nonfactual situations of physics the attribute 
of publicity is even vaguer. However, in the "science" that 
gets written in textbooks any generalization that ranks 
as a "law" of physics has run the gauntlet of public accept­
ance. But such public acceptance is only the consensus 
of individual physicists, each of whom was individually 
convinced of the validity of the law by activities essentially 
private. In general, whenever one is concerned with a 
scientific "proof," one is concerned with something essen­
tially private. Even physics, therefore, cannot be com­
pletely reduced to a public basis. In psychology, complete 
reduction to a public basis is not possible even on the 
factual level, for the behavioral psychologist is driven to 
recognize the existence of phenomena "accessible only to 
a single individual," as, for example, my toothache. If I 
have a toothache I usually do not feel the necessity for 
any sort of verification that I actually have it, so that it 
might appear that here we have knowledge without the 
necessity for verification; on the other hand, I usually 
do not say, "I know that I have a toothache," but simply, 
"I have a toothache." In situations as immediate as this 
the whole concept of "knowledge" appears merely as a 
verbal artifact, which may be dispensed with. But I cannot 
say about you, "I know that you have a toothache," with-
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out attempting some sort of verification. And even in the 
apparently most immediate case of my own toothache it 
not infrequently happens that the dentist tells me that the 
tooth I think is aching is not the one that really aches. 
Verification in such cases has to be by some indirect 
method. 
Verification, whether more or less direct, is always of 
the logical form, "Such and such may possibly be the case 
because this and that is the case," but never of the logical 
form, "Such and such is certainly the case because this and 
that is the case." These situations are usually dealt with 
on a probability basis, and there always seems to be a 
factor of probability in any actual verification. For this 
reason no knowledge can be certain. For another reason 
no knowledge can be certain, for knowledge is an aspect 
of our activity and as such can never avoid the specter of 
self-doubt. There is no adequate answer to the questions, 
"How do I know that I am not now dreaming?" or "How 
do I know that I have not suddenly gone insane?" All 
intellectual functioning is subject to the fundamental and 
unprovable assumption that our intellectual integrity is 
preserved. 
For these various reasons it is not uncommon to hear it 
said, "All knowledge is really only probable knowledge." 
We may, if we like, speak of knowledge in this way; but 
if we do we have to be careful, for the implication is close 
to the surface that somewhere there is such a thing as 
certain knowledge but that for some adventitious reason 
we are not able to acquire it. There is no such thing-it 
is of the nature of knowledge to be uncertain. In spite 
of all this, it is not knowledge either unless there is some 
operation for checking or for verification. 
Assuming now that the physical scientist has accom­
plished his verification, making his operations as direct 
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.as the circumstances permit, so that he 1s m a position 
to say that he knows that some statement as to a factual 
.situation or as to a general law is a "correct" statement, 
what is the significance of his verification and of his knowl­
edge? Why did he go to the trouble of making his verifi­
cation? I think that he made the verification because he 
wants to use his knowledge, and that the significance of 
the verification is to be found in the range of circumstances 
in which the knowledge can be used. He seldom, I think, 
makes the verification because he has any interest in ac­
quiring knowledge isolated from any context. Now the 
range of circumstances opened for the application of 
knowledge by any particular sort of verification depends 
-0n the sort of verification it is and has to be determined 
in general by experience. The estimation by any individual 
.as to what is the range of permissible use of "knowledge" 
that was obtained by any specific method of verification 
will in general depend both on the past experience of the 
individual and on his individual temperament. A large 
part of the scientific experience of the human race has been 
devoted to acquiring more effective estimates of the range 
of valid application of the "knowledge" obtained by vari­
ous methods of "verification." The range of fruitful appli­
cation of the knowledge that the fever of one's son was 
caused by the evil eye of his neighbor, a knowledge 
verified by the statement of the witch doctor, is estimated 
to be greater by the savage Hottentot than by his more 
,experienced European contemporary. Verification by the 
witch doctor is not esteemed by the European as a signifi­
cant method of verification, but the European arrived at 
this conviction only on the basis of an extensive past 
experience. This is an extreme example, but there survive 
in our own society individual differences of opinion about 
the significance of various indirect methods of "verifying" 
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knowledge which have some resemblance to it. 
Our discussion of the range of application of the knowl­
edge corresponding to some specific method of verification 
suggests at once the specific subtopic for this paper, namely, 
"Can it (i.e., the knowledge of the physicist) be expected 
to lead to a full understanding of reality?" It would be 
easy to make this question the start of an interminable 
discussion of the nature of reality, with no possibility of 
agreement. I think, nevertheless, that there are some things 
that can profitably be said without attempting any com­
pletely general philosophical discussion. Perhaps even 
more than for the word knowledge most physicists have a 
temperamental aversion to the word reality. They avoid it 
whenever they possibly can. There are, nevertheless, cer­
tain things that the physicist does that have a connection 
of sorts with some aspects of what I imagine to be the 
philosophical concept of "reality." The physicist ascribes 
a special significance to situations in which he can make 
readings with instruments, and he might even reluctantly 
consent to saying that the readings of his instruments 
correspond to something "real." Those physicists who say 
that the electric field at a point in apparently empty space 
is "real" do so because if they go to the point in question 
with an instrument the instrument gives a reading. Besides 
concepts corresponding to something "real" in this instru­
mental sense, the physicist also recognizes concepts which 
he describes as conventions, but which might perhaps 
alternatively be said to be concepts corresponding to noth­
ing "real." For instance, there was a school of thought 
which maintained that the "force" of Newton's laws of 
motion was only a "convention" because there was only 
a single definition for it, namely mass times acceleration. 
Here the convention would disappear and "physical real­
ity" enter if some second alternative and independent 
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definition of force could be framed in terms of which it 
would be possible to subject the statement "force equals 
mass times acceleration" to an experimental check. In 
general, when there are two independent methods of 
getting to the terminus, the physicist thinks of the situation 
in ways recalling the way in which apparently the philos­
opher thinks of "reality." 
Granting, now, that the physicist has conceptual ma­
chinery recalling the philosopher's "reality," I think the 
question of our topic can at once be answered, for the 
physicist certainly does not expect that his knowledge will 
ever lead to a full understanding of this "reality." His 
reason, however, is special to him, and not at all what the 
philosopher presumptively implies by the question. I think 
the physicist emphatically would not say that his knowledge 
presumptively will not lead to a full understanding of 
reality, for the reason that there are other kinds of knowl­
edge than the knowledge in which he deals. His reason 
is based on his actual experience as a physicist and has 
almost no recognizable philosophical component. For it 
has been his universal experience that never has it been 
possible to set bounds to the knowledge that can be ob­
tained with instruments, but always the bounds of factual 
knowledge can be pushed back, both in the direction of 
the very small and in the direction of the very large, by 
instrumental advances. The physicist at present sees no 
indication that this process of continued expansion will 
ever stop, although he may believe that further progress 
may become increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the phys­
icist sees no present possibility, and anticipates no possi­
bility in the future, that it will be possible to penetrate 
into this new territory by any other methods than an 
extension of those he already uses. The method of the 
witch doctor is ruled out in his thinking. 
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The development of quantum theory has, I think� 
materially altered the physicist's conception of the nature 
of his "knowledge" and the sort of hold this knowledge 
enables him to gain on whatever may be meant by "real­
ity." For he has learned that the object of knowledge is 
not to be separated from the instrument of knowledge. 
We can no longer think of the object of knowledge as 
constituting a reality which is revealed to us by the instru­
ment of knowledge, but the two together, object and 
instrument, constitute a whole so intimately knit that it 
is meaningless to talk of object and instrument separately. 
This insight is deepened by developments on the outskirts 
of what is traditionally considered to be physics, develop­
ments such as the construction of complicated computing 
machines and the advances in our understanding of brain 
structure and function. It now appears that the instrument 
of knowledge par excellence is the brain, and that the 
nature of the brain determines and limits any possible 
"knowledge." Furthermore, I believe it to be the temper 
of the times to regard this as the whole story: given a 
complete description in atomic terms of the constitution 
of the brain (perhaps expanded to include the whole 
nervous system), nothing more is needed, but everything, 
including all the immediate data of introspection, will 
be found somewhere concealed in the functioning of this 
inconceivably complicated system. Some modification in 
this formulation will doubtless be necessary to include 
quantum phenomena, but it seems to be the present 
thought that any such modifications will not obscure the 
expectation that as complete a description as possible in 
physical terms will tell the whole story. This attitude is 
not capable of any rigorous justification, but it is not for 
that reason to be characterized in terms of "belief" or 
"faith." The attitude is rather to be described in terms of 
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a program for action. The physiologist or the psychologist 
regards as the most promising program for the immediate 
future one in which attention is given to determining 
everything implied in the detailed atomic structure of 
the brain. There is no present indication that this program 
is not capable of being carried out in principle. Neither is 
there any other sort of program that in the light of past 
experience offers any present prospect of success. 
Given now that the brain is the ultimate instrument of 
knowledge, a limitation at once appears on any possible 
sort of contact which such an instrument can make with 
any so-called reality. For it is perfectly obvious that it is 
impossible that there should be a unique one-to-one corre­
spondence between what happens in the brain and the 
aggregate of things that happen outside it. A sufficient 
reason is the numerical discrepancy between the number 
of things that can happen inside the brain and the number 
that can happen outside it. If "reality" is taken to include 
all the things that happen outside the brain, it is so obvious 
that the brain is incapable of even a full description of 
reality, to say nothing of understanding it, that I think 
a physical scientist would not think it worth his while 
even to bother to make the point. Instead, it becomes a 
pressing problem to understand how the brain is at all 
capable of dealing even moderately effectively with the 
complication outside it. Whatever its method, it would 
seem that the brain must be forced to ignore most of what 
is outside it and practice some method of selection. There 
can be no question of any similarity or resemblance be­
tween what the brain does and what provides the subject 
of its activity. In fact, the concept of "resemblance" or 
"similarity" is meaningless in this connection. The situ­
ation is admittedly highly unsatisfactory; it is even difficult 
to talk about it self-consistently. But in spite of this I 
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think that the physical scientist is convinced there is no 
other way. The brain provides the only conceivable instru­
ment of knowledge, and any plausible programs of action 
have to be drawn with this in view, and with the clear 
recognition that there are many unsolved problems here. 
2 
Is "Physical Knowledge" Limited by Its 
Quantitative Approach to Reality? 
FRANK J. COLLI NGWO OD 
MY INTENTION is to approach the subject under 
consideration, namely, physical knowledge, or, as I would 
prefer to express it, the knowledge obtained as a result of 
the investigations of the physical sciences, from what is 
usually called a historical point of view. But it is not that 
point of view in the pejorative sense of a mere recounting 
of events fairly well fixed in space and time. Rather, I wish 
to examine the reasoning involved in the distinction be­
tween the mathematical sciences, the mathematicophysical 
sciences, and the philosophic sciences aimed at understand­
ing whatever there is that is knowable about material being. 
To carry out that intention one should start with those 
who first set down the distinction, because one can then 
not only see their reasoning on the matter but also under­
stand the later developments in the light of that of which 
they were developments. 
Thus, where to begin in this most important and most 
complicated business of truth and certitude in our knowl­
edge of physical being is not really a matter of choice. One 
25 
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must begin at the beginning, the philosophic and scientific 
beginning when men first reflected in an intelligent manner 
upon what they were doing, and why. No one knows the 
absolutely first beginning of speculative thought, but we 
have discovered the period when the philosophers of our 
Western culture first set down what they thought and won 
the approval of their peers. Unless we start with them, the 
whole attempt to say something coherent, acceptable, and 
true runs the risk of being invalidated by a prior knowl­
edge, easily available to us, but of which we are ignorant. 
It has often happened that a truly fine analysis of a subject 
matter has fallen into desuetude because of a lack of 
intelligent appreciation only to be rediscovered centuries 
later as though it were being discovered for the first time. 
For example, Descartes, in stumbling upon the notion of 
a purely mathematical science of material being, did not 
realize that the same notion had been thoroughly discussed 
in ancient Athens and had been beautifully implemented 
by ingenious Greek scientists, who were not unaware of 
the limitations of such an approach to reality. There is 
no instance of any one of them claiming that the mathe­
maticophysical approach to reality is the only one. 
As far as we know, from the best records that we possess 
of the early history of Western civilization, the first kind 
of knowledge that was esteemed for its exactness and 
correctness was mathematical knowledge. The notion of 
demonstrating the truth of some statement by a reasoning 
process is seldom mentioned in the remnants of the civili­
zations preceding the seventh century B.C., which saw the 
advent of Greek philosophy and mathematics. The highest 
period of development of Egyptian civilization produced 
a rather poor mathematics, poor because it was not devel­
oped as a knowledge independent of things but only as 
a practical knowledge, and especially poor because the 
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notation was as cumbersome as that of the later Roman 
numerals. During the same early period of the history of 
Western culture, the Babylonian civilization of the Sume­
rian peoples developed the sexagesimal mathematics that 
we still use in our conventional measurement of time and 
in trigonometry. That civilization also produced profuse 
and valuable recordings of an astronomical nature. When 
Claudius Ptolemy produced his Syntaxis Mathematica, 
commonly called the Almagest, around A.D. 150, his efforts 
superseded all previous attempts to draw up reliable and 
complete astronomical tables because of the incorporation 
of this large group of Babylonian observations which were 
remarkably accurate for the time in which they were made. 
The Babylonians also had a rudimentary algebra which 
was quite innocent of any desire to prove the formulas 
which had been taken from a plane geometry and alge­
braicized. 
But no thoroughgoing explanation of the varieties of 
knowledge is to be found in the Egyptian and Babylonian 
civilizations from which the pre-Socratic philosophers, 
especially Pythagoras, inherited so much. However, there 
were these mathematical and astronomical treasures for 
the taking. Pythagoras helped himself to them and became, 
to use Aristotle's phrase, the founder of mathematical 
philosophy. His followers cultivated the mathematical 
heritage received from Babylonia, and in the heat of the 
speculative enthusiasm peculiar to the fourth through the 
second century B.C., they not only developed this heritage 
tremendously but spared no effort to render mathematics 
strictly scientific by giving proofs and by isolating the 
postulates and axioms. But the early Pythagoreans placed 
a peculiar stricture upon their approach to mathematics. 
It is true that above all they wanted to know the reason 
for the correctness that mathematics gave to their calcu-
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lations. But at the same time they held firmly to the notion 
that mathematics was a science of whole quantities. I 
interpret this to mean they thought that their mathematics 
was a science of the quantity of things. The axioms and 
postulates of Euclidean geometry lend force to this inter­
pretation.1 For this reason they would not permit them­
selves to talk of multiplying a length by a length because 
such a physical action is impossible, nor would they use 
numbers or symbols raised above the third power, because, 
to their observations, only three dimensions were evident 
in things and to use numbers raised to the fourth or fifth 
power was to be talking about no thing (nothing). 
The later Pythagoreans, Archimedes, for example, had 
no qualms about using algebra as an algebra, irrespective 
of whether the things being analyzed could in fact be 
multiplied by themselves or divided by another, or not. 
The reason they felt this way, I presume, is that they saw 
mathematics as a science of something other than material 
things, although it was most useful in the mechanical 
science of the time. Archimedes, in trying to estimate the 
area under a curve, by seeking to exhaust the area through 
dividing it into rectangles of known area, developed a 
notion of the infinitesimal and of how to calculate with 
it that predated by roughly twenty centuries the develop­
ment of the infinitesimal calculus by Leibnitz and Newton. 
He could hardly have reasoned so brilliantly unless he 
were quite sure that mathematics was primarily a knowl­
edge of quantity abstracted from all the limiting charac­
teristics of actual material quantities. He shows no 
awareness of the strictures placed upon the Babylonian 
mathematical heritage by the earliest Pythagoreans. 
Thus a distinct transition, in the estimation of what 
mathematics is, occurred between the time of Pythagoras 
and the time of Archimedes. That period of transition con-
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tains within it the lifetimes of Plato and Aristotle, which 
is quite sufficient to make it noteworthy; but it is also the 
period in which the discovery of the irrational, the square 
root of 2, for example, demanded some thought as to just 
what mathematics is and as to how it differs from other 
knowledge. Plato and Aristotle appear, in my opinion, 
to be located in the period when the transition was occur­
ring from considering mathematics as a science of things 
to considering mathematics as a science of abstractions 
only. This being so, Aristotle had the advantage of knowing 
both views and of making his choice between them. That 
choice and its relevance will be explained in a moment. 
First, let us consider Aristotle's illustrious teacher and his 
estimation both of mathematics and of the nature of reality. 
Plato held that the mathematical sciences, although they 
proceed with rigor and have some certainty on that ac­
count, nevertheless are based upon hypotheses, and for 
that reason lack apodictic certainty. The examples that 
Plato gives of these hypotheses include the odd and the 
even, the various figures, and angles. ·what he called 
hypotheses, then, are the postulates that the odd and the 
even exist, and that the figures and angles can be con­
structed. Proof in mathematics, for Plato, means that, 
given some statements, others may be logically deduced 
from them; for example (my own example), given that 
there are triangular figures, the property of the contained 
angles equaling two right angles can be deduced by the 
aid of a construction. 
There is no appearance of hesitation on Plato's part in 
making the mathematicals ideal entities: "And do you 
know also that although they [the mathematicians] make 
use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are 
thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they re­
semble, not of the figures which they draw, but oE the 
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absolute square and the absolute diameter." 2 Mathematics 
is not a science of existing material things, for Plato. 
Nevertheless, in recommending its study he gives two rea­
sons for its importance. One reason is that the study of 
mathematics draws our attention to the realm of the 
intelligible and fits the intellect for the journey into the 
realm of the pure intelligibles, the realm of absolute 
certitudes.3 The other reason is a practical one, namely, 
that mathematics, although it is not a science of sensible 
things, is nevertheless most useful in analyzing the universe 
about us. 
The practical usefulness of mathematics is lauded in 
many dialogues, the Philebus, the Epinomis, the Laws, the 
Republic, the Timaeus. In the Republic, mathematical 
knowledge is depicted as being a requisite for the soldier 
in the ordering of his troops, and as enabling the musician 
to successfully construct in numbers the harmonies that 
are basic to music.4 In fact, it is employed by all arts and 
sciences and forms of thought.5 Also in that dialogue, 
Plato chides the astronomers for star-gazing when they 
should be attending to the development of mathematical 
equations that would be capable of accurately formulating 
the path and motion of the planets.6 His point is that, 
in spite of the endless flux of appearances in sensible 
reality, sufficient stability can be brought into our manage­
ment of practical things, by the measuring and ordering 
that the use of number effects, to enable us to conduct our 
practical affairs successfully.7 Furthermore, in the celestial 
realm there is not the same degree of mutability that there 
is in the sublunary sphere.8 As a result the heavenly bodies 
appear to move in regular, orderly motions which will be 
susceptible of description by mathematical constructions 
and formulas.9 
This doctrine, that mathematics can order and bring 
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certainty into our everyday practical knowledge, and that 
it will eventually bring certainty to our knowledge of the 
motions of the heavenly bodies, strongly suggests that 
sensible reality is in some degree mathematically consti­
tuted. This second notion of,the utility of mathematics, 
which depicts mathematical forms as the models, and even 
as the constituents, of sensible being, is given in the 
Timaeus. There air and water are seen as binding together 
fire and earth in the same manner as the means in a 
numerical proportion bind the extremes to each other.10 
And when the Maker forms the visible universe he does 
so by constructing the four elementary bodies out of a 
chaotic matter by means of the forms of two kinds of 
triangle, the half-square and the half-isosceles.11 But that 
out of which this material world is constructed is the 
ultimate in disordered chaos and so is the least subjected 
to intelligence and order. Even though the elementary 
bodies are constructed of mathematical figures, they retain 
much of the mutability characteristic of the primordial 
source.12 How modern Plato's assessment of the mutability 
of matter is! Change the mathematics involved, and the 
whole account would be as timely as that of any contempo­
rary book on the philosophy of science. 
Naturally, knowledge in tenns of the elementary bodies 
and of composites formed from them will be no more 
than mere opinion. That is to say, for Plato, knowledge 
in terms of the affections that sensible becoming (there is 
no being, and therefore no intelligibility, in the sensible 
realm precisely as sensible) gives rise to in our senses is 
impossible. Opinion alone is possible concerning this 
realm. Any proof or demonstration apart from the mathe­
matical is out of the question here. There can be no know­
ing of the substantial nature or of the properties of a 
material thing. It is futile in Plato's philosophy to talk 
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of any scientific knowledge through the causes of material 
being. Consequently, the royal road to truth is not through 
the investigation of sensory phenomena; that way leads 
to doubt about even those things of which he at first 
seemed so certain.13 The royal road to truth for Plato is 
in thought and through thought to the Good in itself. In 
this ascent to the Good, it is mathematics in its pure fonn, 
that is, considered apart from sensible things, that first 
satisfies the intellect's avid desire for the intelligible and 
thus serves as a steppingstone to the realm of pure in­
telligibility, which is attained not by any deductive process 
but by an act of vision on the part of the intellect. Once 
this vision is attained, once the essential nature of reality 
is discovered, then the material universe will be under­
stood as it is derived from the spiritual universe.14 This 
goal, set out for attainment partly by speculation of a 
mathematical kind and partly by pure intuition, did not 
prove to be as appealing to posterity as it was to Plato. 
I would not wish to overstate Plato's position on the use 
of mathematics. Nowadays, when the utility of mathematics 
as a practical science is beyond question, there is a temp­
tation to look back to Plato and to see in him the person 
who successfully championed the use of mathematics in 
the elaboration of physical science. This is not exactly the 
truth. What he praised was the study of mathematics as an 
intellectual exercise and as a study which aided in obtain­
ing the vision of the Good. Thus he championed each of 
the four branches of mathematics, numbers, geometry 
(plane), stereometry (solid geometry), and astronomy, in 
the same manner; that is, while allowing that they were 
indispensable in practical affairs, nevertheless he actually 
praised them only inasmuch as they were helpful in obtain­
ing knowledge of the Good. 
One might more correctly credit Aristotle as being the 
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man who championed the use of mathematics in the 
elaboration of the sciences of things. He too considered 
astronomy and harmonics, as well as the other sciences 
universally recognized as mathematical, as being branches 
of mathematics. But he also added optics and mechanics 
to the list of the more physical branches of mathematics. 
In these four areas of investigation the knowledge of the 
proven fact is given by the mathematical astronomer or 
optician or musician or physicist. By the use of mathe­
matics such men give proof. In these subjects, "It is the 
business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of 
the mathematicians to know the proven fact; for the latter 
are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, 
and are often ignorant of the fact." 15 Aristotle probably 
means, by the latter part of his statement, that they are 
not aware of all the possibilities of using their mathematics 
in the analysis of things. Thus, because natural bodies 
contain points, lines, planes, and volumes, they manifest 
quantitative aspects and so admit of treatment by mathe­
matical theorems. Geometry knows only the abstract form 
of the straight line, and this form has no existence in 
itself. The straight is found in stones and wood and in all 
bodily things, even in air; it cannot be isolated physically, 
but only mentally. 'Whereas the geometer considers the 
straight apart from things, the student of optics considers 
straight lines in the air.16 Thus are the applied parts of 
mathematics distinguished from the speculative parts. 
As for speculative mathematics, the pursuit of the study 
of the mathematicals in themselves, Aristotle explains 
what Plato had left undiscussed. Plato had maintained that 
the mathematician uses the visible forms in order to think 
about the mathematicals. But his explanation of the origin 
of the mathematicals is unsatisfactory. Aristotle holds that 
the mathematician investigates abstractions. "For before 
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beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible 
qualities, e.g., weight and lightness, hardness and its 
contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible 
contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and con­
tinuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in 
three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantita­
tive and continuous, and does not consider them in any 
other respect, and examines the relative positions of some 
and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities 
and incommensurabilities of others, and the ratios of 
others." 11 
The abstractions are representations of the quantified 
aspects of material things. In order that the purely quanti­
tative aspects of such things may be grasped more clearly, 
their other features are left out of consideration. Thus, by 
abstraction, the features not relevant to quantity considered 
in itself are left aside, and the remaining content of 
cognition is then analyzed. Aristotle made no claim to 
being a mathematician, and he made no contribution to 
the development of Greek mathematics. Therefore in his 
explanation of mathematical abstraction we are not sur­
prised to find only the most elementary notions used as 
examples. The basic notion of quantity is that of the 
continuum, the extended-in-three-dimensions. By sub­
traction (in thought only), a continuum in two dimensions, 
and a continuum in one dimension only, are isolated. 
The Greeks defined solids, plane surfaces, and lines in this 
manner. The possible arrangements of these would in­
clude all the figures of plane geometry. The commensura­
bilities would yield whole numbers and proportions. Thus, 
a smaller length taken three times would measure a greater 
length. The two lengths are said to be commensurable 
because they have a common measure. 
Although these notions are very elementary they serve 
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to indicate the nature of mathematical abstraction. Over 
and above being the intellectual process that gives stability 
in thought to the notion of continuum, abstraction is a 
process of subtracting various quantitative aspects of that 
conceived continuum. Consider for the moment only three 
of those subtractions. Think of them quite apart from the 
abstractive process necessary to attain to any object of sci­
entific analysis. The first subtraction takes away all colors, 
sounds, odors, etc. It leaves an utterly blank continuum 
having only two characteristics, size and shape. The second 
subtraction deletes the various aspects of size and shape. 
In one case depth is omitted, in another width, in a third 
length, leaving an absolutely featureless continuum, which 
could not be imagined, but which could be thought of as 
empty space. It would have to be defined as a mere possi­
bility of extension. 
The third subtraction leaves aside the characteristics of 
quantity as it is found existing in actual quantified things. 
It substitutes symbols that are appropriate for reasoning 
about quanta that have a very indeterminate character. 
These quanta are as near to pure potency as the mind can 
conceive. With these symbols unknown quantities can be 
reasoned about. For example, a ratio can represent the 
comparison of a length to a length: one side of a table is 
to another as 4 is to 3; or it can represent a comparison of 
areas; or it can represent simply a ratio of numbers; or it 
can represent a ratio of unknowns, a/b as b/c. Although 
Aristotle did not carry his analysis beyond arithmetic to 
the consideration of a purely symbolic science, he never­
theless saw why mathematics was useful in ordering and 
measuring and calculating about things. It is because the 
abstractions are far more wieldy in thought than the 
quanta are in actuality. Corresponding to the orders and 
relations of quantities that exist in mathematical systems 
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is the possibility of approximately the same orders and re­
lations existing among actual quantities. It is not the pre­
cision and exactness of mathematics that are chiefly 
responsible for the practical usefulness of some of its parts. 
Actual quantity is an attribute of matter, and it shares the 
vaiaries and mutability of all material things. Therefore, 
it cannot be measured and analyzed with the absolute pre­
cision that is characteristic of mathematical analysis. There 
is no such thing as an exact measurement of actual quan­
tities; measurements are only as exact as our measuring 
devices make them. A mathematical yard contains exactly 
36 mathematical inches, but no such accuracy can be found 
in measuring the lengths of a yard and its inches in actual 
quantity. 18 
So long as a mathematics treats of that which has some 
basis in things, no matter how slight that basis may be, the 
actual order in the mathematics may be sufficient to bring 
to light the hidden order in the realm of quantity in sen­
sible things. This is the factor in practical mathematics 
that makes it successful. The agent in act in such cases is 
the human intellect perfected by mathematical knowledge 
and possessed of the incommunicable knack of seeing where 
the possibility of application lies.19 
But, going beyond Aristotle's elementary teaching on 
abstraction, why is it that mathematics is based upon hy­
potheses? If one starts his investigation with sensibles, he 
accepts them as given and then proceeds. He knows why 
he starts there; it is because he has something given whose 
being present he does not need to question. He does not 
say, if there are sensibles then I define them as such and 
such. The sensibles are, and their definitions are contained 
in their very being. The problem of the investigator is to 
analyze such being into its definitions which are either 
speculative or operational depending on what the aim of 
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the investigator is. But if one starts with symbols which 
represent subtractions from natural things, which do not 
mirror their qualities, nor their actual determinate shapes 
or sizes, nor any of their powers or dispositions, the possi­
bility of finding among such symbols an object of knowl­
edge, as absolute and as independent of the thought of 
man for its existence as is the sensible universe, is reduced 
to the vanishing point. And mathematics is fundamentally 
the art of manipulating symbols of this kind, whether they 
be lines and surfaces, or the unknowns of algebraic systems, 
or whatever. There is a minimal being remaining to the 
symbol after the abstraction of all determinations so that 
its nature is close to being a mere possibility. If one says, 
let p stand for any instance of anything, and let q be in 
some manner different from p; then it is evident that both 
p and q are in the highest degree indeterminate. The 
manipulator of the most abstract of these symbols has the 
power to give an intelligible content to his symbols which 
the symbols do not yet possess, actually, but which they 
are capable of receiving. The restrictions upon this human 
creator reflect only his purely human capabilities intel­
lectually and his dependence upon the sensible universe 
for meanings to be given to the symbols. His dependence 
upon the sensible universe is reflected in this that he con­
siders as valid operations with symbols, operations that he 
sees in matter, or in his own mental acts apprehending the 
material world. Thus addition and subtraction are opera­
tions, for manipulating the quantities of things, and such 
operations are allowed in the realm of symbols. The if. 
then notion is based upon concomitances discovered in 
nature; the notion of "function and variable," if it is really 
different from the "if-then" notion, is based upon con­
comitances discovered in the variable aspects of nature; 
and so on for the remainder of the operations, disjunction 
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and the like. The one exception that occurs to me is nega­
tion, for its analogue is found not in nature, nor in appre­
hension, but in judgment. 
If this analysis, of what mathematics in its simplest form 
is, be correct, then one would be very surprised indeed if 
it started with anything other than hypotheses. One might 
expect a purely formal science, such as abstract mathe­
matics or symbolic logic, to be based upon the most certain 
foundations, as this would seem to be consistent with its 
abstractness from the realm of mutable matter and with 
its formal clarity. But, upon investigation of the nature of 
symbol itself, upon seeing its neutrality to intelligible 
meaning before it is used, one clearly sees that any opera­
tion performed and any meaning given to symbol will be 
at the whim of the artificer who wishes to construct a mean­
ing in symbols. 
I have endeavored to show that the very nature of sym­
bolic reasoning is such that it has to start with hypotheses 
because of the abstraction from meaningfulness that is in­
volved in obtaining the symbolic notion. But this does not 
explain why the physical sciences too are based upon hy­
potheses. It is not enough to say that they make use of 
mathematics as an instrument and that the science suffers 
from the imperfection of the instrument. This is true in 
the sense that mathematics is an ideal science dealing with 
straight lines, or curved if you prefer, plane and curved 
surfaces, regular functions, and the like, which do not oc­
cur in nature in the way in which they are defined. This 
causes difficulty, but not anything insuperable to human 
ingenuity. The basic difficulty in the attempt to find abso­
lutely certain first principles in the physical sciences lies 
in the starting point that must be adopted in the practical 
investigation of sensible being. To have scientific certitude 
one needs a knowledge of cause. In the physical sciences 
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the search has been predominantly for material causes, the 
ultimate constituents of things. Although there have been 
efforts to formulate formal causes, the manner in which 
the constituents are arranged and interrelated, they have 
usually taken the form of laws of action. Perhaps formal 
causes are inexpressible in any otheT way than by listing 
physical properties and describing activities. Whatever the 
case may be for formal causes, the pursuit of ultimate ma­
terial causes has been unabated since the four-element 
theory was laid to rest by the analysis of combustion. But 
even today the ultimate material causes still elude us. As 
a result, knowledge in terms of the basic material com­
ponents of being is not yet possible. Therefore the attempt 
to explain in terms of ultimate material causes is thwarted 
by our failure so far to discern them. The only available 
substitute for the desired proofs regarding the ultimate na­
ture of physical reality is hypotheses about physical reality. 
Thus the modern sciences of nature supplement their de­
scriptions of the visible world with suppositions as to the 
ultimate nature of both visible and invisible material be­
ing. 
The two obvious restrictions upon physical knowledge 
as possessed by present-day sciences of matter are reliance 
upon symbolic instruments in thinking about things and 
the use of hypotheses in place of knowledge of the actual 
ultimate material elements. Does it follow then that, if 
there is this uncertainty about the facts of physical being, 
the being· that we are most readily acquainted with, the 
same uncertainty will necessarily be found in any other 
knowledge that attempts a correct account of creation? To 
rephrase my opening question: Is "physical knowledge," 
which is limited by its quantitative approach to reality, the 
only knowledge of reality? 
To answer the question I should like to present a brief 
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analysis of Aristotle's account of both knowledge and real­
ity. Knowledge on both the sensory and intellectual levels 
is the production within our consciousness of a represen­
tation of something. In the representation the thing is 
"seen" under some aspect or other; for example, sight sees 
it as being colored and shaped, and intellect goes beyond 
this, seeing it as being a self-existent or an accident. It is 
this process of "seeing" what is enduring among the 
changeable aspects of things that enables one to obtain 
something enduring in knowledge.20 The something en­
during in knowledge is information of what a thing is pri­
marily, or for the most part. Such knowledge endures even 
when that of which it is knowledge does not endure. For 
conceptual knowledge to be true it does not have to con­
form to the mode of reality possessed by that of which it 
is knowledge. In fact, the kind of reality that is being con­
sidered at a given moment, whether it be a thing apparent 
to the senses, or a hypothesis, or an ideal such as a theory, 
will be thought over and apprehended by the intellect 
without there being necessarily any reference to the status 
of the thing being known. This latter kind of knowledge, 
of how what is being thought of exists, is attained by in­
tellectual judgment. To understand the indeterminacy 
principle, or the ergodic hypothesis, is not too difficult; 
but to judge truthfully whether they are valid and to what 
extent they are valid is another and more difficult matter, 
requiring the decision in advance as to what criteria are to 
be used in deciding what mode of existence is possessed by 
an object known. The one criterion accepted by the lay­
man is this: If the thing being thought of is one that I can 
have sensory awareness of in my waking state, then it has 
more to it than simply my thought of it; it is a thing. This 
is the criterion used in everyday knowing. Unfortunately 
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it will not work for Professor Bridgman; his remarks im­
ply that he cannot tell whether he is awake or asleep. 
Some things are evident, and some are not. When one is 
fully conscious that he is seeing a colored thing, he takes 
the coloredness of the thing to be evident to sight. He 
never attempts to prove what is evident; only what is not 
evident demands proof. Other things over and above sense 
qualities are evident; for example, quantity and change 
are two other fully discernible aspects of the universe. The 
relation between the color seen, and that in things which 
gives rise to it, is not evident and so provokes an invesfr 
gation both of things and of sensing. Similarly, the con­
nection between minimal quantity and the nature of a 
material thing is not evident and requires investigation. 
When such investigations turn up the truth of the matter, 
the truth is called scientific. This truth, as was previously 
mentioned, can be expressed in quantitative terms or it can 
be expressed in nonquantitative terms. ·when it is expressed 
in nonquantitative terms it lacks the approximative pre­
cision and accuracy that the use of measurement gives, but 
it is certainly true knowledge. If I pass light through a dif­
fraction grating and attempt to measure the path of the 
particle, or wave, that travels from the grating to a screen 
behind it, undoubtedly I am dealing with measurables: 
distance, frequency of light, and extent of fringes on the 
screen. But the question as to the path of the individual 
whatever-you-call-it of light is saved from being utterly 
ridiculous only by the fact that I, and any other observer 
who cares to, "see" light entering the grating and light ap­
pearing on the screen. The unverifiable assumption that it 
is the same light that strikes the grating and that strikes the 
screen afterward causes me no greater concern than the 
unverifiable assumption that the sunlight that caused my 
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sunburn is the same light that left the sun eight minutes 
earlier. 
Philosophers like Aristotle have been of the opinion that 
it is better to start with what is evident, and from that 
vantage point to proceed to investigate what is obscure. 
The precision of an approximative measurement is not re­
quired for such a procedure; nor are the assumptions that 
there is gravitational force, and that the velocity of light is 
constant, prerequisites to knowing that water flows down 
to the oceans and that the sun warms things. Knowledge 
of this latter kind is presupposed to all science of whatso­
ever type, quantitative or nonquantitative. If absolute pre­
.cision were a prerequisite for truth, only speculative 
mathematics would be true. But speculative mathematics 
is obviously based on assumptions (the use of natural num­
bers, 2, 3, 4, etc., excepted). To hold that absolute pre­
cision is the essential prerequisite for truth would put us 
in the peculiar position of holding that man, who cannot 
make a single thing (he can only rearrange what he finds), 
<:an, in elaborating mathematical systems, make the only 
truth there is. 
All sciences, including the philosophy of science itself, 
have had to avoid the exclusive use of merely quantitative 
expressions in order to talk of qualities and activities which 
.are more than the measurements that can be made of them. 
I can, by using terms standing for qualities, quantities, 
substances, etc., tell what mathematics is; but no mathe­
matics can tell what it is. Nor can any mathematics tell 
what a substance, or a quantity, or a quality, is. In fact, a 
hasty induction from only ten books purporting to tell 
what mathematics is (written by authors who understood 
mathematics, I presume) left me with the opinion (not very 
approximative, I am sure) that mathematicians, integrated 
into one spokesman who resolved all their opinions, could 
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not tell anyone what mathematics is. But enough of this 
raillery. Mathematicians must know what they are talking 
about; how else could they disagree? 
Since mathematics, when used by physics, is only a 
method and not an explanation, it can be dispensed with 
to some extent when a true explanation is achieved. For 
example, if force did exist as the cause of the orbits of the 
solar planets, their orbital motions would be understood 
in terms of it. Kepler's laws would add nothing to this 
basic understanding. They would add something to the 
knowledge of how the planets follow their orbital motions, 
but would add nothing to the why. Speculative physical 
science has very little need of mathematics in expressing 
the qualitative and substantial nature of things. Mathe­
matics is an instrument of analysis; it is not a constituent 
of things. Only the perverse way of looking at things that 
is characteristic of positivism could hold that an instru­
ment of analysis is more real than what it analyzes. But no 
one could possibly believe in positivism any morel 
Aristotle held that knowledge of the quantitative, quali­
tative, and activity differences of material things gives 
knowledge of their forms. The essential form of a thing is 
defined as that factor which determines the actuality of a 
thing. It is not a sophism. It is a way of speaking that cor­
responds with reality. For example, the reason why a tree 
and a cat appear to be different to us is that the basic ele­
ments of both are formed in a different manner. If you put 
a portion of both through qualitative analysis you would 
find carbon as a constituent of each. But it does not seem 
reasonable to say that both the cat and the tree are carbon 
compounds having inexplainable differences in appear­
ance. It seemed reasonable to Aristotle to say, in the begin­
ning, that, whatever the ultimate constituents of things 
tum out to be, those things that appear to be radically 
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different are formed differently. Thus, for him, the essen­
tial form of a thing is that which accounts for a thing's 
being the kind of thing that it is. 
When a tree or a cat is reduced to its elementary parts, 
there is no point in searching for the original form. The 
act of killing and dissolving needed to get at the parts has 
destroyed the organization characteristic of a whole tree 
and a whole cat. Although no form is isolable this does not 
mean that forms are mere devices to explain an organiza­
tion of matter that we do not understand. We do not 
understand this organization, but it is obvious that matter 
is organized. The term form is used to indicate this fact, 
and it is indispensable to both our everyday and our philo­
sophic vocabulary. For sciences whose greatest concern is 
the isolating of material causes, it can be dispensed with 
in matters of analysis, but something like it, terms such as 
"organic whole," "synthetic whole," have to be used to ex­
press the togetherness of parts that is characteristic of actu­
ally existing material things. 
If human knowledge could grasp the essential form of 
a thing it would understand all the characteristics of that 
thing. Obviously no one can say of any material thing that 
he understands it completely. Qualities and activities are 
signs of the essential natures of things. To banish these 
from discourse because some aspect of them is measurable 
is to make thought easy at the expense of making it empty. 
Although the reduction of qualities to quantity has often 
been attempted and has often been claimed successful, the 
simple fact of the matter is that no quantity can be known, 
either directly or by instruments, without its being known 
by means of qualities that have an effect upon our senses. 
The universe is quantified, but that is not all that it is. It 
exhibits qualities that are constant-the orange color of 
copper, for example; and without these qualities, sense 
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qualities, and the activities of material things, nothing 
would be knowable. If the qualitative aspects of things by 
which we know them are erroneous, then so much more 
so are the quantitative aspects, for they are known only 
through the senses which detect qualities primarily and 
quantities only secondarily. If you deny the reality of qual­
ity, you must deny the possibility of knowing objective 
quantities. 
To conclude, things are quantitative and qualitative and 
substantial. A knowledge of things from one of these points 
of view, the quantitative, requires the elimination of the 
ordinary qualitative aspects, the color, the sound, etc., that 
are associated with it. But to banish these from considera­
tion in order to have a nice clear-cut precision, from the 
purely quantitative point of view, is not to banish them 
from reality. They will remain and will still inform us of 
"what things are up to" after the present distress over the 
upsetting effect to the latest physical theory is long for­
gotten. Remember, a practical science, in order to be suc­
cessful, does not need to know what things are; it only 
needs to know what they are likely to do, or, failing that, 
what we can do to them. But a speculative science, and the 
philosophy of science and metaphysics are such, must have 
reasonable certitude before it can progress; and in the 
realm of matter such certitude is difficult to obtain. The 
philosophy of science, it seems to me, must accept this ac­
count of things, and, directing its attention to the kind of 
thing that mathematics is and to the difficulty involved in 
the analysis of matter, must attempt to get an over-all view 
of the quantitative-investigation field and say something 
intelligent about what is going on in it. It does not belong 
to it to say anything about matters that are not clearly in 
its domain, unless in talking about such matters it takes 
full cognizance of the viewpoint by which they are to be 
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properly apprehended. Everything involved in speech is 
capable of being analyzed quantitatively except the way in 
which its reception by hearing affects the intellect of the 
hearer. No quantitative analysis can predict this effect, or 
measure it, or explain it away. In the beginning there was 
mind, and matter, and forms, in Aristotle's language; they 
are still here challenging us to know them, more and more 
fully, and forbidding us to exclude either matter or any 
one of the various forms, quantitative, qualitative, etc., 
from a true account of things. 
3 
Does Physical "Knowledge" Require A Priori
or Undemonstrable Presuppositions? 
HENRY MARGENAU* 
I. The Logical Forms of Scientific Demonstration
To KNOW, as the title of my discourse requires, 
what is meant by an undemonstrable proposition, it seems 
necessary to achieve clarity and perhaps agreement with 
respect to the meaning of "demonstration" in physics. The 
word is used in a great variety of contexts. It denotes meth­
ods of conviction or persuasion ranging all the way from 
deductive mathematical proof to incidental exhibition of 
specific items of evidence. Literally, it means "showdown," 
and its meaning centers in the presentation of crucial or 
striking sensory confirmation of a proposition. 
I shall first accept the wider sense of demonstration, al­
lowing the word to stand for any experience that has a 
large measure of suasive power or cogency relative to a 
physical proposition, supposing, however, (a) that the ex­
perience is of the direct or perceptory type (not merely the 
• Aided by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
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recognition of logical or mathematical consistency) and (b) 
that the proposition is sufficiently general to be called a 
hypothesis or a law or a theory. Under these conditions 
one encounters two large classes of demonstrations in a 
science like physics. The first may be called inductive or, 
better, correlational; the second, deductive or, for reasons 
that will soon be given, exact. 
Let Boyle's law be such a proposition. To demonstrate 
it may mean making a very large number of measurements 
of the pressure and the volume of a gas at a given tem­
perature, showing that they all very nearly satisfy the law. 
The logical situation here is this. The experimenter has 
obtained n values for the pressure P, and n corresponding 
values for the volume V. Except by an unwarrantable and 
logically illicit extrapolation, these 2n experimental values 
cannot establish the belief that in every possible measure­
ment, past and future, P equals c/V. What they do imply 
is that the correlation coefficient, k, of the P, with the c/V. 
is very nearly 1, and this entails, via laws of induction 
which are progressively being clarified,1 that future obser­
vations will satisfy Boyle's law with a computable probabil­
ity, a probability that is a function of both n and k. 
Here then is the character of an inductive demonstra­
tion: it changes n into n+l, increasing the probability in 
question. The psychological force of an inductive demon­
stration, however, is enormously greater than its logical 
force. If a student to whom the law is a novelty sees a few 
positive instances of the correlation between P and 1/V, 
he is greatly impressed and takes the demonstration as final 
proof in the same vein and with the same satisfaction as a 
proof of Pythagoras' theorem. This is partly valid, for the 
probability is raised from O to a value not far from 1 by 
only two or three positive instances, whereas many further 
confirmations cause it to crawl toward I very slowly; it is 
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partly wrong, because the novice mistakes the element of 
surprise for cogency. 
For the more advanced student a demonstration of 
Boyle's law requires a great deal more. He will think of the 
law as implied by, or as a special case of, a more general 
proposition called the perfect gas law, or as a consequence 
of the equation of state for real gases, and he will see even 
this in the framework of the more embracive kinetic theory 
or statistical mechanics. Having already confronted situa­
tions which led him to accept the validity of the laws of 
particle mechanics, and regarding the passage from particle 
mechanics to statistical mechanics as a simple and reason­
able one, he thinks of the analytic consequences of that 
theory as true, and his a priori expectation, when con­
firmed by a very small number of positive instances sup­
porting Boyle's law, engenders in him an assurance 
concerning the outcome of future experiments that is far 
beyond justification by the inductive probabilities just 
mentioned. The point is that the coherence of the logical 
texture in which the proposition to be tested is embedded 
produces its own evidence, and this evidence makes reli­
ance on correlations less severe and less important. Never, 
of course, does a physicist dispense with empirical con­
firmation, nor can a theory create empirical data out of 
purely rational ingredients-Eddington was, in my opinion, 
quite wrong methodologically when he suggested that the 
constants of nature are reflections of tautological human 
procedures. What the physicist entertains here is healthy 
respect for the positive feedback that takes place between 
purely inductive evidence and the a priori expectation 
that flows from the logical entailment of a given statement 
by more general propositions already confirmed. In prac­
tice, he couples correlational demonstration with deductive 
demonstration. A science that has attained success and 
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stability between these procedures is called exact, and for 
this reason I have labeled the deductive method itself ex­
act. Let us study it more carefully. 
Its use amounts to what is ordinarily called an explana­
tion, a feat which is characteristic of the deductive process 
and has no meaning in any correlational pursuit. Explana­
tion starts with some very general affirmation, such as is 
contained, for example, in Newton's laws together with 
the ergodic hypothesis. Let me call this set of premises So. 
They alone do not imply Boyle's law. Hence, one intro­
duces a set of further assumptions of a less general sort 
concerning which there is some empirical evidence. They 
may include the supposition that the forces acting between 
individual molecules are additive, or central, or indeed 
zero. These suppositions will be called S1. From the con­
junction of S0 and S1, theorems T1, T2 • • • can be derived 
by logical procedures; among these theorems are the gen­
eral gas law and its special case, Boyle's law. But as a the­
orem the statement is still indefinite and empty, for it 
merely contains the symbols P and V whose reference to 
observation needs to be inserted. It is at this place that 
operational definitions 2 enter, and by their intervention 
empirical manipulations can engage the symbols in con­
crete fashion, leading to a climax which logicians call con­
firmation or disconfirmation. 
In symbols: So· S1 :::> (T1, T2, T3 · · ·) 
One of these theorems, say T,, functionally relates P and V. 
P and Vin turn are connected to numerical values P' and 
V' by rules of correspondence 3 of which operational defi­
nitions are a special and important class. If P' and V' are 
found in observation, Ti is said to be demonstrated and to 
be true (with certain reservations). And if all T, are con­
firmed, preferably many times and by numerous observers� 
So and S1 are demonstrated. 
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Some may feel that the word demonstrate in this connec­
tion is ill chosen. I confess to some sympathy with this sen­
timent, because the manner in which the S's are verified is 
rather indirect and lacks the "ad oculos" quality expected 
of demonstrations. Nevertheless, no more direct way to 
ascertain the truth of abstract propositions is available, and 
if the word demonstrate is to have any significance at all 
with respect to such general principles as the basic laws of 
mechanics, of thermodynamics, or the ergodic hypothesis, 
which enter into our example, it must reside in the transi­
tion from S to P' and V' which has been sketched. 
Accepting this meaning of demonstration, we ask what 
measure of certainty it confers upon S0 or, to be more spe­
cific, upon So · S1• In common language, So • Si, henceforth 
simply written as S, is called the explanation of, or the 
reason for, Boyle's law. Every explanation in science is an 
act of logical inclusion-a chain of reasoning that allows a 
particular proposition known as a fact to be seen as the 
consequence of a more inclusive set of propositions. There 
is often a series of explanations, as in the case of gravita­
tional motion, where a "fact," like the fall of a stone, is ex­
plained by Galileo's "law" of constant acceleration; this 
itself can be explained in terms of Newton's law of uni­
versal gravitation, and this, once more, as a special case of 
Einstein's law of gravitation. Here we have to stop, for at 
the present stage of physics there is no more general theory 
which yields Einstein's (or some other, perhaps more suc­
cessful) formulation of general relativity as a deductive 
consequence. A proposition forming the logical starting 
point of an explanatory chain is called a postulate or, as a 
carryover from the days when first principles were regarded 
as indubitable, an axiom. In our example of Boyle's law 
the chain has but a single link; at least, one may think of 
it in that way. Strictly speaking, the number of links is not 
52 The Nature of Physical Knowledge 
countable: as in all deductive situations, one can interpose 
between first premise and final conclusion an arbitrary 
number of intermediate though usually uninteresting 
steps. Here, for simplicity, we shall regard the passage from 
S (basic principles) to T (Boyle's law) as one. 
The demonstration in question has this form: 
S :J T 
T 
:.s 
Every student of elementary logic will at once recognize 
in this conclusion the famous form of the fallacy of the 
consequent. One is really not entitled to affirm S if its con­
sequent, T, is true. The physicist knows this, too, for he is 
aware of the circumstance that Boyle's law may very well 
be also the consequent of postulates quite different from 
S, perhaps not yet discovered. 
The history of science is full of instances where accepted 
implication relations of the form S :J T though still valid 
have been abandoned as part of science. This may happen 
for several reasons, among them the following. Sometimes, 
. later, more refined experiments prove a given consequence 
of S, T, false. In this case S usually has to be changed. This 
change is uninteresting from my present point of view, for 
it could have been effected even if the reverse relations 
were true, i.e., if T implied S. The usual case, however, is 
this. Further experimentation shows that T remains true, 
but new observations become possible, observations ex­
pressible, let us say, in the form of a different theorem T'.
Now T and T' are quite compatible since they deal with 
different sorts of phenomena, but T' is usually not implied 
by S. If the relation S :J T were reversible, so that T ::J S 
and T' :J S', S and S' would contradict each other, and we 
should be developing a kind of physics in which each set 
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of phenomena must be explained by its own set of theories, 
simplicity and cohesion being lost. It is the irreversibility 
of the implication relation, S ::J T, that saves the day; for 
T and T' can both be implied by a different and wider set 
of postulates. That irreversibility, however, forces science 
to affirm the consequent. 
Hence follows the important methodological result that 
physics can never be certain of its postulates. This is the 
price it pays for its dynamism, for its facility of self-correc­
tion, for its impressive rate of growth. And as for deductive 
demonstration, we see that it, too, can never reach certainty 
of its premises. 
Yet the lack of certainty encountered here is altogether 
different from that which afflicts correlational demonstra­
tions. They could be expressed in terms of probabilities. 
By probability the physicist means a relative frequency in 
some well-defined ensemble. Such an ensemble is available 
when Boyle's law is tested empirically: one can clearly 
specify and observe the relative frequency of volume meas­
urements falling into a range about Vi when the pressure 
has a value in the neighborhood of Pi. But what about the 
relative frequency of a theory (postulate, hypothesis) S? 
It seems to me, in view of the practice of scientists and 
in view of the logical situation just discussed, that a search 
for a "probability index" of theories is unprofitable. We 
do not speak of theories and postulates as probable or im­
probable, but as correct or incorrect relative to a given 
state of scientific knowledge, or perhaps as approximations 
to a more exacting theory, either known or not yet known. 
In applications of a theory we make allowance not for 
probabilities of hypotheses but for errors of numerical re­
sults. There is no ensemble of theories in which favorable 
and unfavorable ones can be counted, and this is because 
theories, like ideas, are not subject to arithmetic; two the-
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ories may be one, or many, or indeed none if they are con­
tradictory. Hence we conclude: Inductive or correlational 
demonstration involves uncertainties capable of numerical 
test as probabilities. Deductive demonstration of theories 
involves a different, intrinsically logical kind of uncer­
tainty which arises from the inevitable fallacy of the con­
sequent inherent in it. To distinguish them, let us use the 
names inductive and deductive uncertainty. 
2. Meta-Principles of Science
Deductive uncertainty means radical freedom of choice
in the construction of hypotheses. For, while a given finite 
set of empirical data (e.g., P{ and T{) allows the calcula­
tion of a most probable or "true" set of values for these 
quantities, no similar unique method for specifying a 
"true" hypothesis or a most probable hypothesis in the face 
of the data (P/ and Tl) exists. The absence of uniqueness 
is especially serious for the kind of terminal hypotheses 
called postulates, and it arises quite clearly from the pres­
ence of "fallacies of the consequent" in the chain of entail­
ments connecting postulates with observations. 
The agreement among scientists with respect to accept­
able explanations remains therefore an astonishing histor­
ical fact so long as only logical concerns are allowed to 
govern our inquiry. When the view is shifted to the actual 
practice of physicists, however, a new and highly revealing 
element emerges: the deductive uncertainty is held in 
bounds by important habits of reasoning, by pre-empirical 
commitments to certain forms of theory-in short, by fac­
tors not imposed and frequently not even suggested by the 
facts themselves. Philosophers have spoken of them as cate­
gories of thought, as razors that shear away irrelevancies of 
explanation, and as injunctions enforced by a lumen nat-
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urale or by divine revelation; physicists have used phrases 
like economy of thought, simplicity, and elegance of ex­
planation, in describing them. Whatever the name, their 
analysis is of importance at every stage of science. In today's 
physics they clamor for attention with greater vehemence 
than ever because a major point of controversy, the so­
called causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, in­
volves precisely these items of transempirical commitment; 
to seek the solution of this problem in the field of data and 
of detailed mathematical analysis, as is sometimes done, 
must be recognized as a misguided and futile endeavor. 
In a traditional sense of the word metaphysical, the para­
logical, nonempirical principles affecting the choice of 
hypotheses should be called metaphysical. To avoid mis­
understanding, may I say that I do not include in that word 
the ontological suffusion of absoluteness which it some­
times carries, or the self-assurance made notorious by think­
ers of Deussen's 4 school; my precedence lies in the usage 
of principled philosophers like Kant, to whom metaphysics 
meant (in part, at least) the theory of scientific knowledge 
with its primary task of elucidating the way in which such 
knowledge is made acceptable and objective. And by non­
empirical I simply mean procedures that have a character 
apart from the coerciveness of observational experience, 
even though they have no business and no significance 
without such experience. 
An extended survey of the metaphysical principles has 
been conducted elsewhere.3 Terms like logical fecundity, 
extensibility of constructs, the requirement of multiple 
connections among constructs, their permanence, causality, 
simplicity, and conceptual elegance were employed to sug­
gest a spectrum of functions which these requirements per­
form. To my knowledge a complete logical analysis of this 
vague assemblage has not been made, nor is it certain that 
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it would be fruitful or that it could be achieved. There is 
perhaps an advantage in the restraint which leaves- these 
principles unanalyzed, for any complete logical structure, 
once established, produces a stability, a rigor often close 
to stagnancy, and the principles under consideration, if 
viable, are in flux. 
This last admission shows at once an insufficiency of the 
Kantian doctrine, upon which the present study leans. For 
Kant, the categories, which may be regarded as the fore­
runners of the metaphysical principles under inspection 
here, were eternal forms of thought, wholly of a priori 
origin. The history of physics since his day belies this al­
legation; it shows that the principles are pragmatic devices 
of great scope, established by an impressive crescendo of 
scientific successes but never exempt from careful scrutiny 
and modification or, indeed, rejection. We have seen what 
has happened to causality in our time, and nobody can 
guarantee the quality of simplicity in theories dealing with 
nuclear forces, although we still hope for it. Despite this 
concession of mortality, however, one cannot fail to be 
astonished by the longevity of metaphysical principles: 
. their lives are reckoned in millennia, whereas physical the­
ories nowadays live decades, and facts may die in months. 
Suffice it here to show briefly how the principles in 
question 5 operate on the contemporary stage of physics. 
As our first example, we choose the history of the neutrino. 
It started out as a metaphysical gleam in Pauli's eye, spring­
ing from the hope that the constructs of nuclear theory, 
in particular of beta emission, might prove consistent 
(logically fertile) and extensible. But questions arose: Is 
the neutrino an insular construct, or is it multiply con­
nected? In particular, are there rules of correspondence 
which give it empirical status beyond the demand for 
consistency in the face of conservation of energy and mo-
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mentum? The issue here was not one of direct sensory 
confirmation, which was ruled out by the very qualities 
assigned to the neutrino itself; nobody expected the parti­
cle to be seen or to manifest itself in cloud chambers. 
Physicists felt uneasy because there were not enough 
connections between the postulated entity and other con­
structs, connections which would make a difference in the 
empirical domain. The principle of multiple connections 
has now been satisfied, even though the neutrino has not 
been seen directly. 
The negative proton was expected on other grounds: 
it had to exist if nature is symmetric. Here an esthetic 
requirement enters the scene, something, perhaps, that 
comes under the heading of elegance. In a way it contra­
dicts simplicity and shows that different principles some­
times compete in application. The force of the symmetry 
postulate was great, inducing theorists to incorporate the 
negative proton in their calculations and to predict how 
it might manifest itself in experiments, all according to 
the pattern S :) T with appropriate elaboration. The meta­
physical principles generated S; empirical verification 
established T.
These brief allusions, which can hardly portray ade­
quately, or do justice to, the interesting play of metaphysi­
cal principles on the scene of present physics, must suffice 
here. Some of the most fascinating problems arise because 
we defy positivism and believe in them; otherwise we 
should not be worried about negative matter, geons, 
chronons, hodons, or, for that matter, the elusive plasma 
oscillations. 
We have said that metaphysical principles often suggest 
general laws S; empirical verification then establishes a T 
which is implied by S. This is the pattern of many dis­
coveries, and it stands in sharp contrast to the accidental or 
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shotgun method of science which probes the facts in 
assiduous and never-tiring fashion with the hope that new 
discoveries, unrelated to present theory, will suggest new 
understanding. Actually, science is a two-way transaction 
which flourishes when equal emphasis is placed on both 
approaches. \Ve are perhaps in danger today of over­
stressing the shotgun attack, chiefly because ideas promot­
ing elegance in theory are rare and money for research 
that turns up stones to see what is under them is plentiful. 
But to return from a digression. Our examples indicate 
that metaphysical principles are as important today as they 
have been throughout the history of physical science. 
However, they never act in isolation. As has been more 
carefully set forth 8 elsewhere, after constructs are selected 
in accordance with metaphysical requirements, they are 
then tested by an establishment of "circuits of empirical 
verification," and only those constructs are retained as 
valid, i.e., as verifacts, which are embedded in a network 
of successful circuits. It is the neglect of this verifying phase 
of scientific method that accounts for the pathology of 
. Deussen's metaphysics. 
Our journey into the territory of scientific method has 
now brought us to an elevation from which the subject of 
this article takes on added interest, or at least added com­
plexity. Should we count the metaphysical principles as 
undemonstrable presuppositions? Are they a priori? Does 
physical knowledge truly require them? The last question 
I should now affirm definitely, and offer in evidence the 
preceding excerpts from recent physics, in addition to un­
countable examples of the past. The other two questions 
can hardly be settled so easily, because they are subject to 
different possible interpretations, and we must return to 
them. First, however, it is well to deal with some challenges 
HENRY MARGENAU 59 
and afterthoughts that have come up in connection with 
the list of metaphysical principles as published.3 
Professor Frank 6 suggests that scientific method is highly 
sensitive to cultural and social factors, and presumably he 
would accord to them a rank comparable with causality, 
simplicity, and so forth. Hence we should inquire whether 
our list needs to be enlarged, and whether it should not 
contain, besides the present socially neutral items, certain 
factors linking the basic procedures of science with the 
structure of society or even the political system in which 
science is practiced. 
Then there is another point that should be discussed. 
To be objective and generally acceptable, it is often 
claimed, scientific truth may not be private truth. It must 
be public, inasmuch as every normal person with adequate 
training can acquire that truth. This view equates objec­
tivity with intersubjectivity and insists on communality 
of demonstration. Again, one may ask whether here is 
not an important principle to be added to our earlier list. 
The next section is devoted to these matters. Section 4 
deals with an allied problem, posed by the growing insist­
ence with which some physicists demand the resolution of 
quantum-mechanical probabilities into mechanistic arti­
facts, or hidden variables, and the like. The interest that 
attaches to this last "principle" justifies our treating it in 
a section by itself, although its status is not different from 
that of the others. 
3. Compatibility with Cultural Norms and Communality
of Evidence as Controlling Factors of Physical Know­
ledge
It is impossible to deny that moral and political con­
siderations affect the course of science, and Frank offers 
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a number of examples to prove the point. Our own time 
presents ample evidence for it. Hence the occurrence of 
such influences need not be argued and cannot be ques­
tioned. What matters here, however, is whether a patent 
historical connection between morals, religion, and politics 
on the one hand, and the methods employed by science on 
the other, justify the inclusion of a requirement of compat­
ibility with cultural norms among the regulative principles 
of science, coordinate with logical fertility, simplicity, 
causality, and so forth. Do we in fact rely on our condition­
ing by the cultural milieu in the same way as we rely on 
simplicity of explanation? 
First, let it be admitted that cultural conditioning, 
while present, is also inescapable. It is a commonplace. 
One cannot think thoughts, scientific or otherwise, for 
which training has not prepared one. Language determines 
in large measure our forms of reasoning, and it may well 
be that principles like causality, which operate with states 
and systems that are doubtless descendants of Aristotle's 
attributes and substances, are historical consequences of 
the subject-predicate relation dominating ludo-European 
- speech. The influence of political systems, though less
direct and affecting mostly the rate of growth of science,
is likewise inevitable, since what can destroy life can also
destroy science. And here we approach the main issue. Is
cultural conditioning to be compared with the metaphysi­
cal principles we have listed, or does it belong in the same
class with other commonplace factors that also affect
science, like the training we receive, the language we
speak, the friends we have, and the food we eat?
I should class it among the latter and therefore refuse 
moral and political considerations an acknowledged regu­
lative role in the formation of scientific postulates and 
hypotheses. To some extent, this is shutting one's eyes to 
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reality in the hope of keeping science clean. But there are 
cogent reasons in favor of this stand. For even those who 
practice political, religious, or moral disciplining of science 
deny that they are doing it; they still insist that they base 
their reasoning on "objective" grounds. Moreover, the 
accounts that inform us of the incidence and the inevita­
bility of such moral-political mortgaging of truth them­
selves never fail to convey a measure of condemnation of 
this very circumstance, thus showing that a distinction 
between good and bad regulative principles is fairly 
universal. Finally, and this is the most interesting and the 
most telling point, history somehow exposes instances in 
which scientific theory has been influenced by nonscientific 
considerations and proves them wrong, ill-conceived, or 
diversionary; science heals the flaws that political con­
ditioning sometimes leaves in the wake of its advance. 
For all these reasons, it would seem that affinity of science 
with culture cannot be demanded as a metaphysical prin­
ciple commensurate with the others. 
The story is different with respect to communality or 
intersubjectivity as a controlling factor of scientific method. 
Here we encounter a requirement which is wholly opera­
tive and acceptable, and which might indeed be added to 
our former list. It was omitted because, I feel, it follows 
from the others. 
Science is certainly an intersubjective, a communal 
affair, so far as that is possible. Every experience, if it is 
to be relevant, must be sharable or communicable; isolated 
experiences, if they can be repeated, do not count. Some 
isolated experiences, however, cannot be repeated. Astro­
nomical observations of the past, a measurement of the 
velocity of light in 1910, are admitted as scientific evidence 
when cosmological theories perhaps involving a variable 
velocity of light are to be tested. It is seen, therefore, that 
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repeatability by other persons is a kind of secondary re­
quirement which is sometimes waived. Dependence cm the 
testimony of others can be contradicted by the equally 
scientific attitude of individuals who will accept no evi­
dence save their own. And there have been mass halluci­
nations. 
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge attains its stability 
by relying on the experiences of many. But this, it seems 
to me, must be regarded as a special consequence of the 
more basic requirements of logical fertility and multiple 
connections, already cited. For a construct that is not 
communicable, or one that is communicated but not 
believed, is clearly sterile. Hence the requirement that 
scientific constructs should be logically fertile, coupled 
with the fact that there are other people, at once implies 
communality of knowledge and belief. 
Again, if a construct is to be multiply connected, it
cannot reside merely within that island universe which is 
my personal experience. It has to make reference to the 
universes we call other minds, and if the connection 
fails, it must be rejected. This requires intersubjective 
· agreement.
Perhaps the more basic concept of objectivity needs 
discussion at this point. Objectivity in science may mean 
two things: first, transsubjectivity, or the kind of docu­
mentation that gives a personal experience an internal 
stability, a coherence with other personal experiences 
which causes it to be accepted as valid. To speak more 
simply, when I see a spot of light in the dark sky and wish 
to interpret it as a star, I first make sure that it is steady 
and does not change its color periodically, like an airplane. 
If I am in company, I ask whether others see it too, but 
this is by no means essential. Any real doubt as to the 
trustworthiness of my visual sensation can be dispelled by 
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reference to other experiences within my private posses­
sion: noticing whether the light appears where according 
to my knowledge there ought to be a star, watching its 
progression across the sky, seeing whether it reappears 
tomorrow. All these are acts of internal checking, of 
probing the consistency of my total experience when this 
item is added to it-in short, of employing the validating 
metaphysical principles (not including communality of 
knowledge) together with empirical verifications. The 
result is objectivity in the experience of seeing the star, 
objectivity attainable through procedures involving only 
private probings; it engenders a certainty that transcends 
the subjective sensation; it generates transsubjectivity with­
out intersubjectivity. 
The last quality, also often identified with objectivity, 
is what I have called communality of experience. It is a 
corollary to the other, to me primary, form of objectivity 
and arises automatically when consistency of understanding 
(the principle of multiple connections) is extended to 
those verifacts within private experience which are called 
other persons. 
4. The Requirement of Spatial and Temporal Abstraction
Since Descartes, physical science has flourished by using
a method he perfected. It involves the abstraction, through 
physical intuition, of ever smaller and finer elements from 
the spatiotemporal continuum. Greek science was wary of 
it, having been impressed by Zeno's paradoxes. Modem 
science has wrestled with the implications of this method 
in the difficult mathematics of continua; in physics, how­
ever, it did not follow the lead very far, for it invented the 
concept of an atom, which is intended as a ban upon the 
ultimate application of abstraction. To be sure, the ban 
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was not taken altogether seriously; physicists continued 
with a good deal of success to probe the interior · of the 
atom, only to find other atoms. The latter, however, take 
on increasingly perplexing qualities which make men 
wonder whether the method of spatiotemporal abstraction 
is being misapplied. 
The style of analysis under discussion goes by other 
names. The Germans call it anschaulich. De Broglie 
identified it specifically with clarte Cartesienne; writers 
looking for hidden variables call it causal. What it seeks 
is invariably a determination of the spatially and tempo­
rally large by the small, and it does not shrink from 
infinitesimals. Our question is: Are we committed to this 
sort of quest; should this tendency be set down as a meta­
physical requirement of physics? 
Let it first be acknowledged that there is nothing 
intrinsically absurd in such a principle, indeed that it 
appears at the same methodological level as causality, 
though it is wholly different from it. If it is to be rejected 
it must be on the grounds of inadequacy to the actual 
state of science. Now, it seems to me that such inadequacy 
has been clear and present since the beginning of the 
century. 
Perhaps most spectacularly, every annihilation process 
involving quantized observables defies ultimate spatio­
temporal abstraction. Consider pair annihilation. Electron 
and positron necessarily have the rest mass m as long as 
they exist. This mass is converted into energy of photons, 
of amount 2mc2. How does this conversion take place if 
it is to be understood under the requirement of temporal 
abstraction? The masses must gradually melt away into 
photon energy, in contradiction to everything we believe. 
Hence, if temporal abstraction must be imposed, the trans­
formation can only be sudden or catastrophal, and this, 
HENRY MARGENAU 65 
I take it, is actually a surrender of the method of spatio­
temporal abstraction. Atomic physics presents a host of 
similar examples. 
The defeat of abstraction had already been suggested 
by Bohr's early quantum theory. If an atom has truly 
quantized states, then the "passage," i.e., the temporal 
transfer in which our method forces us to believe, is not 
only mysterious or difficult to understand (as physicists 
often said); it is logically impossible. The atom can only 
be in one or the other of these two states; to say that it 
is in both at once acknowledges the fiasco of the method. 
Physics has, of course, given it up in this instance. Yet its 
desire for continuity was strong; 7 continuity could not 
be found through ordinary spatiotemporal abstraction, 
hence physics seized upon a variable that remains con­
tinuous when simple abstraction fails and introduced 
probability, the probability of the atom's appearing in one 
of the quantized states upon measurement as distinct from 
its being in them. One might say that probability saved 
continuity at the price of spatiotemporal abstraction. 
The very notion of classical causality, if taken seriously, 
requires renunciation of the method. Whatever causality 
may mean in detail, it suffices here to regard it as a relation 
between states of a physical system which allows the 
prediction of future states on the basis of its present state. 
Suppose that an electron is a region of space filled with 
substance, a fluid, perhaps, to which we cannot in principle 
deny the possibility of complex motion. To be sure, 
Lorentz and Abraham got away with simplifying assmnp­
tions which gave it rigid structure, but these could at 
best be only first approximations. In fact, they opened the 
door upon an infinite regress, a never-ending abstraction 
of spatial domains inside the electron, each with its own 
causal destiny and its effects upon the others. There is 
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no assurance that simple hydrodynamic models would 
work in such a situation, and the prospect is an infinite 
proliferation of presumed observable features which would 
belie predictability. Hence, ultimate spatial abstraction 
must be renounced to save causality. 
With all these indications I find it difficult to concede 
to the tendency under review the status of a methodo­
logical requirement. True, it had the semblance of success 
and still makes major claims, but progress has apparently 
overtaken it. This conclusion also shows what attitude 
one should take toward attempts to interpret quantum 
mechanics in terms of spatiotemporal abstraction: they 
may be worth while, for science does occasionally reverse 
its trend. But if its progress is steady, they have two strikes 
against them. 
5. Conclusions
Our quest for the meaning of demonstration in physics
brought us face to face with two types of uncertainty 
inherent in all confirmatory procedures: If the procedures 
are inductive the conclusion is only probable; if deductive, 
they are subject to the fallacy of the consequent. In the 
latter case, helpful regulative principles, here called meta­
physical, serve to minimize or limit the uncertainty; recog­
nizing this important fact we reviewed the metaphysical 
principles and their function in recent physics. And we 
permitted ourselves a lengthy digression into problems 
of the determination of method by cultural and political 
concerns, intersubjectivity, and geometric abstraction-a 
digression that was meant to bring an earlier analysis up 
to date. We now return to the original question: Does 
physical knowledge require a priori or undemonstrable 
presuppositions? 
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Stated with rigor and circumspection, the answer is 
this. If allowance is made for the irremovable uncertainties 
residing in the results of demonstration, if we do not ask 
for more than what our analysis has proved attainable, 
then physical knowledge requires no undemonstrable 
presuppositions. If we ask for certainty, for explanations 
that are unchangeable and eternal in our search for phys­
ical knowledge, then all of it is based on undemonstrable 
propositions. 
The use of the term a priori is a little troublesome, 
though natural, in this connection. Its classical sense, made 
famous by Kant, can hardly be maintained today.8 If it 
is nonetheless adopted, the required metaphysical prin­
ciples are half a priori, half a posteriori, the former because 
they come epistemologically (though not genetically) be­
fore observational experience; the latter because they are 
born pragmatically from experience and change with use. 
To the extent that these principles are a priori, then, it 
must be affirmed that physical knowledge requires a priori 
presuppositions. 
Our first answer, however, which bespeaks the intrinsic 
uncertainty of all scientific knowledge, has an aspect of 
triviality, and one gets a feeling that it misses what this 
symposium is about. Granted, you may say, we can never 
be certain of all details of scientific objects, as for example 
of the properties which present understanding assigns to 
an elementary particle; nevertheless, our belief in their 
very existence is not founded on undemonstrable pre­
suppositions. There is after all a vast gulf between belief 
in the existence of electrons and belief in the existence of 
gods, and it is this difference that our discussion intended 
to examine. 
On the plane of principles, metaphysical or otherwise, 
I can see no difference between gods and electrons. The 
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demonstration of one involves the same logical movements 
as the demonstration of the other. There may be a· differ­
ence in the degrees of success when the final necessary 
appeal is made to empirical observation. But the widest 
disparity in this comparison appears when one examines 
the specific manner in which the metaphysical principles 
are applied to one instance and to the other. Again, the 
requirement of multiple connections is the decisive issue. 
The construct electron is rich in relations to other valid 
constructs; it is pervaded by many validating circuits of 
confirmation, is a pivotal link in many chains of physical 
reasoning, bears numerous correspondences to the plane 
of perceptions. The concept God, at least in some of its 
connotations, is almost insular, devoid of the fullness of 
relations with other verifacts that are enjoyed by physical 
concepts. This is certainly true if it is posited, as it often 
is, merely for certain kinds of satisfaction which do not 
culminate in verification. 9 
The second and perhaps more meaningful answer to 
the title question, then, is available if one reconstructs 
the question slightly and puts it as follows: Does physical 
knowledge require insular constructs, that is, ideas, postu­
lates, or concepts inaccessible to demonstration and un­
connected with other demonstrable constructs? The answer 
to this is clearly no, and the reason lies, perhaps para­
doxically, in the metaphysical presuppositions of science. 
4 
Does "Knowledge" of Physical Laws and Facts 
Have Relevance in the Moral and Social Realm? 
GEORGE P. KLUBER TAN Z, S.J. 
ANY significant discussion of morality must be 
placed in the context of the contemporary discussions. 
You will forgive me if I summarize briefly the recent 
history of ethical theory. At the beginning of this century 
the British philosopher G. E. Moore examined the work 
of his predecessors in ethics and maintained that all of 
them had fallen into what he called "the naturalistic 
fallacy." 1 According to him, instead of investigating and 
clarifying what it is that men ought to do, they gave 
accounts of what men were doing. They confused, he said, 
"is" and "ought." In his view it was impossible by an 
examination of the facts to arrive at any moral criteria 
or any moral judgment. He maintained that the knowledge 
of the good was obtained only by intuition. No other 
process could ever reveal to us what good was or what a 
particular good was. By "intuition" he meant a direct and 
immediate knowledge that neither could be proved nor 
needed any proof. 
Next on the field of ethical theory came the movement 
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which is sometimes called logical positivism. In their 
examination of ethical theory the positivists agTeed with 
Moore that it was absolutely impossible to derive an 
"ought" from an "is." 2 But, in addition, they attacked 
Moore's intuitionism, which they declared nonexistent.3 
Hence, in their first treatments the positivists flatly 
maintained that all moral propositions were simply non­
sense. The recent successors of the positivists, namely, the 
British analysts, have not taken such a rigid view. Instead 
they have maintained that so-called ethical propositions 
are really not statements of fact but statements of attitude. 
According to them, "This is good" means, "I like this," 
"I approve of it"; and it may or may not imply, "I want you 
to do the same." 
In this country, ethical theory and ethical practice have 
been discussed repeatedly by pragmatists and instru­
mentalists. What is common to both these theories is 
that the good is defined "as that which is useful, success­
ful." Let us look a little more closely at the statement, 
"The moral good is that which is successful, or, leads to 
further goods." If we expand this statement in terms of 
the meaning of good which it contains, then we must say 
that the moral good is that which leads to further goods 
which are goods because they lead to further goods-and 
so on. Now, when the very meaning of the term is thus 
cast into an infinite regTess, the basic meaning of the whole 
set of propositions disappears. 
Many American philosophers attempt to escape the 
meaninglessness of such an infinite regTess by using social 
norms (social approval, or the generally accepted stand­
ards). But, as the British analysts have pointed out, it is 
one thing to say, "The society in which I live approves 
of certain actions"; it is another to say, "I ought to pay 
attention to what society approves of." The second propo-
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sition cannot ever be justified by an appeal to society itself. 
For this would be a completely circular justification, and 
would amount to no more than saying, "Society approves 
of my following what society approves of." 
As William James had already seen, one possibility 
would be to shift the meaning of usefulness or success 
from the objective outcome of the action to the subjective 
relationship. Now, if we take pragmatism in this broad 
sense-as allowing the meaning of good to consist in the 
satisfaction of personal wants and desires-then indeed 
we avoid the infinite regress of meaning, but we seem to 
be reduced by another route to the same situation in which 
British theory finds itself. 
It would seem then that right and wrong consist ulti­
mately in nonrational, inexplicable, and even groundless 
likes and dislikes, for there is no know ledge process by 
which ethical theory and moral facts and obligations can 
be ascertained. Does this entail the end of any meaningful 
discussion of moral problems? The analysts seem to have 
accepted this conclusion, to have allowed rational discus­
sion only about the logic of moral propositions, not their 
content. If this were the final word, my assignment would 
be simple enough. To the question, does physical "knowl­
edge" have any relevance in the moral realm? I should 
have to answer, In principle, none; in practice, if people 
should happen to agree, such knowledge has a secondary 
function of clarification-or something like that. 
In common with many philosophers 4-and, I think, 
with most nonphilosophers-1 believe that there is a ra­
tional way to talk about the moral good. I do not intend 
to offer you yet another ethical theory to compound the 
confusion, but rather to suggest a way in which we can 
combine the proven conclusions of the various theories 
into an acceptable and successful way to explain the nature 
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and the knowledge of the moral good. I should like to 
ask for one limitation on our considerations and "discus­
sions: namely, that we should not begin with particular 
moral problems on which there is widespread and violent 
disagreement. I propose instead that we restrict our dis­
cussions to a few fairly simple cases on which we can 
safely presume that all of us agree-the evil of lying, or 
that of deliberately causing pain without any need or 
reason; or, again, the positive obligations of telling the 
truth in science, or of alleviating the pain of others. In 
such examples we can successfully investigate our real 
knowledge that there are obligations and consider how this 
knowledge has been won. From this, we can then draw a 
number of general conclusions that will help us to answer 
the general question: What is the relevance of knowledge 
of physical facts and laws in the moral and social realms? 
The first step in such an analysis is to determine the 
meaning of moral good. In the light of the philosophical 
discussions we have just reviewed, two points become 
clear. First, the good is neither a thing in itself, nor an 
absolute inhering quality of a thing. When, for example, 
a mountain climber is asked why he wants to climb moun­
tains and he says, "Because the mountain is there"-this, 
obviously does not answer the question. The mountain 
is there, it is tall and rugged, and so on. But, no matter 
how we amplify these physical descriptions, in no way 
do they answer the question: Is the mountain a good? 
Moreover, the same is true of any action. Yet, is not 
an action of helping another a good? This is a crucial 
instance. An action of helping another-this action has a 
physical reality. It consists, let us say, in bringing food to 
a person in desperate need of it. What is done can be 
observed, described with care, analyzed in terms of various 
forces and movements; in short, an entire factual descrip-
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tion can be given of the action taken simply in itself. Is 
there anything in the course of this description which 
makes the action good? Or, perhaps, is the whole action 
good even if none of the parts are? It would seem that we 
cannot say so. To show that this is not the case, we can 
put it into different conditions. For example, let us con­
sider the father of a family whose child is in immediate 
and desperate need. This man is at the point of giving 
the necessary food to his own child. At the moment when 
he is doing so he sees before him a stranger in equal need. 
If he simply leaves his child to starve and goes on to feed 
the stranger, is his action still good? I think at this point 
all of us would hesitate. We would be inclined to say, 
"It is no longer good to abandon one person to save 
another; at least, it is not clearly an obligation." 
This second case can lead us to see why we call an action 
good. ,v e do not consider an action good because there is 
either in some element or in the whole of the action 
considered in abstraction a physical quality which we can 
call goodness. To this extent we must agree with the 
criticisms directed against the naturalistic fallacy. It is 
simply not possible to consider good as if it were some kind 
of absolute quality. But we need not therefore have re­
course to some nonphysical quality. The equally forceful 
criticisms by the positivists of G. E. Moore's intuitionism 
precisely go to show that good cannot be a nonnatural 
quality either. 
The action we are considering is good only when viewed 
in relation to the total situation. Now, from this we should 
be led to see that good is not an absolute quality of any 
one thing. Can we then say that good is a relational 
attribute? Let us see whether this will help us in our two 
previous types of cases. ·with regard to things-the moun­
tain is not good in itself if it is viewed simply and non-
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relationally. But if, for example, it is viewed as a challenge 
to a mountain climber, then it is good for someone. The 
action of helping another is not good considered simply 
in itself. But it is good for some one who does have food 
to give to another. 
But have we not thereby fallen into the pitfall of emo­
tive ethics? "The good is what I like," and since what 
I like is a purely arbitrary choice, then, the moral good 
is a purely arbitrary consideration that can be disregarded. 
Or, if we take account of it, it is purely private. There 
cannot be any objective agreement; and, if agreement 
must be found, we shall have to look elsewhere-to legal 
coercion or social conformism. 
This would be a sorry escape indeed. But is it necessary 
that we have recourse to some kind of arbitrary, whimsical 
choice, or unfounded and baseless desire? There is another 
way which is both more obvious and more 1·ealistic. Let 
us begin again with things. Quite likely we can grant 
that the desire to climb mountains is somewhat personal. 
In fact, to the extent that is a merely personal response 
to the mountain's presence, most men would be inclined to 
· say that it is not moral at all. There is lacking in it any
kind of necessity. On the other hand, if we turn from
mountain climbing, which is entirely free and arbitrary,
to something necessary, for example, food, the case is
different. Food also is not good in itself as simple and
absolute being; food is good for someone. But food is
good for someone not merely because he has an arbitrary
desire for food. It is good for someone who has a need
for food. This need is not arbitrary, conventional, artificial,
subject to free choice. Nor are we concerned with whether
people like to eat or not. It is, of course, true that most
people enjoy eating; but the goodness of food does not
lie in its relationship to the pleasure that is usually ex-
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perienced. Neither do biologists discover that organisms 
need food solely by examining all organisms and then 
drawing a kind of rough generalization. They are able to 
say: an organism needs food, because it has a certain 
structure and a particular kind of material. In other words, 
the need for food is natural to living things. It is therefore 
correct to say that we can have some knowledge of a nature. 
By the term nature I mean the internal constitution of 
a thing-like a man, a maple tree, a monkey-which is the 
source of its constant specific tendencies and of the activi­
ties proper to it. A nature is relatively permanent; it is 
manifested by activities and is logically connected with 
them. To speak of "human nature," for example, is not 
merely a useless way of restating the original facts or a 
verbal trick adding something to the facts. A man is a 
man even while he sleeps, that is, while he is not actually 
performing some of the activities peculiar to man. Nature, 
then, is a real, concrete, structured possibility of acting. 
Granted that man's nature is not the same kind of 
nature that we would find if we were dealing with gold 
or silver or other chemicals, it remains true that something 
can be said about human nature.5 Consequently, at least 
in principle, the term to which "good" is referred can be 
investigated with some hope of success, some hope of 
objectivity, and, consequently, some hope of agreement 
(though there have been very considerable disagreements 
not only about what human nature really is but also about 
the very possibility of knowing human nature objectively). 
This is not a question of grasping by intuition, by some 
mysterious immediate process, the entire nature of man; we 
all recognize that such knowledge is not within our grasp. 
Nor is there question of any a priori approach, any sort 
of preconceived or analytically given notion of nature. 
We can find out what man is in the same way and only in 
76 The Nature of Physical Knowledge 
the same way as we find out what an organism is.6 We 
have to study organisms and analyze their behavior: Simi­
larly, from a study of what men do we can find out what 
man is. The analysis of human nature is, however, not a 
statistically summarizing process. We do not simply ob­
serve man in all possible situations, then summarize, 
generalize, abstract, and arrive at a set of universal descrip­
tions. We find involved in the various activities of man 
some basic characteristics common to a whole line of 
activities, no matter how much those activities may differ 
in other respects. For instance, we do not have any a priori 
notion of rationality. We can only find out what rational 
behavior is by examining what men do-including our­
selves. Sometimes men perform actions which are reason­
able; sometimes they act stupidly. Now, we do not strike 
an average between the most intelligent behavior-for 
example, that of a scientist, a statesman, a great artist­
on the one hand, and the most stupid, ignorant, super­
stitious, irrational behavior on the other, and say that 
human nature has as its characteristic behavior something 
between the two extremes. ,ve observe human actions, and 
we find in them, for example, an adaptation of means to 
ends. Whether it is really an adaptation of suitable means 
to proportioned goals, or whether it is an entirely blind 
combining of means which leads to no success at all, in 
both extremes we find the effort to adapt things and actions 
for purposes. This is the kind of way in which we can 
analytically study what men do to find out what man is. 
Similarly, we do not find out either that man is free or 
what freedom is by averaging together a bit of compulsive 
behavior and a bit of fully deliberate rational choice and 
then say this average is what freedom naturally is. Rather, 
by examining carefully various kinds of behavior we dis­
cover in some of them the exercise of freedom, and from 
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this conclude what man can do if conditions are ideal. 
The work of some contemporary anthropologists confirms 
and in some respects clarifies the notion of human nature 
that we derive from analysis and reflection.7 Not only man's 
merely organic needs but also his strictly human needs­
the need for love, for friendship, for association, for 
development, opportunity, scope for freedom-all these 
things can be established to be real and true human needs.s 
Next, is the simple natural relation of hunger and food 
itself a moral one? We would of course recognize that 
animals also need food and that food for a hungry animal 
is good. Would we be inclined to say that the animal was 
behaving morally? We would indeed say that it was be­
having naturally. Though some philosophers may have 
maintained that animals behave morally in seeking food, 
I do not think the majority do so. There is still something 
lacking. If morality is a peculiarly human quality, then 
something about the relational situation which we qualify 
as morally good must be peculiarly human. It is not 
peculiarly human to need food, but it is peculiarly human 
to have a recognition of this fact and to be able to judge 
how it is best fulfilled. \Vhat raises the merely natural 
good to the level of a moral good is its submission to 
reason. That is morally good which bears a relationship 
to a natural need or tendency inasmuch as this relationship 
is judged by reason and its use is guided by reason. The 
moral good is a reasonable good. What do we mean by 
qualifying an action as "reasonable"? \Ve mean that it is 
not haphazard, random, arbitrary, merely impulsive, but 
is justifiable. We mean, positively, (a) that it is taken in 
relation to the entire context of the objective situation, 
especially in relation to its consequences, and (b), on the 
subjective side, that all man's tendencies be considered in 
their essential order, not just one in isolation.9 
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Moreover, reasonableness in action can be objectively, 
impersonally judged; it is neither subjective, nor - a con­
ventional, customary norm. For example, biologists and 
doctors have criteria which, although they have been 
arrived at by an examination of particular cases, are not 
merely an average or a conventional standard. The amount, 
or quality, or kind of food that the human organism needs 
is not arrived at by examining the eating habits of all the 
races of men in all their cultures and then extracting an 
average which is named the reasonable amount; much less 
does the doctor judge by what he himself eats. If a doctor 
wants to give a patient a suitable diet, he considers such 
factors as weight, state of health, type of activity, availa­
bility of foods, and by means of these considerations arrives 
at a quite impersonal and objective judgment. 
At least at many levels it is possible to see that one use 
of a particular physical thing or action is reasonable and 
another not. Thus, let us examine the action of telling the 
truth as compared with that of telling a lie. There is an 
external action of communicating through words or other 
external signs what is in a man's mind. As the other term 
of the relation, there is a man who has knowledge, a power 
of communicating, and a need and desire to communicate 
with his fellow men. Now, what is the reasonable way to 
use communication? Note, we do not say that a man must 
talk or otherwise manifest his mind; 10 but, if he engages 
in communication and at the same time chooses to do so 
in such a way that he does not manifest his mind but rather 
something contrary to it, then the action is unreasonable. 
If, then, lying is unreasonable, it is a moral evil. On the 
other hand, telling the truth is a reasonable use of an ex­
ternal action corresponding to the need and tendency of 
man and judged by reason to be suitable in the concrete 
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circumstances, as well as guided by reason: therefore, it is 
morally good. 
Now, with all this in mind, we can intelligibly approach 
the proper topic that I have been directed to examine: Is 
there any relevance of physical laws and facts for the 
moral and social realm? To the extent that such laws and 
descriptions clarify the nature of the object or action that 
man is thinking of performing, they are relevant to moral­
ity. Let us again take a simple example. Ordinarily men 
proceed on the assumption that those foods which are tasty 
are also healthful, and in many cases simple sensory re­
sponse is a sufficiently good criterion. There is no question 
and no need for any more elaborate knowledge of the ob­
ject. But it is unfortunately true that this criterion is not 
always applicable. Ptomaine poisoning, for example, is not 
discoverable merely by the taste of the food. Here a scien­
tific knowledge of what ptomaine poisoning is, how it is 
caused, and how it can be prevented is of great use and 
indirectly enters into a moral consideration. If man is to 
use food reasonably, the food he eats ought to be such as 
not only to be palatable but also, and principally, health­
ful, nourishing. Food that in spite of its appearance and 
good taste is not healthful ought to be avoided by a reason­
able man; therefore, it would be immoral to use, sell, or 
give it to others. To the extent, then, that scientific tech­
niques are sometimes necessary to find out which food is 
healthful or unhealthful, even in the simple decision about 
the right use of food we may be obliged to make use of 
complex scientific knowledge. This example can be ap­
plied to a very urgent contemporary case, the effect of fall­
out on certain foods. The physical knowledge possessed 
only by carefully trained scientists is nevertheless a matter 
for everyone's moral consideration, and must influence 
everyone's own individual moral choices. 
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The same case can be made to illustrate the bearing of 
physical knowledge on social decisions and actions. So­
ciety is concerned with the common good, the common 
welfare, the welfare of all. Now, suppose that someone is 
doing something which has as a long-term result the ex­
tensive poisoning of the food supply of an entire nation. 
The intrinsic character of the real sensible object cannot 
be discovered by immediate sensory response, but instead 
needs very elaborate means. Yet society, through its re­
sponsible authorities, is obliged to take scientific knowl­
edge into account in allowing, controlling, or stopping the 
action which is causing these effects. To illustrate with an­
other very pertinent case. Only a scientist can give an ade­
quate account of the likely effects of nuclear warfare, which 
are beyond the grasp of the ordinary untrained person. 
Nevertheless, what the physicist can establish to be the 
probable effects of extensive nuclear explosions can change 
our moral judgment about war and the testing of nuclear 
weapons. 
But this case, obvious as it seems to be, can be misinter­
preted. First, it is not precisely as physicist that the phys­
icist proclaims the evil of nuclear warfare, if he does, but 
as a man who has in addition to his human judgment the 
advantage of much more knowledge of relevant facts. Sec­
ond, the harm to human life, great as it is, is not an abso­
lute evil. The reason is that physical life and physical 
health are not absolute goods. As we have seen earlier, for 
a moral good, there are needed not only a suitable object 
and a natural tendency but also the judgment of reason. 
Now, a preservation of life or health which involves a de­
nial of truth, a betrayal of good, a surrender of freedom, 
is no longer to be chosen automatically. Instead, reason 
must weigh the two sets of consequences-their importance 
for a truly human life, the probability or certainty that 
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they will occur, and so on. And, in the light of these con­
siderations, it could be that the right moral judgment 
would be to risk the physical evil to preserve the rational 
,good. 
Next, we must ask: What about the relevance of phys­
ical laws to moral judgments? From one point of view, 
scientific laws are general propositions that state relations 
between classes of facts. As such, they have the same kind 
of relevance for moral judgment that particular facts have. 
There is some difference in that particular facts are part 
of the present situation, whereas laws are more likely to 
enter into moral judgment as giving us knowledge of fu­
ture consequences. But, since consequences are merely fu­
ture facts, they are not moral goods in themselves, any 
more than present facts are. Furthermore, since the facts, 
taken absolutely, cannot be moral, the laws relating them 
are not moral laws. As Professor Margenau said, scientific 
truth is not established by, nor to be judged by, the effects 
of the use of that knowledge upon human beings. A prop­
osition, a law, or a theory is not true because it is useful, 
or desirable, but, by the same token, because it is true it 
is not necessarily good. 
Scientific laws, however, are usually more than just em­
pirical generalizations. Usually they are refined according 
to the requirements of theory, and so we must look for a 
moment at physical theory.11 
According to the terminology I am using, scientific 
theory is at a higher level of generalization than law, con­
nects laws rather than facts directly, and is deductively 
related to these facts. By this I mean that, if we grant the 
theory, the laws and facts follow as logical consequences. 
In relation to facts and laws already known, theory stands 
as explanation, as intelligible ground or reason. For an 
acceptable scientific theory this is not enough; theory must 
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be "fruitful": it must suggest new experiments hitherto 
unthought of, whose outcomes, predicted by the theory, 
constitute its "verification." For this reason, many scien­
tists, though not all, admit the legitimacy of theoretical 
elements in the structure of science. 
As most contemporary philosophers of science agree, 
theory consists of rational constructs. These "products of 
the scientific imagination" are by no means arbitrary; their 
form is controlled by the facts and laws, and they give con­
sistency and connection between more particular laws. 
Hence, theory can be true or false; or, if we are squeamish 
about this terminology, theory can be correct or incor­
rect. It is fashionable in some quarters today to suggest that 
such remote propositions are statements only about our­
selves as observers rather than about the things. Granted 
that this is sometimes so, I believe that an interpretation 
that makes this necessary in principle is at variance with 
the whole spirit of science. It seems to me that the basic 
attitude of science is realistic. But, also, scientific truth is 
not simply that of a descriptive or historical proposition. 
A fortiori, the truth of a theory is not that of a naive iso­
morphism. The truth of a theory is defined by the laws 
from which it arises and the new results to which it leads. 
For these reasons, theoretical concepts no longer express 
the direct intelligibilities of things and activities. But it is 
concrete things and activities with which moral judgments 
are concerned. So, the presence of harmful radiation in 
food directly affects my moral judgment concerning my 
use of that food, or my activities which might increase such 
activity. But, for example, the interior structure of an 
atom, the nature of "distances" between intra-atomic par­
ticles, the presence or absence of parity, the amount of 
angular momentum, seem to have no direct influence on 
human action and moral judgment, important as they are 
GEORGE P. K.LUBERTANZ, S.J. 83 
for scientific theory and even scientific experiment. In­
deed, it is hard to see how propositions like this could be 
thought to impinge upon the sphere of moral behavior. 
True, there have been writers who have claimed for sci­
entific theory an impact far greater than what I have al­
lowed for. It is sometimes said that human freedom would 
be in conflict with determinism, that the human mind is 
incapable of knowledge beyond the scope of sense experi• 
ence, that the human being is so much a part of nature as 
to be one with it, that morality is so interwoven with 
superstition that it must be abandoned wholesale, and so 
on. To my way of thinking, such propositions are not sci­
entific but philosophical, and so not necessarily connected 
with any scientific law or theory-certainly not of the phys­
ical sciences. 
In fact, even the life sciences develop theoretical con­
structs which are not directly significant for moral judg­
ment, even though they are intimately connected with 
what is distinctive about moral behavior, the nature ot 
man. For example, the harm caused by an uncontrolled 
use of drugs is discoverable apart from any explanatory 
account of how drugs affect personality. Nor do we judge 
the evil any differently when we know that there are psy• 
chological factors which bring a man to the use of drugs. 
This is not to say that we do not judge the drug addict 
differently; we may well decide that drug addiction is a 
disease rather than a moral fault. But, fault or disease, we 
still consider it morally wrong to allow a pusher free access 
to our school playgrounds. And this is the point I am trying 
to make. 
In summary, a science which is engaged in the discovery 
of facts and laws and the construction and verification of 
theories to explain them does not have the logical possi­
bility of making moral judgments. But because moral good 
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is a relational attribute which implies two terms: the thing 
or action in itself, and the natural need or tendency of 
man, any factual knowledge, including the scientific, of 
either of these terms in their mutual relation does have 
relevance in the moral and social realms. 
5 
Dualistic Pictures and Unitary Reality 
in Quantum Theory 
ALFRED LANDE 
1. Critique of Dualism
ERNST MACH once observed: "There is no cause 
nor effect in nature; nature simply is. Recurrences of like 
cases exist only in the abstraction which we perform for 
the purpose of mentally reproducing the facts." To which 
one may add: the mental reproduction of facts in the form 
of a methodical schema, or law, or theory must of course 
be checked for its empirical adequacy. And it ought to be 
evaluated also under the criterion of simplicity or economy 
of thought. Under these criteria determinism has been 
found wanting and has been replaced in modem quantum 
theory by statistical law. But, again, paraphrasing Mach: 
nature as such is not quantal or dualistic; nature simply 
is. Although there is no question as to the empirical ade­
quacy of the half-corpuscular, half-undulatory quantum 
formalism, I doubt whether the present dualistic ideology 
approaches the ideal of simplicity, with or without the 
copious literature trying to make dualism more palatable 
to the ordinary mind and to the physicists themselves. It 
would certainly be preferable to have a unitary theory, 
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either resting on a continuous concrete substratum sup­
porting waves with occasional corpuscular appearances, or 
assuming discrete particles as the real constituents of mat­
ter which occasionally produce the appearance of waves. 
Here I must ask your indulgence for using the words 
"real" and "apparent" in the same ordinary sense as when 
a stratified layer of clouds is said to appear like a continu­
ous train of waves, yet upon closer inspection is found in 
reality to consist of many droplets in a statistical arrange­
ment. It is true that in the microphysical domain the sit­
uation is more complicated, because, the closer one looks, 
the more blurred the picture becomes in some of its fea­
tures. From a purely empirical viewpoint it thus may be 
hard to arrive at an immediate decision in favor of one or 
the other "mental picture." But how about the criterion 
of simplicity? 
Instead of scrutinizing and improving the quantum 
ideology under this criterion, physicists, like other people 
in a quandary, have sought refuge in philosophical reflec­
tion rather than taking positive action. It is argued: why 
set up unnecessary problems when the answer is so simple? 
There is a fundamental principle of duality; and the equal 
rank of corpuscles and waves as mental pictures is assured 
by their give and take in the principle of complementarity. 
Besides, what is the difference between physical appear­
ance and physical reality, anyway? The idea of a real world 
behind the phenomena is a metaphysical dream. And it is 
precisely the quantum theory that has given us the "epis­
temological lesson" that an objective reality, independent 
of the means applied by an observing subject, should not 
even be a topic of intelligent discussion. Let us be content, 
then, with two pictures or constructs whose union so ade­
quately describes the facts. 
This positivist viewpoint of Bohr and Heisenberg is of 
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course diametrically opposed to the realism of Einstein, 
who with reference to the quantum dilemma declared: 1 
"The concepts of physics refer to a real external world in 
which 'things' (material bodies, fields, etc.) claim to have 
real existence independent of perceiving subjects." To 
this I would add that, carrying the philosophical discussion 
about "reality," or lack of it, into natural science is, in 
my opinion, a misuse of philosophy for the profane end of 
brushing off an important internal problem of atomic 
physics. In the case of stratified clouds nobody will speak 
of two mental pictures, one of waves and one of droplets­
irrespective of the philosophical reflection that our "ex­
ternal world" is a mental picture. One rather will weigh 
all the evidence and use his reason to decide which he will 
accept as "real," cloud waves or discrete droplets. In atomic 
theory it is just as imperative, and possible, too (see section 
2), to establish a simple, realistic, and unitary theory in 
which the "quantum miracle" of a wavelike misbehavior of 
particles becomes a necessity. But let me tell the story in 
historical order. 
Schrodinger, from 1925 up to this day, has consistently 
taken the stand that only matter waves are real, that par­
ticles are mere appearances, perhaps high wave crests in 
the wave field, in the sense of unitary field theory. And 
what looks like momentum conservation for particles in 
collision is actually a resonance phenomenon of interfer­
ing matter waves. As late as 1953 Schrtidinger declared: 2 
"There is, I think, no other way of accounting for the 
atomicity of matter than by admitting the eigenvalues of 
the wave equation to be discrete." Few quantum physicists 
look with favor on this view. 
In 1926 Max Born suggested that, in spite of matter ray 
diffraction, only particles are the real constituents of mat­
ter, as confirmed by many decades of atomic theory as well 
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as by the observation that the diffracted intensity pattern 
is built up by individual corpuscular impacts, on·e after 
another, in a statistical fashion. Born's unitary particle in­
terpretation, which regards Schrodinger's wave amplitude 
as a "probability amplitude," has been accepted by most 
physicists, myself included. 
Born's victory was watered down, however, by diplo­
matic intervention from the neutral country of Denmark 
through a third view, which wants to have it both ways. 
We are told that an electron, strictly speaking, is neither 
particle nor wave. Instead, both particles and waves are 
mental pictures of equal rank, neither having a preference 
over the other; rather, they complement each other. Born 
himself has lately become neutral and dualistic. In an 
otherwise most illuminating article of 1953 3 he declares. 
that water waves and electromagnetic waves are "real" by 
virtue of having certain invariant characteristics. But then 
he continues: "Why then should we withhold the epithet 
'real' even when the waves represent in quantum theory 
only a distribution of probability?" My answer is similar 
to that of the good Doctor Johnson rejecting the subjec­
tivistic idealism of Bishop Berkeley: you can kick, and be· 
hurt by, a stone as well as by a particle and by a water 
and an electromagnetic wave; but you cannot kick, or be 
hurt by, a list of statistical fractions. Putting such a list 
of betting odds, compiled according to past experience­
even when this list can be graphically represented by a 
wavelike curve-on the same plane of "reality" with those 
particles whose average fate is represented by the "curve" 
is indulging in a linguistic trick for the sole purpose of 
saving face for an obsolete dualism, obsolete ever since 
Born interpreted wavelike appearances as actually pro­
duced by particles. 
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And here I come to the root of the "quantum mess." The 
same people who accept Born's clear and realistic unitary 
particle interpretation also do homage to the dualistic and 
neutral doctrine of Bohr and Heisenberg, occasionally also 
relapsing into the ideology of unitary wave theory (e.g., in 
the so-called contraction of a wave packet of Heisenberg's, 
which in fact rests on a vacillation between two meanings 
of the word "state," 4 physical state of an object versus state 
of expectation of an observer). This double- or triple-think 
is defended by semiphilosophical argument, such as, quot­
ing von W eizsacker, 5 "Perhaps we can best speak of the 
collapse of the category of substance; perhaps we should 
rather speak of the necessity of adapting our logic, formed 
by thinking in objects, to the new situation." 
Adapting our logic? And to which new situation? Every­
body knows that the elastic data of a piece of iron, and 
viscosity data of the same piece of iron in the molten state, 
are mutually incompatible observables; one must never 
even think that both data could be possessed by the same 
piece of iron at the same time, one overt and the other 
hidden. This example is even more "quanta!" than that of 
position q and momentum p, which can be possessed simul­
taneously. For example, a particles are emitted by a radio­
active substance with a well-known momentum p; when 
they hit a screen at a certain place q, they arrive at q with 
momentum p. Only the future p in a subsequent experi­
ment cannot be predicted (Margenau 6) better than with 
margin 
ap ~ h/Sq 
This uncertainty relation would have no physical meaning 
unless exact p values belonging to a given range aq are first 
observed, and then found to be scattered over a range ap 
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(K. R. Popper 7). The scatter 'dp of exact p values for given
'dq of a particle gives us an important lesson in mechanics. 
But it is hard to see why it should give us an epistemolog­
ical lesson, compel us to change our logic and not to think 
in objects any more, etc. Those profundities seem to have 
but one end: to save the pre-Born dogma of a fundamental 
duality according to which "an electron is neither particle 
nor wave," instead of simply conceding that electrons and 
other particles statistically behave in a wavelike fashion, 
and we still do not know why. Refer to section 2, however, 
for an explanation. 
The question "why" is hardly answered by the allega­
tion (von Weizsacker 5) that "an electron, under certain
experimental conditions, behaves as though it were a wave 
filling the whole space." This "as though" ignores the key 
consideration of Duane 8 of 1923 that the periodic pattern 
on a screen is due to the mechanical activity of the periodic 
crystal "filling the whole space" rather than to a mythical 
wave character of the electron filling the whole space. 
Duane's systematic quantum-mechanical particle interpre­
_tation of the wavelike diffraction (which preceded Born's 
particle interpretation of the 'Ji function by three years) 
has been ignored also by Bohr in his long and inconclusive 
"Discussion with Einstein," 9 which otherwise could have
been resolved in a few pages. 
What can be the reason that physicists accept the statis­
tical particle interpretation in their everyday work, yet pay 
lip service to a dualistic ideology which replaces objective 
physics by an evaluation of subjective expectations and 
mental pictures? The reason, in my opinion, is that neither 
Duane, nor Born, nor their successors have ever proceeded 
from interpretation to an explanation as to why, i.e., on 
the grounds of which elementary nonquantal features of 
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particle mechanics, said particles (or bodies in general) 
should display wavelike interference phenomena and peri­
odicity in space and time; e.g., why is E = hv and p = h/"A.? 
Reference to a "principle" of duality is no better than say­
ing that people are poor because of their poverty. I think, 
however, that Duane-Born's particle interpretation of un­
dulatory quantum phenomena can indeed be supple­
mented by an explanation based on a few elementary, 
almost self-evident, nonquantal ground postulates from 
which one arrives at the same amazing rules of quantum 
mechanics which are usually introduced ad hoc or as mani­
festations of "quantum principles." I can report on these 
developments only in the most perfunctory manner. For 
details refer to the physical literature.10 
2. Unitary Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
As a first step one has to renounce the determinism of
classical mechanics in favor of still unspecified statistical 
laws for the transition of a specified object (particle, atom, 
field, etc.) from state to state in response to macroscopic 
testing instruments such as a position meter, an energy 
meter, a momentum meter, and so forth. Let us call these 
testing instruments an A-meter, B-meter, etc. From an 
A-meter test our object can emerge only in one of the A
states, A1 or A2 or A3, etc., respectively. The B-meter test
leaves the object in one of the B states, B1 or B2 or Ba, etc.
Suppose that the object has emerged from an A-meter test
in the state A3• If it is now subjected to a B-meter test, its
emergence in the particular state B5 occurs with a definite
statistical frequency, P(A3, B5), also known as the transi­
tion probability from A3 to B5• The various transition
probabilities from the A-states to the B-states can be
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ascertained experimentally and then be compiled in a table 
or "matrix" of the form 
P(A1, B1) P(A1, B2) · · 
P(A2, B1) P(A2, B2) · · = P(A, B) 
Similarly there are tables P(B, C) and P(A, C), and so forth, 
pertaining to the same object. The transition probabilities 
are two-way symmetric, P(A3, B5) = P(B3 , A3) in corre­
spondence with the reversibility of classical mechanical 
processes. From this it follows that not only every row 
but also every column in a P matrix adds up to unity. 
One may therefore denote the P matrices as unit magic 
squares. 
As a second step let us assume that the various P tables 
are connected by a (still unspecified) general correlation 
law of "transformation" so that, when the tables P(A, B) 
and P(B, C) are given, the table P(A, C) is thereby deter­
mined, or at least restricted-as the length L(A, C) in a tri­
angle is restricted when the lengths L(A, B) and L(B, C) 
are given. The problem of figuring out possible forms of a 
general correlation law of transformation between P tables 
leaving their unit-magic-square quality invariant is a purely 
mathematical proposition. There is only one conceivable 
law that satisfies this condition of invariance, known as 
the law of unitary transformation. It is precisely what the 
physicist calls "interference for probability amplitudes." 
It is best expressed in terms of intermediate quantities � 
which are complex, but so that �(A., B1) is complex con­
jugate to �(B1, A.), and the absolute square of both equals 
P(Ak, B;) = P(B1, Ak). Complex quantities are often used 
in physical theory for representing wavelike quantities hav­
ing amplitude and phase. Therefore the physicist is 
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tempted to see, in the law of unitary transformation, which 
in matrix notation reads 
�(A, C) = �(A, B) X �(B, C), 
a "wave law." However, since a complex quantity can also 
be represented by a vector in a plane, it is more adequate 
to conceive the complex probability amplitude � as a 
vector giving direction to the corresponding probability 
P, so that all the P's together form a kind of structural 
framework in a plane, as the lengths L(A, B), etc., connect­
ing points A, B, C, · · · , in a plane form a geometrical 
framework, with the associated vectors obeying the law 
V(A, C) = V(A, B) + V(B, C). 
Therefore, the "interference of probabilities" is not a wave 
law impressed on particles by a strange whim of nature 
wishing them to conform with Bohr's principle of comple­
mentarity or duality. It rather is the only conceivable gen­
eral correlation law between the probability tables (unit 
magic squares), supposing that a general correlation law 
exists at all, rather than chaos. Incidentally, a uniqueness 
proof is still lacking; therefore the word conceivable rather 
than possible has been used. The situation here is similar 
to that of statistical mechanics, which has been erected 
without a strict proof of ergodicity. 
The third step which completes Duane-Born's statistical 
interpretation into an explanation concerns the wavelike 
periodicity rules of quantum dynamics, Planck's E = hv, 
de Broglie's p = hj).., and their modem counterparts, 
Born's commutation rule and Schrodinger's p-operator 
rule, culminating in the Schrodinger wave function 
�(q, p) = exp (2i7tqp/h). 
The h-dominated quantum rules resulting m this wave 
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function are usually introduced ad hoc. However, they 
can be explained, i.e., deduced from the following well­
known elementary features of linear coordinates q and 
conjugate linear momenta p: 
(a) Any physical quantity defined in terms of two
(or more) coordinates q' and q" shall depend on the 
difference, q' q", rather than on absolute q values. The 
same shall hold for p. 
(b) The statistical density in q-space for given p is
constant, and the statistical density in p-space for given 
q is constant. 
Both (a) and (b) stipulate only that there is no preferred 
system in q-space or in p-space, that is, invariance of me­
chanics under Galileo and/or Lorentz transformations. 
Neither (a) nor (b) is a quantum postulate. Yet, in combi­
nation with the previously discussed interference law 
(unitary transformation) with invariance of the unit-magic­
square quality of the P tables, (a) and (b) lead by mathe­
matical necessity to the result 
4(q, p) exp (2i7Cqp/constant) 
which is the backbone of quantum dynamics. The con­
stant is called h; it must be a universal constant, the same 
for all objects, because interaction between two objects 
would be impossible if the one should give out quanta h 
and the other could receive only quanta h' different from 
h. The interference of probabilities and the wavelike
probability amplitude function 4(q, p) can thus be ex­
plained on the grounds of simple and general nonquantal 
postulates of symmetry, invariance, and the like, on a 
unitary statistical particle basis. 
The same formal quantum rules can immediately be 
applied also to a field when the field is first "mechanized," 
= 
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i.e., represented by an energy function in terms of gener­
alized field coordinates and field momenta. In the case of
an electromagnetic field the question is not: does light
consist of waves or of photons? It is rather: why does a
field vibration of frequency v display energy changes
E = hv only? The answer is that fields, like particles, are
subject to the general quantum rules that have been
known since 1926, but can also be explained as seen above.
A completely different question is that of the special
energy functions of various "fundamental" particles and
their fields. We here are concerned only with the general
formal quantum rules, not with their application to
special mechanical systems. The formal quantum rules,
however, can be understood without appealing to a
"principle" of duality. Duality remains as a superficial
appearance; it is not a fundamental principle in its own
right.
6 
Metaphysics: Before or After Physics? 
RAYMOND J. SEEGER 
IT WOULD be interesting to ascertain the common 
denominators of agreement and of disagreement of these 
papers on The Nature of Physical Knowledge. Each one 
of us, I suppose, would agree and disagree with each 
speaker to some degree. My role as a discussant of the talks, 
not of the topic, will be essentially that of an individual 
critic. My only choice is whether to make everyone un­
happy by criticizing each paper somewhat, or to make 
myself unhappy by reviewing one paper completely. As 
a compromise, I shall consider primarily the three papers 
that were sent me before the meeting. 
Our basic problem in this discussion is the philosophy 
of physics, i.e., an attempt to answer certain perennial 
questions which always arise along any broad approach to 
the study of man and his environment. For example, from 
the viewpoint of physics: Is the law of gravitation true? 
Is a physical field real? Why study physics, anyway? The 
philosophy of science, in general, is an attempt to get 
common answers to these common questions from all 
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scientific avenues, namely, physics, biology, psychology. 
sociology: What is true? ·what is real? ·what is of value? 
Three distinctive attitudes are typified by the statements: 
"I do not know" (dogmatic agnosticism); "I do not know. 
but" (indifferent skepticism); "I do not know, but I am 
finding out more and more" (aggressive faith). We must 
keep in mind throughout our discussion the peculiar 
viewpoint, expressed or inarticulate, which each speaker 
undoubtedly has with regard to these fundamental philo­
sophical questions (including Professor Percy Bridgman's 
belief that physics has "almost no recognizable philosophi­
cal component"). Otherwise, there will be foggy confusion. 
Our speakers seem to cover the entire gamut. Professor 
Bridgman, who claims, "The scientist has no place for 
faith," 1 fears that we may soon be involved in the law 
of diminishing returns for science, inasmuch as its prob­
lems are becoming more complex and seemingly fewer 
new methods are available for their solution. In this 
respect I note that George Gamow concludes his recent 
book, Matter, Earth, and Sky, with an equally pessimistic 
note. Viewing the frontiers of the universe for the very 
large and for the very small, he draws an analogy with 
the old discovery of the "new world" and hence the round 
earth, which by its very finiteness limited further findings. 
As the haze of quantum theory and of relativity spread 
across Lord Kelvin's almost cloudless view, a glorious dawn 
hailed a new day! We, too, can hopefully peer beyond our 
seemingly inaccessible horizon. 
In looking over the three papers one is struck at once 
by an apparent lack of clarity due to the failure of precise 
definition of the terms of the topic. No common ground 
for discussion is evident. Professor Bridgman, it is true. 
confesses his own qualms in this regard, particularly with 
respect to the word nature; Professor George Klubertanz. 
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indeed, seems to use it in the same sense as one does in 
speaking of human nature. The word physical, too, is not 
sufficiently definitive for satisfactory discussion. Professor 
Bridgman would have it include modern biological phases 
and possibly some psychological aspects. What about the 
other speakers? Knowledge (in quotation marks in the 
title) seems to be an especially vulnerable concept for each 
of the speakers, albeit they use the term science (it'S Latin 
equivalent) with little such apprehensiveness. Professor 
Bridgman would avoid any distinction between physical 
knowledge and any other so-called knowledge. He considers 
that knowledge, in general, implies truth, which he him­
self does not bother defining here-even operationally; 
frankly, he wishes to avoid any suggestiveness as to platonic 
ideas. Neither does Professor Henry Margenau find it 
necessary to define physical knowledge, while regarding 
certain "metaphysical" principles as prerequisite to any 
such physical knowledge-Le., existing strictly before phys­
ics, not after it. Thus he not only assumes a priori guides, 
but he insists that they exist expectantly beyond the realm 
of human senses. More difficult to understand are the 
particular "metaphysical" principles which he regards in 
some sense as only half a priori and half a posteriori (a 
paradoxical contradiction of terms). One would wish some 
operational or practical criteria for recognizing these un­
defined aspects. 
There is need for individual clarity, if not common 
agreement, not only with respect to the words in the topic 
itself, but even more with respect to other terms that are 
frequently used by the speakers. Explanation is just such 
a word. Professor Alfred Lande is evidently unhappy with 
Max Born's atomic picture, inasmuch as it does not purport 
to "explain" facts; i.e., it does not seek to relate them to 
"familiar and simple general principles." He makes an 
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interesting, but not logically necessary, characterization 
of theories as being descriptive, interpretive, and explana­
tive. Furthermore, Professor Margenau would view the de­
ductive method as equivalent to explanation, somewhat 
in the sense of Professor Lande, but not entirely so. He 
likes to use the word exact in connection with such logical 
consistency-exactly what I would not wish to do in 
applications of mathematics to phenomena. 
The word metaphysics, too, has been frequently used. 
Professor Lande regards a metaphysical stage as "a hidden 
power or principle that accounts for phenomena"; he 
cites the old "horror vacui" as an example. Unfortunately 
Professor Margenau has not found it necessary to give here 
a clear-cut, complete definition of his own usage of this 
term. In this connection I am reminded of a statement by 
the late Richard von Mises: 2 "Every author that writes on 
metaphysics more or less changes his boundaries." 
Last, and most important, is the use of the term reality. 
Professor Bridgman would urge physicists to avoid this 
word reality as an anathema, although he admits grudg­
ingly that measurements can be regarded as being physi­
cally real. He observes rightly that physicists never deal 
with complete reality. Professor Lande, on the other hand, 
argues that every physicist must be a realist-like Einstein. 
From a different viewpoint Professor Klubertanz, too, 
believes that science should be realistic. 
This casual usage of undefined terms results in the 
evident lack of communicability among the participants. 
Accordingly I should certainly agree with Professor Bridg­
man that any panel must agree upon definitions before 
attempting to discuss their applications-particularly at 
a Socratic symposium on natural philosophy. 
All these papers are concerned not just with the philoso­
phy of physics, but with the broader question: What is 
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physics? I shall not attempt to go into details as to their 
individualistic answers, but rather indicate important 
aspects that I personally would emphasize. 
First, let us consider the experiential origin of physics. 
Much has been said here of the need for repetitive experi­
ences, which Professor Bridgman implies are essential. A 
single explosion, of course, is not repetitive; but even 
history does not strictly repeat itself. Apparent repetition 
of an event is frequently due to our more or less simplified 
view of it. We often say, "It happened again." But what 
is "it"? How do we recognize "it"? How do we isolate an 
event from its associations? Observed repetition depends 
upon our operational ability (in principle, at least) to 
identify approximate classes which may recur from time 
to time. In this connection we assume tacitly the uniformity 
of nature and require understandingly a community of 
ideas, both of which serve as automatic checks upon any 
verification beyond our personal confirmation (Professor 
Bridgman's "intellectual integrity"). Isolated individuals, 
such as Leonardo da Vinci, to be sure, may unknowingly 
be correct, but ahead of their times. The rate of scientific 
progress, however, depends upon the communicability of 
ideas as well as upon their correctness. Professor Margenau 
would apparently minimize the opinions of others in 
comparison with his own self-knowledge. He would regard 
personal transsubjectivity as a primary, objective fact­
presumably as cogent as Professor Bridgman's private 
"scientific" proof. But what about John Dalton's color 
blindness? Would not his consistently colorful pictures 
be different from those of other viewers? In these dis­
cussions, as physicists, we seem to forget that, in all our 
total experiences, we focus upon a few selective aspects, 
which necessarily distort our own views of the phenomena 
themselves. Man and his environment become a skeleton 
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framework outlined quite differently by physicists and by 
biologists, as well as by other scientists. 
The other major component of physics is theory. All 
the speakers-myself as well-agree as to the uncertainty 
of physical knowledge. In particular instances, however, 
I am inclined to be even more uncertain than some of 
them. Professor Bridgman, for example, stresses the fact 
that one should never state: "Not A is, because B is"; but, 
rather, "A may be because B is." I should claim, more 
cautiously, "A may be because B may be." Moreover, I 
am not so positive as mathematically inclined Professor 
Margenau that the deductive method is more significant 
than the inductive one and, therefore, will produce a 
greater exactitude of theory. (That comfortable word 
exact again!) Deduction, indeed, when applied to natural 
phenomena does not have any greater certainty in its 
premises than induction in its conclusions. A deduction 
is either a logical tautology restating what is implicitly 
involved in the premise, or else a scientific proof based 
upon inductive generalizations, which we call axioms. 
Deduction and induction are experientially opposite sides 
of the same coin. As far as I am concerned, the conservation 
of momentum derived from Newton's laws of motion is 
no less certain than the laws themselves-indeed, it may 
be preferable as a starting point for certain purposes. 
"Deductive uncertainty" involves empirical choice; "induc­
tive uncertainty" is based upon theoretical choice. By no 
means do I find that "those principles, metaphysical or 
pragmatic, as you will, serve to minimize or limit the 
uncertainty." 
In other cases, I have apparently a greater feeling of 
certainty. For example, Professor Lande views with alann 
a particular kind of positivist philosopher who exhibits a 
"world picture of his own making without claim to repre-
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sent real objective events in a real world." He regrets that 
such positivists may look at "two pictures with the reserva­
tion that neither picture is true." To me, a theory is 
pragmatically "true" only in so far as it agrees with 
observed facts, i.e., describes and predicts phenomena. 
Our present difficulty with the concept of an electron 
arises to some extent out of our desire to describe it in 
familiar language as a particle or as a wave, whereas we 
have no experiential basis for doing so. Professor Lande 
views the use of both pictures as an immature composite 
like a Greek mythological creature, say a centaur, half 
horse and half man. Is it not possible, however, for us to 
use different metaphors to describe the same situation? 
We may note, "He is a lion in the fight"; or we may say, 
"He won't give up the ship." In each case, a certain 
characteristic is communicated without the necessity of 
combining both pictures into a lion-eating ship or a ship­
sailing lion-as when viewing different sides of a partially 
hidden building. I endorse wholeheartedly Professor 
Lande's desire to have a single picture-by all means in 
classical terms, if possible. The question is whether or 
not such a picture is humanly possible on the basis of 
what we now know. At present, I find nothing more 
logically satisfying than the principle of complementarity. 
This is not the occasion to examine the details of Professor 
Lande's ingenious and interesting presentation of quantum 
mechanics.3 I would merely note a few personal misgivings. 
In the first place, we cannot regard an electron as a 
particle in all experimental setups. Even when we speak 
of the mass m of an electron we generally extrapolate its 
dependence upon speed to the condition of zero velocity. 
Any such experiment will necessarily be related to the 
measurement of its energy E with the measurement of its 
conjugate time t-and hence an uncertainty t:.E related 
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to an uncertainty �m. (I do wish physicists would not 
speak so loosely of "masses which gradually melt away into 
photon energy." After all, mass is truly conserved in such 
a process.) We have not actually fixed an electron in space 
and in time; hence we have no experimental evidence 
that it behaves wholly like a macrocosmic particle. Now 
an electron behaves like this, now like that! But what is 
it-this elusive electron? I find difficulty also in recognizing 
operationally the generality of Professor Lande's basic 
probability function, !Ji(q, p), and its associated unitary 
matrices. His argument seems to be based only on the 
reasonableness of some specific instances. Finally, the equiv­
alent mathematical formalism which he develops does 
not happen to give me a "familiar" picture. I would, of 
course, agree that the mathematical solution of a wave 
equation need not be interpreted as a physical wave; 
indeed, it does not have to be related to a physical or 
mathematical model at all. Professor Lande's basic com­
plaint seems to be that we all are concerned more with 
what an electron does than why it does so. One is reminded 
of Aristotle and of St. Thomas Aquinas who insisted upon 
discerning an intelligible principle as to why a rock falls 
and smoke rises, why a body moves at all, rather than as 
to how bodies fall, as questioned by Galileo Galilei. There 
is always a practical limit as to what any of us will accept 
as "general, simple, and familiar." Certainly no single 
theory has ever been in complete agreement with all 
pertinent facts. Our theoretical choice 4 is dependent at 
any time upon many factors, past, present, and future. 
In short, as the speakers look at the experimental and 
theoretical aspects of physics, they seem to be faced with 
the need of agreeing first of all upon what physics itself is. 
I should like to consider at greater length Professor 
Margenau's interesting belief in the existence of meta-
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physical presuppositions such as simplicity, elegance, cau­
sality, et al.5 \Ve would certainly all agree that there are 
such heuristic factors affecting the choice of hypotheses: 
economy of thought, symmetry, invariance, etc. All of 
us, for example, would probably subscribe at least to the 
assumption that any theory should be simpler than the 
facts it purports to describe. 
The question today is whether these are truly meta­
physical principles or merely pragmatic guides, as Philipp 
Frank6 suggests. Professor Margenau would regard them 
as "metaprinciples." Although a definition is not given 
explicitly by him here, the meaning seems sufficiently clear 
from the context. But are they inherently scientific in 
nature or essentially extrascientific (i.e., metascientific)­
beyond observable nature? I note that Professor Margenau 
defines science as "everything accessible to experience." 
Why then should one not include these in the behavorial 
sciences, say the sociology of science? Extrascientific or 
"nonempirical" may imply merely a narrow definition 
of science. I cannot subscribe to his artificial distinction 
between socially acceptable elegance and socially produced 
education-the former being presumably a metaphysical 
principle; the latter, only cultural conditioning. Certainly 
intersubjectivity, i.e., the communality of science, is an 
inherently behavioral pattern of society, not a metaphysical 
presupposition. 
What are his "rational criteria" for selecting such meta­
physical principles, as contrasted with social pragmatism? 
Mach's economy of thought, to me, is basically a social 
development of science-not necessarily a lodestar, which 
he set out to reach. The cultural pattern, I believe, is an 
important factor; it is not "socially neutral." For example, 
so-called simplicity of mathematics depends upon the 
mathematical knowledge and technical skill of the user, 
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and is therefore a function of time. One would wish to 
record all historical failures to designate simple things, 
as well as remembered successes for any such proposed 
principle. Professor Margenau's qualitative distinction be­
tween a metaphysical principle and a physical theory, based 
upon the quantitative difference of their half-lives, lacks 
logical cogency. The explanation may be merely in the 
more subjective component of the former and the more 
objective aspects of the latter. Simplicity, indeed, may be 
of value not so much for its esthetic relations as for the 
dynamic impetus it gives to the developing of a theory, 
say by the heuristic employment of models (including 
mathematical ones). James Clerk Maxwell and Albert 
Einstein were both able to generalize more easily because 
of earlier, comparatively simple theories. Elegance and 
beauty, cultural attributes, both vary with time and place. 
As phenomena and their associated theories become more 
complex, simplicity itself may fade into a nebulous con­
cept-even into the grin of a vanishing Cheshire cat. 
Symmetry, too, is certainly less binding in art today than 
in the time of the Greeks. Nevertheless, does symmetry 
remain a metaphysical principle of modern science? Has 
the heuristic value of symmetry in dealing with the exist­
ence of elementary particles been a coincidence of large 
numbers-or an intrinsic phase of a universal design? How 
shall we describe its failure to insure parity? What about 
modern asymmetry tomorrow? Presumably complex phe­
nomena might well show symmetric relations as a first 
approximation, whereas essentially asymmetric, simple phe­
nomena would never exhibit any symmetry at all. Would 
Professor Margenau regard yesterday's Pythagorean glori­
fication of integers, used even by Johannes Kepler, as a 
metaphysical presupposition for science? What is the role 
of such an idea today? Is it akin to the late Arthur Stanley 
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Eddington's numerology? Would Professor Margenau have 
regarded William Prout's hypothesis as a metaphysical 
principle yesterday? What about now? 
What, moreover, must one do in the case of inevitable 
conflicts among such metaphysical principles, that are 
unresolved in social usage? The general gas law, it is true, 
may be relatively simple, but it certainly does not represent 
enough economy of thought inasmuch as it does not 
comprehend all the data contained in the less simple van 
der Waals expression. Professor Margenau himself is aware 
of this dilemma, but he does not propose to resolve it­
by any hypermetaphysical principle. What is particularly 
lacking in this restrictive view is the role of the human 
imagination! Despite Professor Margenau's unforgettable 
image of the neutrino as a "metaphysical gleam in Pauli's 
eye," I myself see no aura of metaphysics about it. It was 
a shrewd guess, and as such would normally be considered 
as a part of the psychology of creation and invention. 
There is nothing sacred or even rational about such a 
practice. The primary question is its usefulness. Such 
guides, indeed, are not necessarily "pre-empirical commit­
ments," except in that a scientist may personally believe in 
them. I would regard them as being born in experience and 
subject to growth changes, riot prenatal conceptions­
except in so far as our minds behave thus under certain 
conditions. They are just as much a part of the structure 
of physical theory as other presuppositions such as axioms 
-all justified pragmatically by their usefulness.
As a discussant, I cannot properly present my own view
on this occasion. I would, however, emphasize a remark 
of Max Born,7 namely, "Faith, imagination, and intuition 
are as essential to science as in any other human activity," 
although I would not necessarily agree with his designating 
such a belief a metaphysical principle. Factually, "we do 
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not know, but we are finding out more and more." Conse­
quently we all sketch a thoughtfully coherent world of 
science out of the seemingly chaotic world of appearances. 
Is it truly representative of an unknown world of nature 
behind the phenomena-on the assumption that nature 
itself exists? What about the relation between this sup­
posedly unchanging world of nature and the changing 
world of science? I cannot altogether agree with Professor 
Margenau that "science will tell us what things are real." 
Neither do I find or expect to find a one-to-one corre­
spondence between these two worlds-possibly because of 
the intermediacy of the brain, as stressed by Professor 
Bridgman. Through the increasing descriptability of 
science and the continuing predictability of its method­
ology, one gains more and more confidence in the likeness 
of the picture as a whole. To me, then, the dynamic world 
of science is essentially a symbol pointing to an indistinct 
invariant world of nature-the world of science created, to 
be sure, subjectively in man's mental image, but not out 
of nothing objective. 
Professor Margenau has indirectly introduced some 
strange gods to this meeting. I regret that he compares 
good science with poor theology, although he admits the 
possibility of good theology-parenthetically. Perhaps, 
therefore, I may be permitted to complete my own view .8 
I cannot endorse his belief that, "on the plane of principles, 
metaphysical or otherwise, I can see no difference between 
gods and electrons." On the contrary, the very nature of 
a physical electron and that of a spiritual God make manda­
tory an essential difference in approach-even though 
similar elements are common. In our one world of man 
and his environment there are undoubtedly religious 
aspects. Out of the transient phenomena, therefore, man 
can and does construct also a world of theology which, I 
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believe, points symbolically to the God of nature. This 
procedure may well involve extrascientific matters, even 
metascientific principles. Here, again, I find no one-to-one 
correspondence between the factitious world of theology, 
created out of the changing world of phenomena (including 
possibly revelations, i.e., insights) and the eternal world 
of God, but once again an increasing likeness as a whole 
is credible in view of the increasing understanding and 
continuing value of spiritual experiences. 
"Knowledge is power," but prior to knowledge there 
is always creative faith that some knowledge is within the 
grasp of man. "Credo ut intelligam" has been the guiding 
light for all progress. "Now abide the faith, hope, love, 
these three"-but the first of these is faith. For faith is 
what physicists-indeed, all men-live by, the basis of any 
"program for action." Perhaps beneath our confusing 
verbiage there is latent considerable agreement as to 
practice, and open disagreement only as to belief in the 
theoretical meaning of the practical. Regardless of the 
terminology, therefore, one might view these so-called 
"metaphysical principles of science" as follows: (1) either 
assumed before physics as an existent prefabricated mold0 
(i.e., strictly extrascientific), regarded possibly as amor­
phous science; 2 (2) or identified heuristically in the 
behavioral sciences 2•6 (i.e., definitely extraphysical), be­
lieved possibly crystallizing after physics to become sym­
bolic pointers 7 to a world beyond our sensory experiences. 
7 
The Role of A Priori Elements 
in Physical Theory 
ADOLF GRUNBAUM 
1. Introduction
I WISH first to examine critically the thesis that, 
in a physical theory comprising a network of hypotheses, 
any one component hypothesis can be preserved in the 
face of seemingly contrary empirical findings as part of an 
explanans of these very findings by making suitable com­
pensatory modifications in the remaining body of the total 
theory. This conception of the ingression of the a priori 
into physical knowledge is, of course, not the Kantian one, 
since it repudiates the latter's dichotomy between a priori 
and a posteriori certifiability as a basis for classifying 
individual principles of scientific theory. Instead, it claims 
that there is a fundamental theoretical ambiguity of the 
observational evidence which allows us, at a price, to 
refuse to abandon any one component hypothesis that 
we have thereby chosen for a priori espousal. This thesis 
was advanced about fifty years ago by the physicist, histo­
rian of physical thought, and philosopher of science 
Pierre Duhem (1861-1916).1 
Duhem's argument was articulated and endorsed by 
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Einstein a decade ago in regard to the epistemological 
status of physical geometry. I therefore wish to inquire 
into its validity in the context of geometry by giving a 
critique of each of the following: ( 1) Einstein's geometrical 
defense of the Duhemian ambiguity; and (2) Jacques 
Maritain's allegation of the existence of a philosophical, 
as distinct from scientific, escape from that ambiguity. 
This inquiry bears not only on the role of the a priori 
but also on the twin problem of the adequacy of physical 
theory as a description of the external world. For, once 
we shall have noted precisely the important distinction 
between the quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry 
in the sense of Duhem and the conventional adoption of 
such a geometry in the sense of Poincare, we shall see the 
following: so far as a geometry can be affirmed a priori in 
the sense of Duhem, its characterization of the geometric 
features of physical reality suffers from uncertainty in a 
less mitigable sense than it does merely because it asserts 
more than is entailed by its supporting evidence. 
Duhem maintains that, just as there can be no crucial 
verifying experiments, so also there can be no falsifying 
(refuting) experiments for any particular hypothesis ingre­
dient in a physical theory in isolation from the remaining 
component hypotheses of that theory.2 His grounds are 
that the logic of every disconfirmation no less than of 
every confirmation is such as to involve the confrontation 
with experience of an entire network of inextricably inter­
woven hypotheses rather than the separate testing of any 
one component hypothesis. The following symbolization 
will serve to clarify the reasoning underlying Duhem's 
contention. Let H represent the particular hypothesis to 
be tested, and A the set of auxiliary or collateral assump­
tions (laws, boundary conditions) integral to the deductive 
linkage descending from H down to the entailed observa-
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tional findings F which might be presumed to support H 
as such. Then, if the arrow, ➔• is the symbol for logical 
entailment, and the dot, •, represents conjunction, we 
have the following premise for an inductive, confirmatory 
inference of H:
[(H•A) ➔ F]•F 
But this premise not only precludes certainty as to the 
truth of H but also makes clear that even such merely 
inductive support as the evidence F does provide for a 
theoretical inference is conferred not on H by itself but 
only on the conjunction of H and the collateral assump­
tions A of the theory. 
An analogous inconclusiveness obtains, according to 
Duhem, in regard to the refutation of an isolated hypothe­
sis H upon the discovery of data O that may seem to be 
highly unfavorable to H because they are logically in­
compatible with the logical consequence F of H•A. I£ the 
tilde, ~, is used as the symbol for negation, the premise 
for the refutative inference that H is false is the following: 
[(H•A) ➔ F]- ~ F 
It is evident that this premise entails not the falsity of H 
by itself but only the weaker conclusion that H and A 
cannot both be true. And now Duhem makes the follow­
ing far-reaching claim: by allowing that H be true while 
A is false, the observational findings O-whatever they may 
be-always permit the theorist to preserve H as a part of 
an explanans of O through a suitable modification of A, 
such that the conjunction of Hand the now altered version 
of the auxiliary assumptions does explain the set 0, which 
is logically incompatible with F. In this significant sense, 
then, Duhem claims, an a priori element does enter physical 
theory, because the logical constraints imposed by the 
112 The Nature of Physical Knowledge 
observational data are sufficiently flexible and ambiguous 
theoretically to sanction a kind of a priori choice in regard 
to the alternative of either unalterably retaining H or 
abandoning it. 
We shall refer to this logical situation as the "Duhemian 
ambiguity" or "Duhemian alternative." 
I have argued elsewhere in detail 3 that Duhem's asser­
tion of the inevitable inconclusiveness of the falsifiability 
of an isolated explanatory hypothesis Hof empirical science 
is a non sequitur in the following sense: No general fea­
tures of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every 
hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which 
it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an essential 
part of the explanans of any empirical findings O what­
ever, provided that we rule out such trivial auxiliary 
hypotheses as ~ H v O (where v is the symbol for the in­
clusive "or"), which no scientist would deem explanatory. 
For-to summarize my detailed argument-Duhem cannot 
guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility 
of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of 
H and some nontrivial, revised version R of the original 
· auxiliary assumptions A: the existence of the required
nontrivial set R of collateral assumptions must be demon­
strated for each particular case.
Here I now wish to demonstrate geometrically that the 
categorical form of Duhem's thesis is false. A critical 
examination of Einstein's geometrical articulation of 
Duhem's thesis will now show that (1) the testing of 
physical geometry furnishes a counterexample to Duhem's 
categorical claim of the inevitable inconclusiveness of the 
falsifiability of part of an explanans, and (2) the valid 
core of Duhem's thesis is the following much weaker 
assertion: the logic of every disconfirmation, no less than 
of every confirmation, of an isolated empirical hypothesis 
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R is such as to involve at some stage or other an entire 
network of interwoven hypotheses in which His ingredient 
rather than the separate testing of the component H at 
every stage. 
2. Critique of Einstein's Duhemian Thesis
Physical geometry is usually conceived as the system of
metric relations exhibited by transported solid bodies in­
dependently of their particular chemical composition. On 
this conception, the criterion of congruence can be fur­
nished by a transported solid body for the purpose of de­
termining the geometry by measurement only if the 
computational application of suitable "corrections" (or, 
ideally, appropriate shielding) has assured rigidity in the 
sense of essentially eliminating inhomogeneous thermal, 
elastic, electromagnetic, and other perturbational influ­
ences. For these influem:es are "deforming" in the sense of 
producing changes of varying degree in different kinds of 
materials. Since the existence of perturbational influences 
thus issues in a dependence of the coincidence behavior of 
transported solid rods on the rods' chemical composition, 
and since physical geometry is concerned with the be­
havior common to all solids apart from their substance­
specific idiosyncrasies, the discounting of idiosyncratic 
distortions is an essential aspect of the logic of physical 
geometry. The demand for the computational elimination 
of such distortions as a prerequisite to the experimental 
determination of the geometry has a thermodynamic coun­
terpart: the requirement of a means for measuring tem­
perature which does not yield the discordant results 
produced by expansion thermometers at other than fixed 
points when different thermometric substances are em­
ployed. This thermometric need is fulfilled successfully by 
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Kelvin's thermodynamic scale of temperature. But atten­
tion to the implementation of the corresponding prereq­
uisite of physical geometry has led Einstein to impugn the 
empirical status of that geometry. He considers the case in 
which congruence has been defined by the diverse kinds of 
transported solid measuring rods as corrected for their re­
spective idiosyncratic distortions with a view to then mak­
ing an empirical determination of the prevailing geometry. 
And Einstein's thesis is that the very logic of computing 
these corrections precludes that the geometry itself be ac­
cessible to experimental ascertainment in isolation from 
other physical regularities. Specifically, he states his case in 
the form of a dialogue in which he attributes his own 
Duhemian view to Poincare and opposes Reichenbach's 
conception. But I submit that Poincare's text will not bear 
Einstein's interpretation. For, in speaking of the variations 
which solids exhibit under distorting influences, Poincare 
says, "We neglect these variations in laying the foundations 
of geometry, because, besides their being very slight, they 
are irregular and consequently seem to us accidental." 4 
. I am therefore taking the liberty of replacing Poincare in 
Einstein's dialogue by Duhem and Einstein. With this mod­
ification, the dialogue reads as follows: 5 
Duhem and Einstein: The empirically given bodies are not 
rigid, and consequently can not be used for the embodiment 
of geometric intervals. Therefore, the theorems of geometry 
are not verifiable. 
Reichenbach: I admit that there are no bodies which can 
be immediately adduced for the "real definition" [i.e., physical 
definition] of the interval. Nevertheless, this real definition 
can be achieved by taking the thermal volume-dependence, 
elasticity, electro- and magneto-striction, etc., into considera­
tion. That this is really and without contradiction possible, 
classical physics has surely demonstrated. 
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Duhem and Einstein: In gaining the real definition improved 
by yourself you have made use of physical laws, the formula­
tion of which presupposes (in this case) Euclidean geometry. 
The verification, of which you have spoken, refers, therefore, 
not merely to geometry but to the entire system of physical 
laws which constitute its foundation. An examination of geom­
etry by itself is consequently not thinkable .... Why should 
it consequently not be entirely up to me to choose geometry 
according to my own convenience (i.e., Euclidean) and to fit 
the remaining (in the usual sense "physical") laws to this 
choice in such manner that there can arise no contradiction of 
the whole with experience? 
Einstein is making two major points here: 
1. In obtaining a physical geometry by giving a physical
interpretation of the postulates of a formal geometric 
axiom system, the specification of the physical meaning of 
such theoretical terms as "congruent," "length," or "dis­
tance" is not at all simply a matter of giving an operational 
definition in the strict sense. Instead, what has been var­
iously called a "correspondence rule" (Margenau and 
Carnap), a "coordinative definition" (Reichenbach), an 
"epistemic correlation" (Northrop), or a "dictionary" (N. R. 
Campbell) is provided here through the mediation of hy­
potheses· and laws which are collateral to the geometric 
theory whose physical meaning is being specified. Einstein's 
point that the physical meaning of congruence is given by 
the transported rod as corrected theoretically for idiosyn­
cratic distortions is an illuminating one and has an abun­
dance of analogues throughout physical theory. Thus, in 
the theory of the Michelson-Morley experiment, for exam­
ple, statements about round-trip times are linked concep­
tually to the readings of physical clocks via the sophisticated 
optical theory of interferometry. And the inadequacy of 
conceiving of all correspondence rules in physical theory 
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as straightforward operational definitions is acknowledged 
by Professor Margenau's avowal in his contributioffto this
symposium that operational definitions are merely one 
species of correspondence rules. I would add that opera­
tional definitions are a rather simplified and limiting spe­
cies at that. 
2. Einstein's second claim, which is the cardinal one for
our purposes, is that the role of collateral theory in the 
physical definition of congruence is such as to issue in the 
following circularity, from which there is no escape, he 
maintains, short of acknowledging the existence of an a 
priori element in the sense of the Duhemian ambiguity: 
the rigid body is not even defined without first decreeing 
the validity of Euclidean geometry (or of some other par­
ticular geometry). For before the corrected rod can be used 
to make an empirical determination of the de facto geom­
etry, the required corrections must be computed via laws, 
such as those of elasticity, which involve Euclideanly cal­
culated areas and volumes. But clearly the warrant for thus 
introducing Euclidean geometry at this stage cannot be 
empirical. 
If Einstein's Duhemian thesis were to prove correct, it 
would have to be acknowledged that there is a sense in 
which physical geometry itself does not provide a geomet­
ric characterization of physical reality. For by this charac­
terization we understand the articulation of the system of 
relations obtaining between bodies and transported solid 
rods quite apart from their substance-specific distortions. 
And to the extent to which physical geometry is a priori 
in the sense of the Duhemian ambiguity, there is an in­
gression of a priori elements into physical theory to fill 
distinctively geometric gaps in our knowledge of the phys­
ical world. 
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I now wish to set forth my doubts regarding the sound­
ness of Einstein's contention. 
There can be no question that the laws used to make the 
corrections for deformations involve areas and volumes in 
a fundamental way (e.g., in the definitions of the elastic 
stresses and strains) and that this involvement presupposes 
a geometry, as is evident from the area and volume formu­
las of differential geometry, which contain the square root 
of the determinant of the components g,1c of the metric 
tensor. Now suppose that we begin with a set of Euclid­
eanly formulated physical laws P0 in correcting for the dis­
tortions induced by perturbations and then use the thus 
Euclideanly corrected congruence standard for empirically 
exploring the geometry of space by determining the metric 
tensor. The initial stipulational affirmation of the Euclid­
ean geometry G0 in the physical laws P0 used to compute 
the corrections in no way assures that the geometry ob­
tained by the corrected rods will be Euclidean! If it is non­
Euclidean, then the question is: \Vhat will be involved in 
Einstein's fitting of the physical laws to preserve Euclid­
eanism and avoid a contradiction of the theoretical system 
with experience? Will the adjustments in P0 necessitated 
by the retention of Euclideanism entail merely a change in 
the dependence of the length assigned to the transported 
rod on such nonpositional parameters as temperature, pres­
sure, magnetic field, etc.? Or could the putative empirical 
findings compel that the length of the transported rod be 
likewise made a nonconstant function of its position and 
orientation as independent variables in order to square the 
coincidence findings with the requirement of Euclidean­
ism? The temporal variability of distorting influences and 
the possibility of obtaining non-Euclidean results by meas­
urements carried out in a spatial region uniformly char­
acterized by standard conditions of temperature, pressure, 
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electric and magnetic field strength, etc., show it to be quite 
doubtful that the preservation of Euclideanism could al­
ways be accomplished short of introducing the dependence 
of the rod's length on the independent variables of position 
and orientation. Thus, in order to retain Euclideanism, it 
may be necessary to remetrize entirely apart from any con­
sideration of idiosyncratic distortions and even after cor­
recting for these in some way or other. But this kind of 
remetrization, though entirely admissible in other con­
texts, does not provide the requfaite support for Einstein's 
Duhemian thesis. For it is the avowed onus of that thesis 
to show that the geometry by itself cannot be held to be 
empirical even when, with Reichenbach, we have sought 
to assure its empirical character by choosing and then ad­
hering to the customary (standard) definition of congru­
ence, which excludes resorting to such remetrization. 
It is precisely such remetrization which Poincare invoked 
as a basis for his claim that, if the customary definition of 
congruence on the basis of the coincidence behavior com­
mon to all kinds of solid rods does not assure a Euclidean 
description of the facts, then such a description can be 
guaranteed remetrizationally, i.e., by merely choosing an 
appropriately different noncustomary congruence defini­
tion which makes the length of a solid rod a specified 
nonconstant function of the independent variables of posi­
tion and orientation. 
By resting the possibility of giving either a Euclidean or 
a non-Euclidean description of the same spatiophysical 
facts on alternative metrizability in this sense, Poincare is 
thus not at all invoking the alleged inductive ambiguity 
which the Duhemian claims to prevail even when congru­
ence is defined in the customary fashion by a standard rod 
for whose idiosyncratic deformations allowance has been 
made computationally. For Poincare tells us that, quite 
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apart from any considerations of distorting influences and
even after correcting for these in some way or other, we are
at liberty to define congruence-and thereby to fix the asso­
ciated geometry appropriate to the given facts-either by
calling a solid rod equal to itself everywhere or by making
its length vary in a specified way with its position or orien­
tation. Thus understood, Poincare's conventionalist con­
ception of geometry is aprioristic in an innocuous sense.6 
By contrast, we shall now see that, in the context of his
assumptions, the Duhemian cannot guarantee an a priori
choice of a particular geometry from a set S of alternative
geometries, since there is an important class of conditions
under which the membership of his set S would be just one
unique geometry!
That the geometry by itself may well be empirical, con­
trary to Duhem and Einstein, once we have renounced the
kinds of alternative congruence definitions employed by
Poincare, is seen from the following possibilities of its suc­
cessful empirical determination. After assumedly obtaining
a non-Euclidean geometry G1 from measurements with a
rod corrected on the basis of Euclideanly formulated phys­
ical laws Po, we can revise P0 so as to conform to the non­
Euclidean geometry G1 just obtained by measurement.
This retroactive revision of P0 would be effected by recal­
culating such quantities as areas and volumes on the basis
of G1 and changing the functional dependencies relating
them to temperature and other physical parameters. \Ve
thus obtain a new set of physical laws P1 • Now we use this
set P1 of laws to correct the rods for perturbational influ­
ences and then determine the geometry with the thus-cor­
rected rods. If the result is a geometry G2 different from
Gi, then, if there is convergence to a geometry of constant
curvature upon repeating this process several more times,
we must continue to repeat it an additional finite number
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of times until the geometry G,. ingredient in the laws Pn 
providing the basis for perturbation corrections is . indeed 
the same as the geometry obtained by measurements with 
rods that have been corrected via the set P ,.. If there is such 
convergence at all, it will be to the same geometry G,. even 
if the physical laws used in making the initial corrections 
are not the set P0, which presupposes Euclidean geometry, 
but a different set P based on some non-Euclidean geom­
etry or other. That there can exist only one such geometry 
of constant curvature G,. would seem to be guaranteed by 
the identity of G,. with the uniqui underlying geometry 
Gt characterized by the following properties: (l) Gt would 
be exhibited by the coincidence behavior of a transported 
rod if the whole of the space were actually free of deform­
ing influences; (2) Gt would be obtained by measurements 
with rods corrected for distortions on the basis of physical 
laws Pt presupposing G1; and (3) Gt would be found to 
prevail in a given relatively small, perturbation-free region 
of the space quite independently of the assumed geometry 
ingredient in the correctional physical laws. Hence, if our 
method of successive approximation does converge to a 
geometry G,. of constant curvature, then G .. would be this 
unique underlying geometry Gt . And, in that event, we 
can claim to have found empirically that Gt is indeed the 
geometry prevailing in the entire space which we have ex­
plored. 
But what if there is no convergence? It might happen 
that, whereas convergence would obtain by starting out 
with corrections based on the set Po of physical laws, it 
would not obtain by beginning instead with corrections 
presupposing some particular non-Euclidean set P, or vice 
versa: just as in the case of Newton's method of successive 
approximation, there are conditions, as Mr. A. Suna has 
pointed out to me, under which there would be no con-
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vergence. We might then nonetheless succeed as follows in 
finding the geometry Gt empirically, if our space is one of 
constant curvature. 
The geometry G, resulting from measurements by means 
of a corrected rod is a single-valued function of the geom­
etry Ga assumed in the correctional physical laws, and a 
Laplacian demon having sufficient knowledge of the facts 
of the world would know this function G, = f(Ga)• Accord­
ingly, we can formulate the problem of determining the 
geometry empirically as the problem of finding the point 
of intersection between the curve representing this func­
tion and the straight line G, Ga, That there exists one 
and only one such point of intersection follows from the 
existence of the geometry Gt defined above, provided that 
our space is one of constant curvature. Thus, what is now 
needed is to make determinations of the G, corresponding 
to a number of geometrically different sets of correctional 
physical laws Pa, to draw the most reasonable curve 
Gr = f(Ga) through this finite number of points (Ga, Gr), 
and then to find the point of intersection of this curve and 
the straight line Gr Ga. 
'\Vhether this point of intersection turns out to be the 
one representing Euclidean geometry or not is beyond the 
reach of our conventions, barring a remetrization. And 
thus the least that we can conclude is that, since empirical 
findings can greatly narrow down the range of uncertainty 
as to the prevailing geometry, there is no assurance of the 
latitude for the choice of a geometry which Einstein takes 
for granted. Einstein's Duhemian position would appear 
to be inescapable only if our proposed method of determin­
ing the geometry by itself empirically cannot be generalized 
in some way to cover the general relativity case of a space 
of variable curvature (in which the geometry cannot be 
= 
= 
122 The Nature of Physical Knowledge 
specified by a single scalar like the Gaussian curvature) and 
if the latter kind of theory turns out to be true. 
3. Duhem's Thesis and]. Maritain's Philosophy
of Geometry
If my proposed method of escaping from the web of the
Duhemian ambiguity were shown to be unsuccessful, and 
if there should happen to be no other scientifically viable 
means of escape, then, it seems to me, we would unflinch­
ingly have to resign ourselves to this relatively unmit­
igable type of uncertainty. No, says the philosopher Jacques 
Maritain, who enticingly beckons us to take heart. The 
scientific elusiveness of the correct geometric description 
of external reality must not lead us to suppose, he tells us, 
that philosophy, when divorced from mathematical physics, 
cannot rescue us from the labyrinth of the Duhemian per­
plexity and unveil for us the structure of what he calls "ens 
geometricum reale" (real geometrical being).7 As against 
Maritain's conception of the capabilities of philosophy as 
an avenue of cognition, I wish to uphold the following 
excellent declaration by Professor Bridgman, which he gave 
in his paper for the present symposium: "The physicist 
emphatically would not say that his knowledge presump­
tively will not lead to a full understanding of reality for 
the reason that there are other kinds of knowledge than 
the knowledge in which he deals." 8 To justify my endorse­
ment of Professor Bridgman's statement in this context, 
I shall give a brief critique of Maritain's philosophy of 
geometry as presented in his book The Degrees of Knowl­
edge.9 
I have selected Maritain's views for rebuttal because they 
typify the conception of those who believe that the philos­
opher as such has at his disposal means for fathoming the 
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structure of external reality which are not available to the 
scientist. In outline, Maritain endeavors to justify this idea 
in regard to geometry along the following lines. Says he: 
"There is no clearer word than the word reality, which 
means that which is .... What is meant when it is asked 
whether real space is euclidean or non-euclidean ... ?" 10 
To prepare for his answer to this question, he explains the 
following: "The word real has not the same meaning for 
the philosopher, the mathematician and the physicist.11
... For the physicist a space is 'real' when the geometry 
to which it corresponds permits of the construction of a 
physico-mathematical universe which coherently and com­
pletely symbolizes physical phenomena, and where all our 
graduated readings find themselves 'explained.' And it is 
obvious that from this point of view no space of any kind 
holds any sort of privileged position.12 But ... the ques­
tion is to know what is real space in the philosophical 
meaning of the word, i.e., as a 'real' entity ... designating 
an object of thought capable of an extra-mental exist­
ence .... " 13 One is immediately puzzled as to how Mari­
tain conceives that his distinction between physically real 
space and the philosophically real space which is avowedly 
extra-mental is not an empty distinction without a differ­
ence. And, instead of being resolved, this puzzlement only 
deepens when he tells us that by the extra-mental geometric 
features of existing bodies he understands "those properties 
which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the 
physical." 14 But let us suspend judgment concerning this 
difficulty and see whether it is not cleared up by his treat­
ment of the following question posed 15 by him: How are 
we to know whether it is Euclidean geometry or one of the 
non-Euclidean geometries that represents the structure of 
the philosophically real, i.e., extra-mental or external 
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space? In regard to this question, he makes the following 
assertions: 
I. The capabilities of physical measurements to yield
the answer to the question are nil,16 because a geometry is 
presupposed in the theory of our measuring instruments 
which forms the basis of corrections for "accessory varia­
tions due to various physical circumstances." 17 Of course, 
we recognize this contention to be a strong form of the 
Duhemian one, although Maritain does not refer to 
Duhem. 
2. The several non-Euclidean geometries depend for
their consistency on their formal translatability into Eu­
clidean geometry. This translation is effected by providing 
a Euclidean model of the particular non-Euclidean geom­
etry in the sense of embedding an appropriately curved 
non-Euclidean surface in the three-dimensional Euclidean 
space. And the privileged position which Euclidean geom­
etry en joys as the underwriter of the consistency of the 
non-Euclidean geometries thus issues in a correlative de­
pendence of the intuitability of the non-Euclidean geom­
etries on the primary intuitability of the Euclideanism of 
·the embedding three-dimensional hyperspace.18 
Using the twin arguments from consistency and intui­
tability, Maritain then reaches the following final conclu­
sion: "The non-Euclidean spaces can then without the 
least intrinsic contradiction be the object of consideration 
by the mind, but there would be a contradiction in sup­
posing their existence outside the mind, and thereby sup­
pressing, for their benefit, the existence of the foundation 
on which the notion of them is based. 
"Either way we are thus led to admit, despite the use 
which astronomy makes of them, that these non-euclidean 
spaces are rational [i.e., purely mental] beings; and that the 
geometric properties of existing bodies, those properties 
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which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the 
physical, are those which characterize euclidean space. For 
philosophy it is euclidean space which appears as an ens 
geometricum reale." 19 
I submit that Maritain's thesis is unsound in its entirety 
and can be completely refuted as follows. 
First, as Hilbert and Bernays have explained,20 the con• 
sistency of the Euclidean axiom system is not vouchsafed 
by its intuitive plausibility as an adequate description of 
the space of our immediate physical environment. Instead, 
we establish the consistency of Euclidean geometry by pro• 
viding a model of the formal Euclidean postulates in the 
domain of real numbers in the manner of analytic geom­
etry.21 Now, Maritain overlooks that precisely the same 
procedure of providing a real number model can be used 
to establish the internal consistency of the various non­
Euclidean geometries without the mediation of a prior 
translation into Euclidean geometry (except possibly in 
an irrelevant heuristic sense). And he is misled by the fact 
that, historically, the consistency of the several non-Euclid­
ean geometries was established by means of a translation 
into Euclidean geometry, as for example in Klein's relative 
consistency proof of hyperbolic geometry via a model fur­
nished by the interior of a circle in the Euclidean plane. 
For surely the temporal priority of Euclidean geometry 
inherent in the historical circumstances of our discovery 
of the internal consistency of the various non-Euclidean 
geometries hardly serves to establish the logical primacy 
of Euclidean geometry as the sole guarantee of their con­
sistency. And Maritain's error on this count is only com­
pounded by his intuitability argument for the uniqueness 
of Euclideanism as the only possible structure of extra­
mental reality. The latter argument is vitiated by the in­
veterate error of being victimized by the misleading 
126 The Nature of Physical Knowledge 
connotation of embedding in a Euclidean hyperspace, 
which is possessed by the terms "curved space" and "curva­
ture of a surface." This connotation springs from unaware­
ness that the Gaussian curvature of a 2-space and the 
Riemannian curvatures for the various orientations at 
points of a 3-space are intrinsically definable and discern­
ible properties of these spaces, requiring no embedding. 
Moreover, Maritain overlooks here that even when the 
consistency proof of hyperbolic geometry, for example, is 
given on the basis of Euclidean geometry-which we saw 
is quite unnecessary-this can be accomplished without em­
bedding, as in the case of the aforementioned two-dimen­
sional Klein model, just as readily as by Beltrami's 
procedure of embedding a surface of constant negative 
Gaussian curvature (containing singular lines) in Euclid­
ean 3-space. 
Lastly, it can surely not be maintained that "the geo­
metric properties of existing bodies" are "those properties 
which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the 
physical." For, in that case, geometry would be the study 
of purely imagined thought-objects, which will, of course, 
turn out to have Euclidean properties, if Maritain's imag­
ination thus endows them. And the geometry of such an 
imagined space could then not qualify as the geometry of 
Maritain's real or extra-mental space. The geometric theory 
of external reality does indeed abstract from a large class 
of physical properties in the sense of being the metrical 
study of the coincidence behavior of transported solids in­
dependently of the solids' substance-specific physical prop­
erties. But this kind of abstracting does not deprive metrical 
coincidence behavior of its physicality. And if the methods 
of the physicist cannot fathom the laws of that behavior, 
then certainly no other kind of intellectual endeavor will 
succeed in doing so. 
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4. Remarks on the Contributions by Margenau and
Bridgman
127 
Professor Margenau's intersubjectivity or communality
of evidence as a controlling factor of scientific method is a 
safeguard whose reasonableness derives from the mutuality 
of accreditation obtaining between theory and evidence in 
virtue of the interpenetration of the criteria of credibility 
which certify evidence as bona fide, on the one hand, and 
theory as evidentially warranted on the other. This inter­
penetration enters into the scientific assessment of the 
credibility of reports of nonrepeatable kinds of experiences. 
The authenticity of the claims of such isolated kinds of 
experiences is made no less dependent on the latter's con­
formity to previous theory than evidence, in turn, is used 
to decide on the acceptability of a theory. Thus, loosely 
speaking, not only is evidence used to confirm a theory, but 
theory is invoked to certify reports of observations as verid­
ical. And, in this sense, the quasi a priori lurks in the twi­
light of the fuzzy boundary between the evidence and its 
interpretation, between the observation terms and the 
theoretical terms of the language of physics. To cite but 
one example from the recent history of physics, one need 
only recall that, even before Shankland and his associates 
denied the adequacy of D. C. Miller's controls in his runs 
of the Michelson-Morley experiment,22 many if not most 
physicists refused to give credence to Miller's claims . .,c\nd 
their grounds for believing that Miller's findings could not 
have been obtained under the conditions claimed by him 
were none other than their quasi a priori theoretical sup­
position that the site of the Case Institute of Technology 
is not a terrestrial singularity. 
In this same vein, it seems to me, one can reasonably 
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reply to Professor Bridgman's challenge that we justify 
our confidence in our being awake rather than dreaming 
at certain times. If asked on what grounds I believe to be 
awake at the present time while talking, for example, I 
would answer not, as Hume did, that veridical perception 
is more vivid than dream experience but rather that the 
conformity of the structure of my present experiences to a 
large body of independently confirmed theory justifies my 
belief that they are waking experiences. And I would add 




Question by Dr. Hanson of the University of Minnesota: 
Professor Margenau, I'd like to pose one question to Pro­
fessor Lande. Since he knows that I ascribe to the Copen­
hagen interpretation perhaps more enthusiastically than 
is good for me, perhaps I may put it somewhat rhetorically. 
The point is this: Lande is perfectly right in saying that 
there is a sense in which, for example, if an accident took 
place on the road I could kick in its direction, but I could 
not kick at the probability amplitude of the density of ac­
cidents on Sunday. That is perfectly true. But, on the other 
hand, there is something, for example, in the beta-ray ex­
periment, the diffraction patterns there, which seems to be 
perfectly kickable at, in exactly the same way that we were 
able to use the fact of periodic distributions in the Laue 
experiments on x-rays to settle that there was something 
wavelike there. I think we are perfectly correct in taking 
seriously the fact that in the Davisson-Germer experiments 
and in the G. P. Thomson work there was something that 
had to be taken seriously; to identify this kind of distribu-
• Transcribed from a tape recording.
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tion with the sort of distribution that we have of the den­
sity of accidents on a Sunday seems to me a bit quick and 
I felt unhappy about it. It is also worth while noting, I 
think, that the 1923 paper by Duane that he mentions cer­
tainly points out that this was not very carefully read by 
most physicists. If what the 1923 paper asserts is true, the 
consequences throughout the whole history of our under­
standing of physics are going to be serious indeed. It is 
just like the 1925-1926 papers by J. J. Thomson, in which, 
for example, he tries to explain the Compton effect in
terms of a pure wave theory (radiation pressure, etc., 
which is wholly qualitative); it is perfectly clear that no 
one has ever read them-not seriously, and if he was cor­
rect there would be, you might say, an ante-Lande and an 
ante-Born approach to the whole problem, and I was just 
wondering how he would react to either of these possi­
bilities. 
Lande: My comment is that, to adhere to the dualistic 
theory in which neither waves nor particles are real, nor 
quite unreal, is a complicated point of view, and as I 
said, the enormous literature produced day after day in 
order to make this duality more palatable may be a sign 
that basically we are not satisfied with it. We want to have 
a unitary theory; and (if I may use the word) even after 
thirty years of persuasion we still want a unitary theory. 
In fact, Born thirty years ago proposed the beginnings of 
a unitary theory in which even the diffraction experiments 
with maxima and minima, which look so very wavelike, 
still are interpreted in the same unitary way, as confirmed 
by the statistical build-up of the diffraction patterns. 
According to the duality, or let us say according to the 
original opinion, all these were "quantum miracles." The 
electrons seem to misbehave. They ought to behave ac­
cording to the rules of classical mechanics but they 
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simply, very strangely, obey wave laws. This obeying of 
wave laws has been codified and raised to an article of 
faith for the last thirty years. I think that as long as we be­
lieve that electrons misbehave we do not understand. But 
I think we could make this misbehavior, these miracles, 
understood by going a little deeper into the formal back­
ground of the interference law and the periodicity law. 
Both are, in my opinion, quite natural and simple, and 
have to be so according to what I said before. 
The Chairman invited further questions and comments 
from the floor. 
Saul A. Basri: It seems to me that as human beings the 
only things we can be sure of are our sensations and 
thoughts, and that because of this we assume that our sen­
sations are due to things outside us which we call the 
macroscopic world. In other words, the existence of the 
macroscopic world is an assumption to explain our sensa­
tions, perhaps to put order into our sensations; and that 
the microscopic world is another assumption of the same 
kind. In other words, we assume the existence of electrons 
in order to explain the properties of the macroscopic world 
which we assume exist to explain our sensations. It is this 
which I wonder whether you, Professor Margenau, or Pro­
fessor Bridgman or Professor Lande would like to com­
ment on. 
Chairman: Professor Bridgman? 
Bridgman: I never use the word "reality"; I was just 
talking about the way I thought other people used it. 
Basri: But would you agree with that view, or would 
you disagree? 
Bridgman: Would I agree that other people say that 
things are real? 
Basri: No, with this particular view of looking at physi­
cal reality through the macroscopic and microscopic world. 
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Bridgman: Well, I say I don't use the word. You can 
get along without it. 
Basri: Would you say this is what you understand by the 
microscopic world? 
Bridgman: Yes, I think the microscopic world has to 
have its explanation. Your language about the microscopic 
world is ultimately reducible to the language you used to 
describe the macroscopic world. 
Margenau: Since I was included in this interrogation, 
may I say briefly what my view of reality is. I agree with 
Professor Bridgman that the term is obnoxious, that it 
has a great variety of meanings and causes a great deal of 
confusion in the minds of people, including physicists. 
One might therefore be well advised to shun its use. How­
ever, it seems to me that, if people 300 years ago, physi­
cists 300 years ago, had decided not to use the word "force," 
which was as vague as is the word reality today, physics 
might not have developed as rapidly, as consistently, as 
it has. 
There are two ways in which the difficulties arising from 
the diffusive usage can be remedied. One is to prohibit 
the use of a diffuse term. The other way is to make it more 
precise. This is indeed what happened to the terms "force," 
"energy," "momentum," which now beneficently infest the 
realm of physics. I don't believe that we should now have 
any objection to their use, because they have been refined, 
because they have been made definite. What I propose is 
to make the meaning of the term "reality" equally definite. 
Let me now turn to the question of the interrogator. 
Yes, indeed, the role of theoretical physics may be regarded 
as an artifact to make what I would like to call sensory 
reality meaningful; to make sense impressions, observa­
tions, and so forth, coherent; to bestow upon them a 
degree of organization, of cohesion, of lucidity which they 
DISCUSSION 133 
in themselves do not possess. We do this, I think, not so 
much by a direct appeal to the ontological existence of an 
external world, microscopic or macroscopic. To be sure, 
there are many who pursue that course. But this is not 
necessary in science. We can, in a sense, following Kant, 
investigate the processes by which we do reach trans­
subjective certainty. 
The process, as I see it, is something like this. One 
matches the immediate experiences against a realm of ra­
tional common sense. One establishes rules of correspond­
ence between the immediately perceived flash of light and 
the construct light which is well known to the theoretical 
physicist, the construct which involves the idea of electro­
magnetic fields, and so forth. One sets up a correspondence 
between this immediate experience and these constructs. 
Now the constructs are so chosen in the first place that 
they make for what I call metaphysical satisfaction. They 
must satisfy economy of thought; they must be logically 
fertile; they must lead to consequences which can be ob­
served. This is one set of requirements to which the so­
called constructs may be subjected, must be subjected. 
This set of requirements, in contradiction to an under­
standing which had arisen in Dr. Seeger's mind, is not ab­
solutely fixed. I think I said in my own talk, and I have 
written, that they are pragmatic devices, although I chose 
to call them metaphysical. Metaphysics can be pragmatic, 
can be tentative, and all that. 
We impose upon our constructs these rules; then we see 
whether they agree through their deductions with empiri­
cal observations. So there are two classes of requirements: 
those called methodological or metaphysical, and those 
called empirical. When both are met we declare: what was 
originally merely a construct has now become what I 
have termed a verifact. At this point, since I was asked, 
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"What is physical reality?" I would answer, the verifacts 
of the physical sciences. This is to me the most satisfactory 
way of stabilizing, of refining, the concept of physical 
reality. 
Bridgman: May I ask one question? Is this reality which 
you describe this way unique? 
Margenau: If you mean unique in the sense of categor­
ical, clearly distinct from everything else, my answer is no. 
There is nothing in human experience that can be said 
to be unique, distinct, and valid in a self-declaratory sense. 
I would apply this even to the laws of logic. Certainly there 
are no pigeonholes in human experience. In other words, 
the concept of reality, or physical reality, which I have 
evolved in so inadequate and brief a fashion, is not one 
that allows you to confer the judgment, "This is real,'' 
"This is not real," upon all entities that interest the 
physical scientist. There are shadings. There are instances 
in which we are not willing to say, "This is real, and this 
is not." 
Many of these instances are of no interest whatever. I 
suppose most of us would be willing to concede that 
electrons are real. When you come to the mass of an 
electron, would you say it is real? \\Tell, you might say, 
yes it is, but in a sense it is not. Are qualities real? Are 
attributes real? Are they real in the same sense as what 
Aristotle called substances, and what we now call physical 
systems (electrons, atoms, stars)? Such questions are to me 
uninteresting, and I should not wish to answer them 
except by statutory definition. In a sense, then, physical 
reality is not unique. 
However, it seems to me that if an approach like the 
one outlined were employed, the term "reality," the con­
cept of reality, might gradually, progressively, attain a 
measure of precision if not uniqueness which is going to 
DISCUSSION 135 
help the scientist, especially in his relations to the phi­
losopher. It is my conviction that what the physicist 
ought to do is to try to refine his terms, endeavoring to 
make the philosopher see what he is doing, to adjust his 
own language to philosophic language, rather than slam 
the door upon the philosopher, rather than setting up 
an iron curtain and establishing one more specialty in the 
large domain of human concerns. And I think that by 
trying to make things more precise, by trying to show the 
philosopher what the physicist means by his terms, and, 
reciprocally, by inducing in the physicist an attitude which 
inclines him to listen with attention and understanding to 
what the philosopher is saying, we are going to bridge 
one of the deep crevasses that divides and bifurcates our 
culture. 
John Forwalter: It seems to me that if we had an able 
semanticist present he might resolve our phenomenological 
problem somewhat. Professor Bridgman, of course, does 
so in terms of symbol and reality. However, much of the 
discussion seems to be a denial on the physicists' part 
that there is a reality. Perhaps this was accidental and can 
be cleared away easily. Really, the framework for clearing 
it away is present in many of the papers, such as that a 
distinction between microscopic and macroscopic leads us 
on to the notion that reality is in many levels or, if you 
prefer, seen through the eyes of many disciplines, and 
with the proper instruments we work within one of these 
levels. But the distinction a semanticist might make would 
be to warn us when we are talking about interpretive 
matters and when we are talking about, let us say, the 
data that we get from our instruments. The scientist would 
take the data, he would find some relationships among 
them-this is an old-fashioned way of looking at science, 
I recognize-he would make some constructs, he would 
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relate them to a general network of knowledge, and then 
he would apply various tests, and I think a logician might 
have found that our tests for scientific truths were not 
all-encompassing; and then the scientist would end it 
here. Perhaps this is far enough to go with it. Even our 
philosophers present did not seem to go beyond to a 
necessary relationship between the facts as physics finds 
them, or the interpretations it puts upon them, and an 
older way of looking at reality. If comment is necessary 
it should be-I should like to have it-along the lines of 
making some of these distinctions or of emphasizing the 
over-all approach of science in terms of various levels of 
knowledge. 
Margenau: I believe there were no specific questions 
here; I thought the remarks very illuminating and inter­
esting. 
Question from the floor (name not available): I should 
like to comment on Professor Collingwood's paper. I think 
he was trying to say that in addition to the primarily 
quantitative structure of physics there is a kind of quali­
tative knowledge, and so the question is this-in addition 
to the general principles that you have discussed as physi­
cists that grew beyond the proper body of physics itself, 
do they not also assume a knowledge of things and com­
mon-sense use of these words which is also outside of the 
general volume of physics? If they do not make this assump­
tion they would not be able to claim that they are using 
the same measuring rods on two different occasions when 
they are moving from place to place. 
Margenau: I think there are two questions being asked. 
One is, must the scientist distinguish between quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of science? Must he acknowledge 
the necessity of qualitative judgments? The second ques­
tion is, are there not certain peculiar qualitative things 
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assumed even in physical science-things like the entities 
to which we assign quantitative properties? Am I stating 
your questions correctly, sir? 
Questioner: Well, I think that if the physicist did not 
make this kind of assumption-would he know how to 
find and recognize ordinary common-sense things? 
Margenau: There has to be a certain degree of, shall I 
say, substantiality, a certain degree of permanence in the 
systems to which the scientist ascribes measurable quanti­
ties. Now, with respect to the latter question, I would 
answer as follows: Yes, indeed, there is an Aristotelian 
hangover even in modern quantum physics. Because we 
still acknowledge the existence of electrons; the existence 
of neutrinos; the existence of what we generically call 
systems, although they are not directly sensible. The 
modern term system is the counterpart of Aristotelian 
substance; and the modern term quantity is the counter­
part of the Aristotelian accidents. I wonder here if Mr. 
Collingwood would agree with me. 
Collingwood: Quantity means the same in both con­
texts, I think. 
Margenau: I would suppose that in every stage of science 
a distinction between quantitative and qualitative attri­
butes of things is necessary. ,ve never get around it. How­
ever, as I read the history of science I seem to observe a 
progressive elimination of qualities in favor of quantities. 
Qualities are supposed to be elusive things, incapable of 
being approached, at any rate captured, by an application 
of scientific methods. 
Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. 
Some fifty years ago, color was one of these esoteric quali­
ties that could not be measured, and the reason was this: 
people stated the attributes of color, defined color, in terms 
of two observables, or "quantities," if you please. One was 
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hue-wavelength; and the other was intensity. Now it is 
true that an artist could paint two canvases in blue, both 
having the same intensity and hue; and yet the two blues 
would look different to the eye of the observer. 
Here then arose the claim that color is a quality, some­
thing that escapes the net of the scientist; something that 
is esoteric, that is really not tractable by the methods of 
science. Now what has happened is this: someone dis­
covered that there is a further quantity, a third observable, 
involved in this business, an observable called saturation. 
Now if you paint two canvases in blue in such a way that 
they agree with respect to hue, intensity, and saturation, 
they also look alike. And so you have here the conversion 
of what was at one time called a quality, not tractable by 
the methods of science, into a scientific quantity capable 
of numerical quantification. And it seems to me that this 
process is going on forever. \Ve cannot say that everything 
in the world that we regard as a quality will some day be 
converted into a quantity. This is a question of faith­
not one of the maxims, metaphysical or ·otherwise, of 
science. I myself believe that this process of conversion of 
qualities into quantities is going on as long as the human 
mind inquires. 
Grilnbaum: I just wanted to remark-I thought I de­
tected in Professor Collingwood's paper and also in the 
discussion something to the effect that quantifiability in 
the usual sense of metrizability is a necessary condition 
for scientific tractability. Now surely this is not so. After 
all, there are topological problems, for example. in general 
relativity theory, which are as scientific as other problems, 
and they are certainly not quantitative problems in the 
usual sense. So it seems to me somewhat dangerous to 
concede first of all that mathematics is the science of 
quantity; I think the domain of mathematics had better be 
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left undefined because it is an elastically conceived domain 
which changes. And I think it is also pregnant with mis­
leading potentialities to talk about scientific tractability 
in terms of quantifiability in the sense of metrical scales 
of measurement. Conceptual circumscribability, axiomat­
izability, articulatability are at least some of the crucial 
requirements for scientific tractability; not necessarily, it 
seems to me, quantifiability in the sense of scales of 
measurement. 
Margenau: I quite agree. One must not take the term 
quantification in too literal and arithmetical a sense. How­
ever, I think it might be maintained that even topology 
is based on measurability and on numbers. I chose the 
term quantifiability, quantification in a larger sense; but 
it is certainly important to point out as Dr. Grilnbaum has 
done that science at all stages does deal with qualities in 
the sense of noncontinuous, nonquantifiable, nonarith­
metical entities. 
Question from floor (name not available): Professor 
Margenau, would you care to comment on Professor 
Seeger's remark that your deductive method is simply 
tautological? You cannot get anything new. So, what do 
you think about the axiomatic method? 
Margenau: May I say that I agree with almost every 
contention made by Dr. Seeger, but I do not agree with 
his reading of my arguments. As a matter of fact, I hoped 
it would be explicit that I do not rely solely upon the 
axiomatic method. The use of the axiomatic method 
amounts to this: one starts with postulates-these postulates 
are part of the axiomatic system. From these axioms one 
derives theorems, as many as possible; one wishes to exploit 
fully the logical contents of the axioms. So one spins out 
these theorems. These theorems are then related to what 
one might call empirical nature or perceptory nature, by 
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certain correspondence rules, epistemic correlations which 
link, for example, the point in the mathematician's ·sense 
with the dot of chalk on the blackboard, the force in the 
sense of Newton's law with the force which Professor 
Lande experiences when he kicks an object. These are 
not the same entities logically; they are correlated by these 
rules of correspondence. 
Now what the axiomatic method achieves is this: it 
makes quite explicit everything that is contained within 
the postulates at the start of the scientific system. It does 
not make them true. Reliance on the results of this analytic 
process of spinning out from postulates what they contain 
logically will never confirm, will never establish empirical 
truth. It will establish internal consistency. Now of course 
errors in science are of various kinds. One can easily go 
wrong in mistaking an observation, making an error in a 
reading. One can also go wrong in misreading the impli­
cations of an axiomatic system. Now the latter kind of 
error is avoided by an effort on the part of scientists to set 
up an axiomatic scheme for every science. When that axio-
. matic scheme is at hand, one can see whether the results 
it yields are in agreement with observations. Then comes 
the matter of empirical confinnation, validation; and 
when you have both these things, namely the axiomatic 
scheme providing facilities for deductive procedure to­
gether with the empirical, the inductive pursuit which 
starts at the other end of the range of our experience, then 
you have what, not I, but everybody in science, calls an 
exact science. We distinguish exact sciences from cor­
relational, or inexact, or descriptive sciences. This is a 
technical term which I use. That does not mean that 
that kind of science is necessarily more exact because it 
uses axioms. It is more exact logically, yes. But it may be 
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wrong. Exactness in this sense does not imply correctness. 
I wonder if I have answered your question, sir. 
Questioner: You say that the deductive method could 
then be used to get further results; but it gives nothing 
new, for no new knowledge is accumulated. 
Margenau: This depends upon what you mean by 
"nothing new." If you mean nothing nonanalytic, nothing 
synthetic, can come out of it, then of course I should 
agree. But, you know, new things do emerge analytically 
sometimes. Look at the theory of numbers. The finding of 
all the prime numbers is a purely analytic pursuit. But 
there's a lot of novelty in finding the million and seventh 
prime number. \Ve must not confuse here novelty with 
analyticity. If you mean analyticity, then what you say is 
in my opinion correct. But if you mean novelty in the 
manner of surprise, of unexpectedness, in the manner of 
not having been able to predict it simply, then of course 
the analytic process, the deductive process, can lead to 
novelty. You may have a nasty differential equation which 
may take years to solve; and some day a mathematician 
succeeds in finding its solution. What he has done is to 
establish an a1.-alytic consequence of the differential equa­
tion according to its boundary conditions, or initial condi­
tions, and so forth. And yet there is a great deal of novelty 
in that solution. 
Griinbaum: Contrary to Jeans, God is not a pure mathe­
matician-that is the one thing He is utterly bored by. 
Jeans said that God is a pure mathematician. \Vhat I am 
trying to say is, since God would presumably see all the 
implications of any postulate system, He would not be 
spending His time proving theorems. 
[Question from floor (not intelligible in the recording).J 
Margenau: Professor Bridgman has been accused by the 
questioner of having said somewhere that all knowledge. 
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mathematical and otherwise, is ultimately empirical, that 
geometry is a branch of physics. Professor Bridgman has 
been asked to reply. 
Bridgman: I never said that. I certainly recognize two 
kinds of geometry. There is a geometry of postulates, and 
a geometry of physical measurement. 
Questioner: I still do not understand that Professor 
Margenau could believe that something could be derived 
from a set of axioms that is not already known. 
Margenau: I am being accused of inconsistency in claim­
ing that by using analytic procedures, that is, by deductive 
procedures, one can deduce something, one can obtain 
something, that is not already known. Now this is so easy 
an allegation to come back at that I fear I must have 
misunderstood the point of the question. Let me give you, 
very briefly, the example I chose before-a differential 
equation has solutions, and these solutions certainly are 
not known in the beginning. The process of solving the 
differential equation is often not a cut-and-dried affair, it 
often relies on human ingenuity; there may be no general 
rules for doing this. The process of solving this equation 
. certainly has all the aspects of originality, and the results 
have all the earmarks of novelty. And certainly the solution 
of the differential equation is not known in the beginning. 
It is implied logically, yes. But it is not known. This is 
the simple remark I would make in answer to your ques­
tion, but forgive me if I misunderstood it. 
Notes 
2. ls "Physical Knowledge" Limited by Its Quantitative
Approach to Reality? 
FRANK J. COLLINGWOOD 
L For other interpretations, cf. B. L. Van Der Waerden, Science Awak­
ening, p. 125; and O. Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity, pp. 
143-144. 
2. In the famous illustration by means of the divided line Plato gives
in a very concise form his view of the role that mathematia can play in 
advancing human knowledge of the truth. The line is divided once into 
two segments, one representing visible things, the other representing 
intelligible things. The first segment is then divided into two parts, one 
representing mere images such as shadows and reflections on water, the 
other representing trees, animals, and artifacts which are the models of the 
images. The segment representing intelligible things is divided into two 
parts, the first of which represents the realm which the soul investigates 
by treating as images the things represented in the second part of the 
segment representing visible things. This realm is the one in which the 
mathematician exercises his ingenuity. He makes use of visible forms and 
talks about them, but in truth he is thinking of the mathematicals of 
which the visible forms are but a likeness. "And do you know also that 
although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they 
are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of 
the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute 
diameter, and so on • • • the forms which they draw or make, and 
which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted 
by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things 
14!1 
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themselves which can only be seen with the eye of the mind." Republic,
VI, 510 C ff. 
3. Republic, VII. 525 B-C and 526 A-C. 
4. Republic, VII, 522 C -E and 526 D. Republic, VII, 531 C. But he
complains that these musicians fail to "ascend to generalized problems 
and the consideration of which numbers are inherently concordant and 
which not, and why in each case." Thus he criticizes them for failing 
to penetrate to the basic principles of number. 
5. Republic, VII, 522 C.
6. "It is by means of problems, then," said I, "as in the study of
geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the 
things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of 
astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural 
indwelling intelligence of the soul." Republic, VII, 530 C. Cf. the imme­
diately preceding part of the text for the censure of the astronomers 
of his time. Cf. the last part of the text in note 8 below, where the 
abstract mathematical formulas are seen as containing the concrete motions 
of the heavenly bodies. 
1. Socrates: For instance, were we to eliminate from all arts those of
numbering, measuring, and weighing, what would be left of any of them 
would, broadly speaking, amount to very little. Philebus, 55 E. Cf. also 
Epinomis, 977 C-E. 
8. "Thus," said I, "these sparks that paint the sky, since they are 
decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the
fairest and most exact of material things; but we must recognize that they 
fall far short of the truth, the movements, namely, of real speed and real 
slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one 
. another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain." Republic,
VII, 529 D-E. 
9. To the man who pursues his studies in the proper way all geo­
metrical constructions, all systems of numbers, all duly constituted 
melodic progressions, the single ordered scheme of all celestial revolutions, 
should disclose themselves, and disclose themselves they will, if as I say, 
a man pursues his studies aright with his mind's eye fixed on their single 
end. As such a man reflects, he will receive the revelation of a single 
bond of natural interconnection between all these problems. Epinomis,
991 E-992 A. 
10. Timaeus, 31 B-32 C.
1 I. Timaeus, 53 C-D.
12. Timaeus, 52 D-53 B.
13. Cf. Phaedo, 96 A ff., where Socrates tells how' in his youth he 
desired to know that part of philosophy called the investigation of 
nature, but in pursuing its questions his eyes grew blind to things that he 
seemed to know quite well, for example, that the growth of man is the 
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result of eating and drinking. Now he does not believe that he under­
stands the reason why one or anything else is destroyed, or generated, 
or is at all. 
14. Republic, 5ll D.
15. Physics, ii, 2, 194a7-12 (Oxford translation), and APo. I, 13, 78b37-
79a2. 
16. The following example of how geometry is used to prove propo­
sitions in optics is from Heath's Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford, 1949, 
p. 59. "The dependence of optics on geometry is seen in all books on
optics from Euclid's Optics onwards. Philoponus illustrates by the propo­
sitions 'Things seen from afar appear smaller, things seen near at hand
appear larger' (Euclid's Optics, Prop. 5).
"Suppose an object CD seen by an eye at A, so that AC, AD are the 
extreme 'visual rays,' as the Greeks called them. The object is therefore 
seen in the angle CAD. 
"Now suppose the eye moved nearer to the object, say to B; BC and 
BD are then the extreme 'visual rays.' 
A 
c "As B is within the triangle ACD, CB and DB 
are straight lines drawn from the ends of the base 
of a triangle to a point within the triangle. Hence 
(Euclid, I, 21), the straight lines CB, BD are together 
less than the straight lines CA, AD, but include a 
greater angle. Therefore the angle CBD is greater 
than the angle CAD. But (Euclid, Optics, Def. 4) 
'Things seen under a greater angle appear greater 
and under a lesser angle less.' Therefore from B the 
object CD appears greater than it does from A." 
17. Metaph., xi, 4, 106la29-106lb25.
18. Cf. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans­
lated by Philip P. Wiener, pp. 132 ff., for an excellent account of the 
approximative nature of all measurement. Cf. also the work mentioned 
in note 20 below, p. 275. 
19. Aristotle seems to have been aware of the approximative nature
of practical mathematics. "The minute accuracy of mathematics is not 
to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have 
no matter. Hence, its method is not that of natural science." [Metaph., ii, 
2 (995a 15-16).J I interpret this text as saying that absolute precision is 
characteristic of pure mathematics and is not to be demanded of any 
practical mathematical science. Contemporary physics is an example of 
such a practical mathematical science. 
This being so, it would logically follow that Aristotle would not make 
the mistake of conceiving speculative mathematics, the geometry codified 
by Euclid a half century after Aristotle's floruit, for example, as a science 
of actual quantities. "Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and 
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volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathe­
matics . .. now the mathematician, though he too treats of these. things 
[surfaces, volumes, etc.], nevertheless does not treat of them as the limits 
of a physical body; nor does he consider the attributes indicated as the 
attributes of such bodies. That is why he separates [abstracts] them; for 
in thought they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference, 
nor does any falsity result, if they are separated. . . . While Geometry 
investigates physical lines, but not qua physical, Optics investigates 
mathematical lines, but qua physical, not qua mathematical." [Physics, 
ii, 2 (l 93b25-194al0).] This text clearly indicates that a discussion of 
Euclidean versus non-Euclidean space would seem absurd to Aristotle, for 
the characteristics of the idealized space of plane geometry arc a result of 
abstracting from the actual dimensions of existing things. If one separates 
the notions of line, surface, and volume from mutable and moving things, 
he should not expect to find their characteristics as mutable and moving 
in his abstractions; nor should he hope to measure actual things by his 
abstractions. 
20. Philipp Frank, in his Philosophy of Science, contemns the act of 
"seeing" with the intellect as being essentially a pathway to self-delusion 
in a metaphysics quite divorced from physics. He fails to account, how­
ever, for the seeing with the intellect that has elaborated all mathematical 
systems and all theoretical systems of physics. In fact, there is no possibility 
of having any object of scientific knowledge until it is seen by the 
intellect as having some possibility of yielding certain knowledge of a 
universal kind. I take it that everyone agrees that what is seen by the 
sense of sight, being material, is essentially changeable and therefore 
not a fit object of scientific (true) knowledge. I think the Platonic-
Aristotelian disputation made perfectly evident the impossibility of having 
a true knowledge of the object of the sense of sight, precisely and only 
as an object of this sense. The stability that any object of scientific 
investigation has is given to it when it is conceptualized; considered in 
its state of material existence such an object is essentially mutable. 
3. Does Physical "Knowledge" Require A Priori or
Undemonstrable Presuppositions? 
HENRY MARGENAU 
I. Mainly through the researches of R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of 
Probability, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. 
2. P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1927. 
3. Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, New York, 1950. 
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4. l'aul Dcusscn, lHetaphysics, Macmillan and Company, London, 1894.
5. There are men who feel that previous illicit use has poisoned the
word metaphysical forever, and they prefer the term methodological. This 
is all right with me, provided that I am not required to ab,indon every 
word (e.g., force, action, energy) that has once suffered from grotesque 
interpretation. 
6. Philipp Frank, The hilidation of Scfrntific Theories, Tkanm Press,
Boston, 1954. 
7. Alfred Lande, American Journal of Physics, 108_. 891, 1957; Foun­
dations of Quantum Theon_. a Study in Continuity and Symmetry, Yale 
University Press, "'-Jew Haven, 1955. 
8. See A. Pap's incisive study, The A Priori in Physical Theory, King's
Crown Press, New York, 1946; also Semantics of Necessary Truth, Yale 
llniversity Press, New Haven. 1958. 
ll. I do not wish tu affirm this for all concepts of divine being; th<.'Ology,
in its clearer phases, does use methods of reasoning similar to those of 
science and thereby removes some of the strictures implied in this 
critique. 
4. Does "Knowlt·dge" of Physical Laws and Fllcls Have Rele1.•rmce
in the ;Horal and Social Realm.1 
GEORGE P. KLl'BERTANZ, S.J. 
I. His two major works are Prinripin Ethica (Cambridge Pniversity
Press, Cambridge, 1903) and Ethics (Oxford l:niversity Press, New York, 
1912). 
2. See, for example, th<: presentation of these arguments in rwn of
the better-known wntemporary British writers, R. M. Hare, The Lan­
guage of Morals (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952); P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics 
!Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1954). But this does not mean that the
analysts intend to sllpport egoism or hedonism: sec Nowell-Smith, ojJ. cit.,
pp. 133-lH, or the summary given by T. E. Hill, Contemporary Ethical
Theories (!\facmillan, New York, 1950), pp. 25-26.
The analysts arc not alone in condemning the naturalistic fal!a,y. Sec, 
for example, I'atrick Romanell, Toward a Critical Xaturulism (Mac­
millan, New York, 19!'i8), p. 63, and F. S. C. Northrop, "Cultural Values," 
in Anthropology Today, edited by A. L. Krocber (Unhersity of Chicago 
Press, Chitago. 195'1). 
3. See Nowell-Smith, ofJ. cit., pp. 75-91; Hare, op. cit., pp. 79-93;
J. 0. Urmson, Philo,ophical Analysis (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), p. 52.
I have not dealt with the Kantian a priori for several reasons. For
one thing, the arguments against intuitionism also count against a priori 
forms. For another, the Kantian ethic is formal and "empty"; as Max 
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Scheler pointed out, it is the material content that is important. Thirdly, 
the Kantian ethic is one of duty; it does not recognize the moral ideal, 
which is more inclusive than duty. 
4. See, among others, Romanell, op. cit.; Northrop, op. cit.; Alexander
Sesonske, 17alue and Obligation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1957); Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience 
(Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955): Morris Ginsberg, On the Diversity of 
Morals (Macmillan, New York, 1957); Abraham Edel, Ethical Judgment: 
The Use of Science in Ethics (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955) (his new 
book, with May Edel, Anthropology and Ethics [Charles C Thomas, 
Springfield, Ill., 1959], should be a further development of his ideas). 
5. Existentialist philosophers insist over and over that man has no
essence or nature. If this were meant literally, in the usual meaning of 
the words, there would be neither good nor evil; everything would be 
indifferent and arbitrary. But the existentialists also admit that there 
is an objective "human situation"; and, even in the most radical formu­
lation, there is a distinction between "authentic" and "inauthentic" acts. 
By the word essence, therefore, they mean "an enclosed and necessitated 
essence"; yet, if man is to be defined as consciousness and freedom, he 
does have a nature, though in a different sense from the nonhuman 
"objects" of the world. 
6. If, with Romanell, op. cit., p. 55, we were to define "scientific
method" as "the continuous commitment to base conclusions on evidence," 
an ethics proceeding in the way here described could justly be called a 
"scientific ethics." For a similar definition of "scientific," see also Harold 
K. Schilling, "Teaching Reciprocal Relations between Natural Science and
Religion," in Teacher Education and Religion (American Association of
Colleges for Teacher Education, Oneonta, N. Y., 1959), for whom the
term "may refer to the general method of intelligence which, in attempt­
ing to solve problems or answer qui;stions, proceeds logically, basing 
conclusions on evidence and avoiding bias and prejudice" (p. 261), and
compare the usage of James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951), pp. 42-62.
Yet this use of "scientific" is not to be altogether recommended, since 
the term science is commonly used in several senses; on this ambiguity 
and the possible misunderstandings that may arise from it, see Robert 
J. Henle, S.J .. "A Philosopher's Interpretation of Anthropology's Contri­
bution to the Understanding of Man," Anthropological Quarterly, 32,
29-31, 1959.
It should be noted that I am not here entering into the distinction
between the "knowledge of man as subject" and the "reduction of man to 
the status of an object" (alleged to be the necessary consequence of a 
scientific approach to man), so much insisted on by Gabriel Marcel and 
other existentialists. 
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7. On the contribution of anthropologists to a better knowledge of
man, and to a clearer delineation of the common needs and tendencies of 
man, see, for example, Robert Redfield, "Anthropology's Contribution to 
the Understanding of Man," Anthropological Quarterly, 32, 3-21, 1959; 
Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," and David Bidney, 
"The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," in Anthropology To­
day, edited by A. L. Kroeber (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953). 
See, also, George St. Hilaire, S.J., "Cultural Relativism and Primitive Eth­
ics," The Modern Schoolman, 36, 179-195, 1959. 
Since writing this paper, I have had the opportunity to read Professor 
Bridgman's latest book, The Way Things Are. Professor Bridgman says, 
"There is something unique back of such a code [that is, a public code] 
which to a certain extent determines it, independent of the particular cul­
ture, namely, the traits which all human beings in all cultures have in 
common and which condition the things which any human being will find 
desirable. . . . From this point of view the attempts of anthropologists 
and humanists to find a universal basis for human morals have a justifica­
tion in nowise tainted by metaphysics." (Harvard University Press, Cam­
bridge, 1959, p. 267.) 
Remarkably similar conclusions are being reached by a number of 
psychiatrists, who point out the destructive effects of the denial or per­
version of the basic tendencies of man. 
8. Readers familiar with Aristotelian or Thomistic philosophy will
recognize that this approach is only a partial analysis of the goal-directed­
ness ("finality") of human nature. I have avoided the more common ter­
minology, partly because it is often misunderstood, partly because in the 
limitations of the space allotted to me I would not be able to present 
adequately the entire argument from "finality." On this point, an inter­
ested reader can profitably consult two excellent articles by John Wild, 
"Tendency: The Ontological Ground of Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, 49, 
468-472, 1952, and "Nature Law and Modern Ethical Theory," Ethics, 63,
1-13, 1952.
9. On the notion of "the reasonable" and the various ways in which it 
is determined, see Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and the 
Natural Law," in Origins of the Natural Law Tradition, edited by Arthur 
L. Harding (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1954), pp. 26-46. 
10. "What is morally good" includes more than "what is of obligation."
Once the basic meaning of "moral good" has been established, positive 
obligation can be found by means of a further specification. The argument 
would be developed, as I see it, along the following lines. Nature is dy­
namically orientated, and this orientation is discovered through man's 
natural tendencies. Moreover, one's own nature is a given in which reason 
itself is contained. Practical reason proceeds from goals whose suitability 
("fittingness") for man is within limits determined for nian. Therefore, 
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man's judgments are found to be directed. Now, in the course of practical 
reasoning, some actions (means) are found to be compatible with the 
natural goals without being a sine qua non of them; and in this case we 
find moral good desirable and ideal but not necessary. Other actions, how­
ever, are found to be so related to the goals that the latter cannot be 
seriously striven for without the former: in this case, there is obligation. 
Finally, when man realizes that there is a moral (or, practical) absolute to 
which he is directed, and that he is responsible to a personal higher being, 
then moral obligation is experienced in its fullest sense. 
IL According to the terminology I am using, "facts" are the "things 
existing in space and time, and their relations" (cf. Morris R.. Cohen and 
Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method [Harcourt, 
Brace, New York, 1934], pp. 217-219), or the events which occur (have 
occurred, will occur), as well as the propositions directly describing them. 
"Laws" are "generalizations which assert invariable sequence, or conjunc­
tion, or functional relationships between relatively directly observable or 
measurable magnitudes" (cf. Cohen and Nagel, loc. cit., and Herbert 
Feig!, "Some Remarks on the Meaning of Scientific Explanation," in Read­
ings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Herbert Feig! and Wilfrid Sellars 
[Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949], pp. 511-512). "Theories" are 
higher-level generalizations (Feigl, loc. cit.) which consist of assumptions 
to interpret laws and facts; they constitute the hypotheticodeductive mo­
ment in science (F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the 
Humanities [Macmillan, New York, 1947], pp. 59-75); they are "constructs" 
(Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality [McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1950], pp. 54-74), which take the place for the scientist for real in• 
trinsic natures that he cannot directly grasp but only attains by a mixed 
experiential and rational process, the "empiriological method" (Jacques 
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, translated under the supervision of 
Gerald B. Phelan [Scribner's, New York, 1959], pp. 21-67, 202-213). Theory, 
therefore, is the distinctive and characteristic element in modern science. 
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